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ABSTRACT
Uncertainty about the future is a key variable in any strategic planning activity.
Developing scenarios is a way to address such uncertainty in an explicit and
structured manner. This thesis intends to show how scenario-based planning
can be used in regional strategic transportation planning. The inherent
complexity of strategic planning efforts for regional transportation systems is
characterized and studied in three "contexts". The first context deals with the
strategic planning process itself. The second one addresses the relationship
between transportation and economic development/competitive advantage. The
third context involves the relationship between public and private organizations
in transportation planning. The thesis shows that scenarios integrate and
address the major concerns identified in the study of these contexts.
The concept of scenario is clarified and its role as a tool for making robust
decisions and broadening decision-makers' perspective is emphasized. A few
examples of earlier scenario exercises undertaken in different environments and
for different purposes are presented. The scenario methodology and its
underlying theory are studied.
The province of Mendoza, Argentina is introduced as a developing region
interested in using transportation to support its socioeconomic development.
The main characteristics of the province and the most relevant issues affecting
this region and its transportation system are presented. The thesis builds on the
previous discussion to raise some lessons for the strategic planning process in
Mendoza. Finally, a step-by-step methodology is followed to illustrate the
scenario-building process for the Mendozan transportation system.
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Joseph M. Sussman
Title: JR East Professor
Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
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PREFACE
The research for this thesis was done within the framework of an MIT research
project called ReS/SITE: Regional Strategies for the Sustainable Intermodal
Transportation Enterprise. This project aspires to developing a new framework
for regional strategic transportation planning. It has identified various
shortcomings in that process through analysis of current planning efforts, and
has worked to establish a new process to overcome those weaknesses. It builds
broadly in the concepts of scenarios and regional architectures as fundamental
to this new generation of regional strategic transportation plans.
1. INTRODUCTION
An inherent and major variable in any planning effort is uncertainty about the
future. Developing scenarios is a way to address such uncertainty in an explicit
and structured manner. As it will be seen later in this work, it is important to
acknowledge that the final objective of this approach is not to provide a more
accurate forecast of future events, but to broaden our perceptions about the
future, which in turn will generate sounder decision-making.
The last 15 years have seen the growth of the literature on scenarios. Scenario-
based planning has been used in a variety of industries and by different kinds of
organizations. The conclusion in this work is that scenarios are a powerful tool
to be used in strategic planning processes, and can readily be applied in a
regional strategic transportation planning context.
1.1 MOTIVATION FOR THE THESIS
The overall purpose of the present thesis is to help to improve strategic regional
transportation planning. Thus, it has been deemed essential to relate the
methodology of scenarios to the main characteristics and shortcomings of these
planning activities. Previous research at MIT has highlighted several
fundamental areas that have not been properly addressed by most
transportation plans. Among them (Mufoz1 , 1997):
1 Muioz-Loustaunau, Abel Strategic Transportation Planning for Mendoza: Frameworks,
Concepts and Scenarios, CIT/MIT Joint Program, 1997
1. The inherent complexity of the context in which transportation
activities take place: the interaction of economic, social, political and
environmental subsystems in shaping the transportation system.
2. The relevance of economic growth considerations, and the increasing
economic competition among countries, regions and cities.
3. The need for a new public/private relationship for infrastructure
development and operation.
4. The need for human resource development schemes to prepare
professionals able to meet traditional and challenging new
transportation demands in a changing environment.
5. The growing importance of intermodalism.
6. The rapid pace of technological changes affecting transportation and
related areas, like information technology.
7. The need to balance between the requirements of passengers and
freight movements.
8. The critical need to link transportation objectives to the specific
strategic issues that a region may face.
Additionally, several authors have pointed out the existence of flaws common to
many current strategic planning activities beyond the field of transportation. An
essential concept that seems to be missing in most transportation planning
efforts: in today's dynamic environment, the relevance of strategy shifts from the
strategic plan to the strategic planning process itself. Detailed plans are not
flexible. The strategy generation process can be the way to provide flexibility in
planning, where flexibility is used here as the ability to cope with uncertainty and
respond to change.
1.2 THESIS OBJECTIVES
The following are the objectives for this work:
* To show how scenario building fits in the overall framework of modern
transportation strategic planning.
* To study the usefulness of scenarios to improve decision-making in
general and for transportation systems in particular, and present the
methodology in some detail.
* To show how scenarios can help the planning process in
public/private partnerships by becoming a tool for brainstorming,
creating consensus and facilitating this joint participation.
* To illustrate the use of the scenario-building technique through its
application to a specific regional transportation system.
* To show how scenarios can help overcome the shortcomings in
current regional strategic transportation planning.
1.3 THESIS STRUCTURE
Based on the motivation and objectives for this work, the thesis has been
structured in three major pieces. A brief description of these parts and the
chapters that form them follows:
I. The framework for scenarios
A significant effort has been made to present some of the most important
characteristics of the environment in which the development of scenarios for
transportation systems is likely to take place. Figure 1.1 portrays the three
"contexts" that define this environment.
Chapter 2 deals with the topic of strategic planning from the perspectives of
planning and strategy. . It reviews the works of different authors who clarify the
structure of this process, provide a classification of planning schools and
highlight some of the common flaws that exist in current strategic planning
practices.
Figure 1.1
The Framework for Scenarios
Chapter 3 presents two major elements of the regional transportation context.
First, the relationship between transportation and economic development is
visited. Then the increasing competition that regions and nations face in the
global economy is also addressed. The chapter also reviews the concepts of
competitive strategy put forward by Prof. Michael Porter.
In chapter 4 a particular organizational context is chosen to study the use of
scenarios: public/private partnerships. The chapter provides the background
and some reasons that explain the rising of these mixed associations and their
I ___ _ L
---- -~ -- - - --lls--------~--~_r- ----o~- - .r~ ---- --- ------ -- - -- I---- ~.~- u;--~---
relevance in regional development. Finally, we focus on the activities of these
partnerships in the infrastructure and transportation fields.
II. The Methodology.
After defining the environment, we introduce the concept and methodology of
scenarios. Chapter 5 shows how scenarios constitute a tool that can integrate
the contexts of strategic planning, regional transportation and public/private
partnerships. The chapter also shows how scenarios can help to improve
strategic planning for transportation by solving some of the problems and
limitations previously identified in the above three contexts (strategic planning,
regional transportation and the public/private partnerships).
Chapter 6 goes deeper into the methodology and presents the underlying theory
and structure of scenarios and the principles and practice of scenario-based
planning. Several methodologies for building scenarios are also reviewed and
one is chosen for the application part of the thesis.
II. The Application.
In Chapter 7 the province of Mendoza in Argentina is introduced as a region that
can benefit from the development of scenarios for its transportation system. In
Chapter 8 an application of the scenario technique is undertaken. A step-by-
step methodology is followed to illustrate the scenario-building process for
Mendoza.
Finally, Chapter 9 closes the thesis with the conclusions and suggestions for
further research.
1.4 A NOTE FOR THE READER
The breadth covered by the framework part of this work is intended to provide
the reader with an appropriate background for the study of scenarios for
transportation. A reader that is already knowledgeable of these topics and is
mainly interested in the use of scenarios might prefer to go directly to the
Methodology and Application parts of the thesis.
2. THE STRATEGIC PLANNING CONTEXT
2.1 ABOUT "PLANNING", "STRATEGY" AND "STRATEGIC
PLANNING"
A review of current business literature will yield a long list of books, articles and
papers whose titles include the words "planning", "strategy" and of course
"strategic planning". The practice of strategic planning is regarded as a symbol
of good management in both private and public organizations.
The idea of a structured approach to deal with the present and future
environment of an organization in order to achieve its goals is an appealing one.
Different thinkers have proposed different ways to accomplish this task and
accordingly we can find several schools of planning.
The popularization of the strategic planning literature has been accompanied
with the usage of different meanings for the terms "planning" and "strategy"
which may be the cause of some confusion. Prof. Henry Mintzberg2 (1994)
presents some of these definitions and moves gradually toward a richer notion of
"planning" and "strategy". In the following two sections, we review his work on
this matter and highlight the basic elements of these concepts.
2.1.1 FOUR BASIC ELEMENTS OF PLANNING
Figure 2.1 depicts four basic elements in Mintzberg's analysis. The simplest
notion of planning is to think about the future, and in a more proactive view,
planning implies taking action to obtain the desired results. We perceive also a
decision-making element of planning: essentially it is necessary to choose
2 Mintzberg, Henry, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning. The Free Press ed., 1994
among different alternatives. Here it is important to remember that
organizations3 perform different activities in order to deliver their output -
products or services- from a set of input resources. For instance, we can think
of a company with three different departments: production, financing, and
marketing. Different activities involve different types of decisions that must be
confronted simultaneously by organizations. While decisions move at a different
pace, making coordination harder, organizations do usually integrate all relevant
decisions at a certain point in time. The development or approval of any plan
brings together different decisions to be confronted simultaneously (Mintzberg4,
1994).
Figure 2.1
Four Basic Elements of Planning
The identification of this need for integration provides the starting point to build a
more comprehensive planning concept. To develop an integral system of
decisions, the planning effort must address the relationships existing among this
3 Unless otherwise specified, "organization(s)" will be used regardless of their public or private
sector character.
set of resolutions. When planning starts to deal with the relations and
interdependence of an organization's decisions, it has entered the domain of
strategy5 . The awareness of such a systemic nature is central to the study and
practice of decision-making, planning and strategy in today's organizations. We
will discuss this topic further when reviewing Prof. James Quinn's hierarchy of
strategic subsystems in section 2.5.5 and Prof. Michael Porter's strategic fit in
section 3.3.4.
The third and fourth elements of Figure 2.1 are related to the organizational
context of planning. According to Mintzberg, formalization is a key component.
The planning process must be formalized within the organization to
"..decompose,... articulate, and especially.., rationalize the processes by
which decisions are made and integrated in organizations." 6
The outcome of planning must be articulated as an integrated system of
decisions. That is, planning should result in a clear statement of the system of
decisions in the organization: what are the most relevant decisions? Is there a
relationship between the different decisions? How will decision X be affected by
other resolutions?
2.1.2 SOME PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGY
Hax and Majluf 7 (1991) state that most works on strategy undertaken during the
last few decades have emphasized only a single perspective on this complex
concept. These two authors provide a comprehensive review of the "various
4 Ibid. 2
s Ibid. 2
6 Ibid. 2, p13
7 Hax, Arnoldo C., and Nicholas S. Majluf. The Strategy Concept and Process: A Pragmatic
Approach. Prentice Hall, 1991
dimensions of strategy" some of which are also discussed by Mintzberg8 as
follows:
Strategy as position or strategy as perspective
Some authors have shaped a meaning for strategy, namely to find the position in
which the organization can make better use of their advantages and avoid its
weaknesses. Others have emphasized the way in which the activities are
performed, i.e., the perspective of the organization. These two views differ in the
focus of their analysis: the external context of the organizations (position), or the
internal one (perspective).
Strategy as a plan vs. strategy as a pattern
Strategy can be seen as a tool that leads the organization's activity, or
conversely as a result of a behavior pattern over time. In the first view, strategy
plays a proactive role, guiding the organization's actions in an intentional and
controlled way. In the second one, the actions define the shape of the realized
strategy. If a corporation conducts itself in a certain manner, we think of such
behavior as its strategy.
The discussion of these two perspectives identifies the existence of different
forms of strategy. Figure 2.2 taken from Mintzberg9 is helpful to explain this.
Generally, after a deliberation process, some of the intended strategy is dropped
out (unrealized strategy), while the rest -deliberated strategy- proceeds to form
part of the realized strategy. The other element of the realized strategy, which is
generally not explicitly recognized in current planning literature is the emergent
strategy i.e., a set of strategic actions that are taken in response to unexpected
events. The importance of Figure 2.2 is that it highlights the fact that in the real
world strategies are a mix of previously deliberated decisions and emergent
8 Ibid. 2
9 Ibid. 2, p.24
determinations. While deliberated strategies are formulated in advance,
emergent strategies are formed to respond accordingly to pressing needs.
Intended strategy
Deliberated strategy
Unrealized
strategy :
Emergent strategy
Figure 2.2
Different Forms of Strategy
(Mintzberg 9, 1994)
2.1.3 AND... A DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC PLANNING
It seems appropriate to suggest that the concept of strategic planning should
integrate some of the elements and perspectives of planning and strategy
discussed above. Hence, strategic planning can be thought as a formalized
process to think about the future and whose result must be articulated as the
integrated system of high-order decisions that will lead an organization's
activities. This broad definition will be sufficient for the purposes of this work.
The following points are worthwhile to be noted:
23
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1. The above definition assumes the leading and control roles of strategy
and planning.
2. If we accept Mintzberg's different forms of strategy -and this thesis
does so- strategic planning has to face the existence of emergent
strategies, which are the result of unexpected events. Therefore it is
not possible to formulate and deliberate them in advance; they must
be generated after such events have occurred.
3. It is important to note that regardless of their emergent or deliberated
character, strategies are a form of decisions. A strategy is a high-
order determination on how to better address the elements present in
the external and internal environment of an organization. Therefore,
strategy-making is basically decision-making.
The question that arises at this point is: how can strategic planning help
organizations cope with uncertainty, and provide a framework for integrating
current strategies with some others that may or may not be formed in the future?
And how can this be done in the context of regional transportation systems?
Before answering these questions, it is necessary to examine the nature and
structure of strategic planning in general and strategic planning for regional
transportation systems in particular. The rest of chapter 2 and chapter 3 will be
devoted to this task.
2.1.4 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC PLANNING
The business literature often portrays strategic planning as a subsystem of a
larger structure: the strategic management system of any organization. Morrison
and Wilson1o (1996) have proposed a simplified model of strategic management
10 Morrison, James L., and lan Wilson. The Strategic Management Response to the Challenge
of Global Change. Taken from http://sunsite.unc.edu/horizon/welcome/Scenariowksp.html;
also published in: Future Vision, Ideas, Insights, and Strategies. Howard Didsbury ed.
Bethesda, MD: The World Future Society, 1996
that is presented in Figure 2.3. The blocks in Figure 2.3 represent the six basic
elements of strategic management identified by these authors: environmental
analysis, organizational assessment, strategic direction, strategic plans,
implementation and performance evaluation. In this model, the strategic
planning subsystem in this model encompasses the first four blocs.
Figure 2.3
Strategic Planning and Strategic Management
(adapted from Morrison and Wilson", 1996)
2.2 INSIDE THE STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS
2.2.1 THE STRUCTURE OF STRATEGIC PLANNING
Another important contribution of Prof. Mintzberg is a clarification of the structure
of current strategic planning activities by noting the differences between the two
25
" Ibid. 10
major constituents of this process -strategic thinking and strategic
formalization- (Mintzbergl 2, 1994):
a) Strategic thinking
This is the part of the process where individuals and organizations actually make
strategy, and can occur in the form of strategy formulation, or strategy formation,
depending if they can be considered deliberated or emergent strategies. There
are two phases in strategic thinking: the analysis of the external environment
and internal conditions of the organization (first two blocs in Figure 2.3), and the
strategy formulation/formation (represented by the third bloc in Figure 2.3).
b) Strategic Formalization
Also referred as "strategic programming", in this stage the developed strategy is
transformed into a set of procedures that can be implemented in a
human/institutional system. This stage is represented by the fourth box of
Figure 2.3. Three major steps are required to perform strategic formalization:
1. Codification. A strategy is formulated/formed as a rich mental picture,
but then must be clarified and articulated in concrete terms that can be
expressed to the people in the organization.
2. Elaboration. The strategy must be elaborated, i.e., analyze the
consequences within the organization and design the plans and
programs that are required for its deployment.
3. Conversion. Implementation of a major new strategy will affect the
daily activities of any organization. The objectives of each unit in the
organization's structure will need to be reconsidered, as will be the
allocation of resources and the usefulness of internal policies and
procedures.
12 Ibid. 2
The previous structure of strategic planning implies that strategies are not the
result of planning, but exactly the opposite -its origin. While Mintzberg's model
depicts the implementation of strategies outside the domain of strategic thinking,
implementation concerns must be addressed as part of this process. Strategy-
makers should preview the environment to be faced during implementation. This
exercise can show a strategy that would be particularly difficult to implement and
actually reshape the decisions on which strategy to pursue.
This thesis is mostly interested in the strategic thinking stage of the process, and
therefore will emphasize the strategy making process of strategic planning.
2.2.2 THE PRESENCE OF UNCERTAINTY
Because the nature of strategic planning involves thinking about the future,
uncertainty is always an issue. We can not know with certainty how the future
will look, but in order to perform strategic planning we must assume the future
conditions of the environment in which organizations or investments will perform.
And the results of planning depend heavily on the accuracy of such
assumptions.
A traditional approach to deal with this concern has been the design and use of
forecasting techniques and models. In spite of the complexity reached by the
state-of-the-art forecasting tools, our capacity to predict future events is severely
limited. Peter F. Druckerl 3 (1974) has stated that:
"Strategic planning is necessary precisely because we cannot forecast"
13 Drucker, Peter F. Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices. Harper & Row, 1974,
p124
The limitations of forecasting are reflected in the three basic alternatives of
forecasts commonly used in project evaluation: low, medium, and high figures.
The medium values are generally labeled "realistic" estimates, and depending
on if high or low numbers are desirable or not, these figures are attributed an
"optimistic" and "pessimistic " character. The main problem with these
approaches is that they do not explicitly address the level of uncertainty faced by
organizations.
In an article in the Harvard Business Review, Courtney et a114 (1997) propose
the existence of the following different levels of uncertainty:
* Level 1: The future is clear enough for traditional forecasting techniques to
predict the future with sufficient precision.
* Level 2: There are few feasible futures that can unfold from the present and
they can be clearly defined as discrete alternatives. A typical example of this
case takes place when the occurrence or not of a specific event will affect the
development of future events.
* Level 3: There is an entire range of feasible futures instead of a discrete set
of outcomes.
* Level 4: The future is so unpredictable that not even the range of feasible
outcomes can be identified.
The above classification recognizes that while we can not predict the future, it is
true that some parts of it can be foreseen. There are stable trends as
demographics, and characteristics of the social or institutional context that we
know will not change dramatically even in the long term. Of course, as we move
further into long-term forecasts, the uncertainty is stronger and becomes the
14 Courtney, Hugh, Jane Kirkland and Patrick Viguerie. Strategy Under Uncertainty. Harvard
Business Review. November-December 1997, p67-79
driving force of the future state of things. Figure 2.4 taken from Mahaffie 15
(1995) gives an idea on the reliability of forecasts for different trends and
changes.
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Figure 2.4
Relative Reliability of Forecast for Different Trends
(Mahaffiel5, 1995)
15 Mahaffie, John B. Why Forecasts Fail. American Demographics, Vol. 17, No. 3, p.36
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2.2.3 THE ISSUE OF FLEXIBILITY IN STRATEGIC PLANNING
Because organizations must recognize the presence of uncertainty in the future,
flexibility in strategic planning is highly regarded. It is common to read and hear
about the importance of making "flexible plans", which can keep leading the
activities of an organization after a change in its environment has occurred.
Nevertheless Mintzberg argues that the concept of a "flexible plan" is essentially
a contradiction (Mintzberg 6, 1994): plans are aimed to direct, coordinate and
control the activities of the organization. In doing so, they draw a path that has
to be followed within established boundaries, and therefore, they actually limit
the flexibility to act. The more detailed the plans are, the more inflexible they
become. As a result, only broad and general plans can be flexible (Quinnl7
1980a).
In a parallel to plans, when a strategy is formulated in detail it becomes a strong
commitment that will be difficult to change. Detailed strategies are too inflexible
-an undesirable characteristic when facing an uncertain future. If we want
flexible strategies then they should be general enough to allow change.
The problem is of course that organizations face a multitude of specific needs in
specific contexts, which requires specific solutions. Because a broad strategy is
not likely to perform adequately in these cases a tradeoff between flexibility for
the future and efficacy in the present arises. Not surprisingly the tradeoff has
been usually been resolved in favor of efficacy in the current operation.
The perception of an increasing dynamism in today's environment has motivated
the search for alternative ways to deal with this concern. If we pursue the idea
16 Ibid. 2
17 Quinn, James B. Strategies for Change: Logical Incrementalism. Richard D. Irwin ed., 1980
of broadness and generality of plans, we know that at some point detailed plans
will be required to address some issues in a specific way. The usefulness of
these approaches will greatly depend on the organization ability to switch to
"specific mode" in a timely manner when new information has arisen. While we
still need to review some additional concepts to perceive more clearly the issue
of flexibility -specifically Prof. Quinn's discussion on specific and general goals
in planning- we can start using some of the ideas we have reviewed so far.
First of all, let us clarify the meaning of the term "flexibility" in the context of
planning: flexibility is used here as the ability to cope with uncertainty by
responding promptly to change. Now, in Figure 2.2 we see that in the strategy
context the response to a change in the environment takes the form of
generation of emergent strategies. Mintzberg's forms of strategies reminds us
that regardless of broad and specific plans, the real source of flexibility is the
capacity of the organization to react in the presence of changing circumstances.
The ability to generate emergent strategies is a reflection of the flexibility built into
organizations. The search for a flexible strategy therefore requires us to deal
explicitly with these emergent strategies: the way they are formed and how can
this process be improved.
A critical observation: the provision of flexibility takes place in the strategic
planning process, not in the plans! In today's dynamic environment, the
emphasis in strategy shifts from the strategic plan to the strategic planning
process itself. And the stage of strategy generation-or strategic thinking-
seems to be the appropriate period in which flexibility should be built into the
planning process.
A related finding: this provision of flexibility occurs through the human resources
of the organization. While the concept of "strategic planning process" is helpful,
it is only a conceptual construct. The foundation of this process is the people
that participate on it. The resulting argument is that the efforts oriented to
improve the strategic planning process should deal with the development of the
organization's human resources.
2.3 A CRITIQUE OF CURRENT STRATEGIC PLANNING PRACTICES
Several authors have pointed out the existence of flaws common to many current
strategic planning practices. These flaws have been identified both in the
strategy and in the planning literature. It is argued that strategic planning, as it
is conducted in most organizations, has lost its role of strategy formulation,
becoming more a strategy implementation device, or an activity oriented to
improve operational effectiveness. In what follows, we review some of these
critiques.
2.3.1 FROM THE PLANNING SIDE
In his book "The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning", Prof. Henry Mintzberg18
highlights the most common problems occurring in current strategic planning
activities. For the interested reader, Appendix A presents what Mintzberg has
called the "fundamental fallacies of strategic planning", which according to him
help to explain the presence of the following faults:
Strategic planning in most organizations has an excessive emphasis on
implementation and scheduling of procedures, without accounting for what is
supposed to be the object of the process: the generation of the strategies.
Prof. Mintzberg goes farther by asserting that because of its normative
function, formalization-oriented planning can become a force that inhibits
strategic thinking.
18 Ibid. 2
* Some models of strategic planning propose the detachment of top executives
from daily activities in order to concentrate in the formulation of the
organization's strategies, and restrict the participation of the remaining
personnel to the implementation tasks. These approaches assume that the
information required by the "strategic thinkers" can be conveniently provided
with formal means of communication. But these usually carry only a fraction
of the knowledge generated in an organization. In fact, many significant
pieces of information useful for strategy-making do not flow through the
formal channels. As a result, people isolated in an "ivory tower" will miss
essential data, and therefore are likely to generate inappropriate strategies.
* Detachment between strategy formulation and daily operations also raises
the issue of commitment. There is a weak incentive to support a strategy
developed by someone else, and on the other hand, strategy-makers' interest
in their output may be lowered by the fact that they will not be responsible for
the application of their ideas. The importance of this issue is stressed by
Drucker19 (1974) in the context of plans:
'The distinction that marks a plan capable of producing results is the
commitment of key people to work on specific tasks. The test of a plan is
whether management actually commits resources to action which will bring
results in the future."
* The rigidity of the most organizations' strategic planning structures assumes
that a creative innovation-based process like strategy-making can be
performed by a system as efficiently as is done by individuals. The
formalization of strategic planning eases implementation of strategy, but a
formal operational system can not substitute for the intuitive/creative process
by which strategy is generated in the human mind. The fundamental problem
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is in the very nature of planning -an analytical process that breaks down a
problem in its parts- while the basic tool of strategic thinking is precisely the
opposite skill: synthesis. Breaking down elements into their pieces allows
formal planning to manage larger amounts of information, and study in detail
the characteristic of each subsystem. But the final and central activity is to
integrate those pieces into a comprehensive whole, a system of strategies.
2.3.2 FROM THE STRATEGY SIDE
In an update on his corporate framework of competitive strategy, Prof. Michael
Porter" (1996) points out that organizations have usually failed to generate their
own strategies because of the following basic pitfalls:
* Strategy has been confounded with "operational effectiveness", and therefore
management and control tools have supplanted organizations' strategy.
Porter points out that while both operational effectiveness and strategy are
necessary for success, the ways they improve performance are essentially
different. Operational effectiveness means performing a set of similar
activities better than rivals do. Strategy is chosen to perform different
activities from the competition's, or performing similar activities in different
ways than competitors do.
* Because of the limitation of resources and the incompatibility of certain
activities, the strategic planning process involves choosing between
tradeoffs. Current thinking regards the presence of tradeoffs as a negative
characteristic that should be avoided. But to arrive to a sustainable strategy,
organizations must decide among these tradeoffs instead of avoiding them.
20 Porter Michael E. What is Strategy? Harvard Business Review, November-December 1996,
p 61-78
They actually enable the existence of diverse strategies. Porter"2 goes
farther by asserting that:
"Strategy is making tradeoffs in competing. The essence of strategy is
choosing what not to do. Without tradeoffs, there would be no need for
choice and thus no need for strategy."
2.4 THREE CORE SCHOOLS OF STRATEGIC PLANNING
Van der Heijden22 (1996) maps all the approaches to planning that have been
proposed so far on to three core "paradigms" in planning:
* The rationalist (or formal) school
* The evolutionist school
* The processualist school
The following sections present a brief summary of his work on this matter. While
at some level it characterizes the first two schools with a "black or white"
principle, it highlights their basic assumptions and proposals.
2.4.1 THE RATIONALIST SCHOOL
The rationalist school is represented by Prof. Porter's work and approaches
strategy-making with the idea that there is a right answer for the organizations'
needs. Therefore, the objective for the whole strategic effort is clear and simple
to state: to discover this solution and apply it. According to this school, the
major steps required to achieve this are (Van der Heijden23 , 1996 and Quinn24,
1989)
211bid. 20, p70
22 Van der Heijden, Kees. Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation. John Wiley & Sons,
1996
23 Ibid. 22
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1. Defining the organization's mission: the reason for its existence
* Defining utility for the organization
* Defining strategic objectives
2. SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) Analysis
* Evaluating the organization's internal situation (strengths and
weaknesses)
* Evaluating the organization's external environment
(opportunities, threats, competition)
* Identifying strategic options
3. Selecting the options that maximize the organization's utility
4. Proposing plans of actions to achieve this maximum utility
5. Implementing the plans
6. Monitoring and control performance
2.4.2 THE EVOLUTIONARY SCHOOL
The evolutionary school rose as a result of growing concerns that the rationalist
model did not consider important issues in a proper manner. It points out the
limitations of a precognitive approach for strategic planning in complex
organizations and dynamic environments. Different authors have studied real-
world strategic planning practices and concluded that the formal strategy
process of the rationalist model does not describe reality. The evolutionist
approach assumes that the complexity of today's environment hinders the ability
to control, predict and even fully analyze the subsystems involved in the
organization's performance. Therefore, the belief that organizations can
improve their odds by thinking and developing a suitable strategy is mere
illusion. In a dynamic environment, survival of organizations can be explained
only by their ability to react and adapt. Therefore managers should not devote
24 Quinn, James B. Strategic Change: "Logical Incrementalism" Sloan Management Review,
(SMR Classic Reprint) Summer of 1989, p45-60
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long hours to identify the solution that maximizes the organizations' utility under
current needs or with a set of assumptions that are deemed likely to occur. Van
der Heijden suggests that the evolutionist view considers this ability to adapt as
something random which can not be developed or controlled by the
organizations.
2.4.3 THE PROCESSUALIST SCHOOL
The processualist school states that an organization's success results from the
creativity, abstraction capacity and "brain power" of their people. And there is no
way to codify these characteristics into a formal planning structure. The focus is
made in the internal process by which the ideas are generated and how to
improve the ability of the organizations to engage in it. An essential element of
the processualist model is the idea of continual learning by linking action,
perception and thinking. Organizations should develop their skills of perception,
reflection, and action to become "learning organizations." In this context, a
reassessment of the role of planning itself has occurred. Arie de Geus 25 , former
head of planning of Shell has concisely expressed this new role:
"... we think of planning as learning and of corporate planning as
institutional learning."
But how do organizations learn? Let us first address briefly the issue of
individual learning. Every human being has a mental model of his/her own,
formed by a set of assumptions, generalizations and biases. They shape our
perception on how the world works and therefore influence our actions. Senge2 6
(1990) raises the following concern:
25 De Geus, A.P. Planning as Learning. Harvard Business Review, March-April 1988, p70.
26 Senge, Peter M. The Fifth Discipline: the Arts and Practice of the Learning Organizations,
Doubleday/Currency, 1990, p176.
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'The problem with mental models lie not whether they are right or wrong....
The problem with mental models arise when the models are tacit -when
they exist below the level of awareness."
Because we are sometimes unaware of our mental models, they remain
unexamined. And because our models are not examined, they remain
unchanged. In a changing world, it is then only a matter of time before our
unchanged mental models deviate from reality.
A prerequisite for distinctive organizational behavior -and learning- is the
alignment of the mental models of the different people that form part of it. For
organizational learning to happen, people must share their ideas, develop
theories and act accordingly in a joint effort. The alignment of the individuals'
mental models generates the consensus necessary for the common action. The
engagement in a "strategic conversation" process is required for organizational
learning. Such a process provides adequate space for joint understanding of the
environment, consensus and an alignment of ideas.
2.5 LOGICAL INCREMENTALISM
One of the authors that can be classified into the evolutionist school is Prof.
James B. Quinn. He introduced the concept of "logical incrementalism" in the
late 1970's with the publication of three articles in the Sloan Management
Review, which provided the base for a later book, "Strategies for Change:
Logical Incrementalism" 27.
The following sections review his work as a useful and valid model that explains
strategic planning in complex systems. Appendix B also presents a few
additional ideas about this view.
27 Ibid. 17
The driving force behind Quinn's research was his findings on how managers
create strategy in the context of real day-to-day performance. He stated that
instead of using the rationalist model for generating the organizations' objectives
and strategy, managers follow an integrative approach that moves incrementally
and that:
'The processes used to arrived at the total strategy are typically
fragmented, evolutionary, and largely intuitive." 28
Everything starts with rough objectives that are continuously clarified, reshaped
and narrowed, as additional information becomes available or consensus in the
organization is achieved.
The theory of logical incrementalism states that although extensive formal
planning is possible and desirable in some cases, its efficacy when dealing with
complex long-term issues is substantially diminished. The basic error is in
specifying certain parameters too early in the process. We can use always use
new information to refine the results of the planning effort and make incremental
improvements. Additionally, the long-term impacts of strategic decisions can not
be fully appreciated at the beginning of the process. Organizations need to
advance further in the planning before becoming fully aware of the aware of the
implications at stake.
2.5.1 THE STRATEGY-MAKING PROCESS
To make strategy, different organizations combine the analytical tools of the
rationalist school with some other elements defined by their internal informal
relations. The appropriate mix of formal and informal elements will vary in
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different organizations, and is a mix of four factors that will determine how the
strategic planning is carried out, i.e., the level of incrementalism in the process
(Quinn29, 1980):
1. Organizational culture
The culture prevailing in the organization is the first determinant of the
strategic planning process. A dynamic, entrepreneurial oriented
institution will undertake its planning activities differently than a more rigid
and bureaucratic one.
2. Nature of the environment and opposition
The environment in which an organization is immersed plays a significant
role in determining the type of process. When faced with a complex and
changing environment and/or strong competition, errors and
miscalculations can be extremely costly, and therefore the process tends
to move step by step. Before committing definitely to a certain position,
that posture is likely to be tested in a flexible way against the
environment, adjusting it incrementally according to the obtained results.
3. Organizational form and management style
Organizations whose structure incorporates groups with different
viewpoints, interests and certain level of operating independence will also
tend to plan incrementally. The simple reason is that since imposing
centralized solutions does not work here, consensus must be obtained
through negotiation. Key elements that relate to this point are the
influence that top-level management has in the decision making, and the
opposition/indifference thresholds for each negotiating party.
29 Ibid. 17
4. Time horizon and degree of control over events
The shorter the time horizon, the more rationalist the planning process
tends to be. Interestingly, the key factor is not the time horizon by itself,
but the degree of control that organizations have over events, i.e., how
much is the final outcome determined by the actions and influence of the
organization? Quinn found that even for long term horizons, planning
was still quite formal as long as the company had reasonable control over
the outcome. Furthermore, in the same organization and for the same
long-term period the type of planning will tend to differ for activities with
dissimilar degrees of control.
2.5.2 STRATEGIC GOALS: SPECIFIC VS. GENERAL
One of the principles of incrementalism that differs most from the formal school
of planning is related to the issue of goal definition. In contrast with the
accepted rationalist belief that goals should be specific, measurable and widely
publicized, the managers studied laid out a small number of goals, broadly
stated and rarely quantitatively measured. According to Quinn30 (1977), the main
reasons for this are
* Specific goals generate centralization in the organization and discourage
desirable participation of subordinates.
* Specific goals easily become the focus for extended opposition that
otherwise would develop in a fragmented way. Especially when dealing
with controversial issues, or performing in a highly politicized
environment, the use of broad objectives can help to keep the process
30 Quinn, James B. Strategic Goals: Process and Politics. Sloan Management Review, Fall of
1997, p21-37
moving forward, avoiding resistance to concentrate on such narrowly
defined points.
* After a specific goal has been announced it tends to be very difficult to
change the direction of the organization. The goal is rapidly identified
with the senior manager and the personnel endorsing it. In fact,
accepting change in the goal appears as the acknowledgment of a
mistake, and the image and decision-making ability of the managers may
be affected. In an institutional perspective, a continual change of goals is
regarded as a sign of unstable direction and lack of proper guidance.
Because of all these, general goals are a good source of flexibility in the
presence of uncertainty and limited information.
* Broad goals promote cohesion and identity by emphasizing widely
supported ideas and omitting at that time the specific discrepancies that
may exist among different views. More specific objectives can easily lose
support from certain stakeholders, creating conflicts in the first stages of
the strategic planning process. Clearly such details must be addressed
at some point, but the incremental theory argues consensus has
developed on a set of general objectives this is easier to do.
The use of specific goals has not been banished from logic incrementalism;
rather they are reserved for certain particular conditions, in which their specificity
is more appropriate. Selected specific goals can be announced at a proper time
to create the momentum and energy necessary to produce a desired change.
Proposing new specific goals is also a major statement of change from the past
by focusing on different issues and actions. This role is especially important
after an organization has suffered a crisis or major adversity. In addition to the
above, we must also note that at a certain point the use of more specific
objectives and plans will be necessary to continue the strategic planning
process.
2.5.3 LOGICAL INCREMENTALISM IN GOAL SETTING
The goal setting process requires active participation from many individuals to
establish an organization's goals. At the same time, people in charge of the
strategy formation need to keep control over the process. Although logical
incrementalism involves a large participatory effort, Quinn acknowledges that the
degree of cooperation can not feasibly reach a total consensus. Managers
generally provide the main lines of the goals and then promote staff intervention
and discussion to enrich the process and generate involvement at all levels. In
short, strategic goals do not arise from an analytical action as suggested in the
formal planning literature; rather they result from a process that moves step by
step and evolves continuously.
2.5.4 INCREMENTALISM AND STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION
Logical incrementalism provides also an alternative approach to implementing
strategic goals. According to Quinn31 (1980b), the broad steps for doing so are
Identify and address the main points of potential opposition and support.
Of great consequence is also to distinguish "indifference zones", which
are likely to face only moderate opposition and are potential compromise
points. The underlying principles are to search for win-win situations, get
the main players to support the objectives, and avoid alienating people as
long as possible.
31 Quinn, James B. Managing Strategic Change. Sloan Management Review, Summer of 1980,
p3-20
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* Increase the personnel's comfort levels with new ideas. Most people
perceive little known concepts as risky. Exposing managers to these
concepts in a previously planned step-by-step approach can ease natural
rejection and tension due to implementation of novel ideas, before actual
implementation takes place.
* Improve the organization's ability to cope with uncertainty. At the
beginning of the incremental planning process, the specifics of the task to
be undertaken are not well defined. Therefore, actions such as the
provision of flexibility, building reserve resources, and improving the
organization's reaction time are central to the implementation. These
actions include technology and environment scanning, developing a pool
of human resources in specific areas, or maintaining independent sources
of essential supplies.
After the path of the organization has become clearer, the following steps should
include:
* Generate "pockets of commitment" within the organization. The use of
team projects to study a particular issue of the strategy is a good way to
do this.
* Formalize those pockets of commitment to boost focus and consensus. A
common approach is the use of specific committees. Quinn notes that
through the choice of the committee's participants, its resources and
timing, its results can be largely influenced. These committees can also
aim to evaluate, balance, or neutralize opposition; to generate new
options; or to broaden support and commitment for a specific alternative.
Many organizations choose to empower someone particularly identified
with a view to lead the effort and on whom its success will depend.
2.5.5 DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY
Quinn32 (1980a) proposes that we should think of strategy as having four basic
dimensions:
1. The three essential elements of strategy
* Main objectives
* Guiding policies
* Major action sequences
2. A few key concepts and thrusts that provide focus, cohesion and
balance.
3. The presence of uncertainty
4. The need for a hierarchical subsystem of strategies
Each strategy must address efficiently its particular objectives
context. In addition they must be linked as integral elements
hierarchical system. The set of strategies must support each other,
must be properly aligned toward the major goals of the organization.
and
of a
they
We note that the hierarchical subsystem of strategies is analogous to
Mintzberg's integral system of decisions. As mentioned earlier in this chapter,
the importance of this systemic view in strategic planning can not be overstated.
Let us use a transportation example to clarify this fundamental principle. In the
next chapter we will review Prof. Porter's model of competitive strategy and we
will see that a regional competitive strategy and regional transportation strategic
planning are linked and can be thought as elements of an overall development
strategy for a particular region. We will also see that the competitive strategy
can lead planning and deployment of the transportation system in a region. It is
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clear that these systems -development strategy, competitive strategy, and
transportation strategy- are hierarchically linked. Figure 2.5 depicts this
hierarchy.
Figure 2.5
A hierarchy of regional strategies
In Figure 2.5, the development strategy occupies the top position in the
hierarchy. It is followed by the competitive strategy -which can be seen as a tool
to achieve the developmental goals- and then the transportation strategy -that
analogously is a tool to achieve the competitiveness goals. The dashed lines
represent the fact that there may be other components of the development and
competitive strategy. In the same way, the strategic planning for the
transportation system in the region is linked but in a higher level of hierarchy to
the road access system of the main localities within the region.
2.5.6 SUMMARY
In chapter 2 we have reviewed the main principles and elements of strategic
planning. We have also pointed out some of the approaches and flaws that are
identified in the works of different authors in the field. After discussing some of
the main issues involved in strategic planning for regional transportation
systems, chapter 3 will highlight some implications and lessons that our
discussion of generic strategic planning has in the context of regional
transportation.
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3. THE REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION CONTEXT
In the present chapter, some of the key changes and characteristics of current
socioeconomic systems will be reviewed. These systems create the context of
the strategic planning effort in transportation, which drives the definition of
objectives for the transportation system. As a result, the increasing relevance of
the features presented in the following sections is likely to reshape the provision
of transportation systems around the world. We will address only two major
components of this context: First, the relationship between transportation and
economic development, and then the increasing competition faced by regions in
the global economy. As part of this last issue, Prof. Michael Porter's framework
for competitive strategy will be also studied.
3.1 THE REGIONAL SCALE
At the beginning of 1998, the United Nations listed 185 independent countries as
Member States33. We think of these nations as different population units that
share essential elements as territory, language, economy, culture, institutions,
beliefs, and so on. And within most nations there are smaller units -regions-
that can be further differentiated by using additional characteristics.
The scope of this thesis is the regional unit. Some authors have highlighted the
increasing relevance of regionalism in today's world. Omhae34 (1995) states that
we are witnessing the arising of "region-states", enabled by the globalization of
trade, the rise of information technology and the dynamism of capital flows.
While the concept or region evokes a strong geographical component, physical
33 http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.htmI
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boundaries are becoming less important every day due to improvements in
communication and transportation systems. Rodriguez et a135, (1997) argue that
the shared elements that determined our traditional understanding of "region"
have lost relevance and a different characteristic has become the essence of a
region: common economic interests. Under this view, the members of a region
need not to be geographically linked or to share the same political/social
institutions.
Regardless of the traditional or the economic-based understanding of a region, it
is clear that the global economy has fostered competition among different
regions of the world. In the words of Rodriguez36:
'These regions recognize that global competition is at the heart of their
economic success or their failure. The aim of a 'competitive region' is to
offer its members access to low cost, quality goods; to provide low-cost
resources; and to foster development and regional prosperity. "
3.2 TRANSPORTATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
3.2.1 THE MOTIVATION FOR INVESTING IN TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
Transportation is not an end to itself and "does not occur in a vacuum."
Transportation systems are closely woven to the daily activities of the society
they serve. This relationship is dynamic by nature and works in both directions:
"Indeed, the transportation system will usually affect the way in which the
socioeconomic system grows and changes. And changes in the
34 Omhae, Kenichi. The End of The Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies. The Free
Press, 1995
35 Rodriguez, Daniel A., Abel Mufioz-Loustaunau, Todd Pendleton, and Joseph M. Sussman.
Regional ITS Architectures and the Competitive Region. Preprint CD/ROM, 77""h AnnualMeeting, Transportation Research Board, 1997
36 Ibid. 35, p2.
socioeconomic system will in tum call forth changes in the transportation
system." 37
The effort undertaken by different regions across the world to improve their
transportation systems is motivated by the developmental effects attributed to
transportation. It is known, intuitively and from past experience that investment
in transportation infrastructure has an important relationship with the economic
performance of a region. We also know that the economic effects of
transportation investments can vary dramatically from one case to another. Due
to the complexity of the problem, this intuitive relationship has not been
established in a straightforward manner. One approach to study this issue is to
review situations where the provision of infrastructure has yielded economic
benefits, and to abstract conclusions on the common characteristics identified.
A general agreement exists in the extreme conditions: the effect of transportation
infrastructure on the economy will be larger for areas where there are limited or
no previous routes, and will be smaller for well connected regions. (Sheppard3 8,
1989). These effects will also depend on the general condition of the economy
in the area under study. In general, the effects of new infrastructure in a
depressed economy will be mainly a redistribution of economic activity in the
region, with small or none aggregate economic growth.
A study undertaken at MIT under the supervision of Prof. Joseph Sussman
stresses the basic roles played by transportation in the economic activities
(Pendleton39 T., 1997):
37 Manheim, Marvin L. Fundamentals of Transportation Systems Analysis. Vol. 1: Basic
Concepts. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1979, p12.
38 Sheppard, Eric. Transportation and Economic Development: The Geographical Literature.
Minnesota Department of Transportation, Final Report, Appendix 1, 1989.
9 Pendleton, Todd. Toward Greater Integration of Economic Considerations into Strategic
Transportation Planning, Working Paper, MIT, 1997
1. Transportation sustains present economic activity.
The transportation system is a support and facilitating structure for the
flow of goods and people generated by existing economic activity. The
lack of adequate transport infrastructure will hinder the performance of
some industries, and will completely exclude the presence of others. The
key concern for the transportation system in this role is related to issues
of capacity and maintenance of the infrastructure. Transportation facilities
must be able to serve current flows without being incapacitated by
congestion. Timely investments are needed to avoid deterioration of its
infrastructure. In this role transportation generally seems to follow
economic development, actually "catching up" with the preceding growth
of traffic and economic activity in the region.
2. Transportation retains present economic activity
A natural trend generated by regional economic growth is the expansion
of industrial activities in the area. Regional output increases and so does
the need for inputs for the production process, resulting in higher
transportation utilization. This is also true from the view of passenger
transportation and the growing character of roadway traffic with the
increase of per capita income is well known. A regional transportation
system with inadequate capacity becomes a constraint to industry.
Industries simultaneously facing this constraint and the incentive to
expand due to the economic environment may move out from the region.
To retain economic activity, it is obvious that a transportation system can
not be planned exclusively to provide service for current traffic levels..
Although the concern is still the facility's capacity, the focus has shifted
from traffic demand prior to economic expansion to increased traffic levels
in the future. In this role, transportation investment happens before
additional economic growth: it does not only precede economic growth,
but it seems to function as a prerequisite for it:
"....infrastructure investment, more than most other types of
investment, creates conditions for future growth well into the long
run." 40
3. Transportation attracts new economic activity
In the global economy, regions compete among themselves to attract
resources to support its economic and social objectives. An important
share of these resources come from "outside" companies that relocate or
expand their operations to new locations. Of great relevance for these
organizations is the choice of location and here the condition of the
regional transportation system plays a third role. It must be remembered
though, that provision of efficient and well-maintained transport
infrastructure may not be enough to attract economic activities. Several
other factors and regional characteristics play an important role on
relocation/expansions decisions. According to some, while it is possible
to think in a transportation system designed to increase the attractiveness
of a region (recall our discussion about competitive advantage), measures
of accessibility that would enable to rank the results achieved are still not
satisfactory (Salvucci 41 , April 1998). Therefore, we can state only a broad
purpose of transportation in this role: transport investments must provide
an interconnected network that links the region with main markets and
suppliers. Again, in this role transportation precedes economic growth in
the region.
4. Transportation physically link regions to the global economy
We must recall from our discussion on competitive advantage that
globalization has enabled regions to participate and take advantage of
40 ---------------. Economic Returns from Transportation Investment. Eno Transportation
Foundation, Inc., Forum Proceedings, July, 1996
41 Salvucci, Frederick. Senior Lecturer at MIT and former Transportation Secretary of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Personal Communication. April 1998.
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opportunities all over the planet. In order to actually benefit from them,
regions must be linked to the rest of the world's markets and suppliers.
This fourth role of transportation is likely to occur before the increased
economic activity derived from the new opportunities can take place.
The four roles discussed above provide a framework to conceptually evaluate
the transportation system in a region. Figure 3.1 depicts the structure of such
framework. Because transportation should be a tool to achieve higher objectives,
its efficacy and "value" will depend on those objectives. If a region's primary
concern is to avoid the loss of production and employment, this will translate into
a higher relevance attributed to projects that improve the retaining ability of the
transport system.
"VALUE" OF THE
TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEM
ATTRACTOR
Figure 3.1
A Conceptual Framework for the Evaluation of
Regional Transportation Systems
(based on Pendleton 42, 1997)
42 Ibid. 39
3.2.2 THE IMPACTS OF TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
Vickerman43 (1991) states that there are three basic effects of transportation
investments in the economy of a region:
* Type A effect -corridor effect- in which the infrastructure does not
generates much impact in the region, and the traffic just passes by.
* Type B effect -crossroads effect- that improves the transportation link
from/to the region.
* Type C effect, which improves regional productivity by reducing the
transportation costs within the region.
Simon 44 (1996) states that there are four specific impacts of investments in
transportation infrastructure:
1. Impacts during construction.
These result from the effect of the initial investment to deploy the
infrastructure. The most evident direct effects take place in the hiring of
labor services, and purchase of equipment. Indirect effects in the region
can become equally important, as a consequence of interaction in the
economy. If companies and workers involved in the project spend their
share of the investment on goods and services produced in the region
and the investment comes from external sources to it, additional
employment and economic activity will be generated.
43 Vickerman, R.W. (editor). Infrastructure and Regional Development. Pion Limited, London,
1991.
44 Simon, O. The Economic Impact of Transport Infrastructure Provision: a Review of the
Evidence. Proceedings of the Institute of Civil Engineers: Transport. Volume 117, Issue 4.
November, 1996
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2. Increase of production in the medium and long term.
If the new infrastructure increases transportation efficiency, a reduction of
transportation costs will be generated. The effect of this reduction on the
overall production costs will vary depending on each particular industry.
Transportation has different incidence in the structure of costs for
manufactured goods, bulk commodities and perishable products. For
cases where transportation costs are an important part of the production
cost, the impact will be higher. An important consideration is that the
provision of improved infrastructure works in both directions: outside
companies may be able to reach the local market with reduced prices. If
regional productivity is dampened by factors others than transportation,
new investments can intensify the competition faced by local companies.
We can summarize this idea stating that the reduction of transportation
costs that benefit basically local producers rather than outside companies
will only happen when the lack of transportation infrastructure is a binding
constraint of production.
3. Value of property in and around the area.
In general, an improved transportation network will increase the value of
the property around the area. Industries prefer to locate in well-
connected regions to reduce their operating costs. For companies in the
service sector, this network also provides accessibility to the customers
upon which they rely to survive. This is generally also true for agricultural
land: better access to urban markets, to the rest of the country, or to the
international economy, tends to increase profitability and raise the value
of the land with it. In a recent study undertaken at MIT focusing on the
metropolitan area of San Juan, Puerto Rico, Daniel Freire45 (1998)
45 Freire, Daniel. The Potential Economic Development Opportunities of Tren Urbano. Master in
City Planning/Master of Science in Transportation Thesis. Department of Urban Studies and
Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 1998.
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highlights that density is a major variable in the effect that transportation
investments have in the economic development of urban and suburban
areas. Sheppard46 (1989) points out that industries heavily dependent on
transportation services prefer to locate near the terminal or major nodes
of the network (i.e. locations near a market, a supplier or a transshipment
point). For these companies:
...an improvement in the transportation network would tend to
reinforce the attractiveness of terminal locations if that
improvement tended to reduce the importance of per-mile relative
to terminal costs, but would favor intermediate locations if the
converse were true."
4. Technological Progress and Innovation.
Improving the transport links to a previously isolated region facilitates the
access of new technological products and services to these newly
connected areas. The first step to get an isolated community into the
computer age may well be to build the transport infrastructure that
assures a fast, reliable, and cheap distribution of the computer products
and services. Although additional investments are clearly required to
generate such technological impacts, transportation infrastructure
enables this progress.
3.2.3 MEASURING THE EVIDENCE: THE US INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM
Several studies have been carried out at the national scale in the US, dealing
with a macroeconomic approach to the Interstate Highway System. They have
related the investments to deploy this system with the economic performance of
industries. This has been done either by using a production function that
defines the output produced by industries for a specific mix of inputs, or a cost
function that indicates the change of the cost of production with the level of
46 Ibid. 38
output. In general, these studies show that the Interstate Highway System has
substantially improved productivity in the US. Nevertheless, there are important
differences in the rates of return yielded by these public works. Some of the
differences can be explained based on different methodologies, while some
others then result from statistical problems when handling aggregate data, or
simplifications in the models that do not reflect the structure of production and
transportation infrastructure with sufficient accuracy (USDOT, 47 1995).
As an example of these type of studies, the US Federal Highway Administration
uses the following three approaches (Binder and Smith48, 1996):
* Macroeconomic analysis, to study the magnitude of the impacts of
infrastructure at a regional and national level.
* Microeconomic industry analysis, to study these impacts from the
perspective of the industries. It uses logistics costs, level of service
variables, and econometric analysis to identify how that infrastructure
investment is transformed into private sector productivity
* Assessment of the highway system, to review the value of the
infrastructure based on the service provided rather than on the amount of
investment. It also studies the enhancement of the system's connectivity
yielded by a particular road.
A recent investigation by Prof. Ishaq Nadiri49 (1996) has overcome many of the
statistical limitations of previous research that intended to address the relation
between transportation and economic development. Prof. Nadiri's results
47 --------------. Transportation Investments and Economic Performance. Transportation Statistics
Annual Report, Chapter 7, USDOT, 1995
48 Binder, Susan and Theresa Smith. The Linkage between Transportation Infrastructure
Investment and Productivity: A U.S. Federal Research Perspective. In Infrastructure and the
Complexity of Economic Development, David F. Batten & Charlie Karlsson eds., 1996.
49 Nadiri, Ishaq, Highway Capital Infrastructure and Industry Productivity Growth. Executive
Summary, Draft Final Report, New York University, 1996
confirm that for the past forty years, public investment in highways in the U.S.
has yielded a significant positive economic return. An important additional result
obtained by this study, shows that increase in non-local road system (NLS)
capital stock (i.e., main or "interconnective" highways), yields a greater
economic return than an increase in total highway capital stock. Table 3.1,
summarizes the findings of this research (Nadiri,Y 1996 and Eno Transportation
Foundation5 l , 1996):
Table 3.1
.... . .  
Annual Rate of Return by Type of Investment
______ .__1950-59 1960-69 .1970-79 1980-89 1950-89
Total Highway 35% 35% 16% 10% 28%
Capital
Non Local Highway 48% 47% 24% 16% 34%
Capital
Private Capital 13% 14% 12% 11% 13%
The numbers in Table 3.1 seem to confirm our basics ideas on transportation
and economic growth: the rates of return yielded in the earlier years of the
system (1950s and 1960s) are notably higher than in recent decades. Still, the
rate of return yielded by investment in total highway capital in the past decade
remains competitive when compared to the private rate of return in the same
period. The larger return of the prior years has been explained as a result of at
least the following factors (Eno Transportation Foundation, 52 1996):
* A strong demand for transportation and a rapidly expanding economy in
the United States.
* The fact that a large pool of industries benefited from the public
investments in transportation.
50so Ibid. 49
s51 Ibid. 40
s2 Ibid. 40
A natural process in which after the first investments in transportation met
the initial needs and the highway system matured, subsequent
investments become basically alternatives for the existing roads, thus
producing lower rates of return.
The following are among the conclusions that can be drawn from Prof. Nadiri's
work (Nadiri,5 3 1996 and Eno Transportation Foundation5 4 , 1996):
* Transportation investments are able to produce a large positive effect on
the economy. The fact that this does not always happen strongly
suggests that these investments must be done compatibly with the
particular economic context of each region and with other policies like
zoning and taxes.
* The rates of economic return of highway investment vary significantly
over time, according to the location of the roads, and apparently
according to the sequence in which they are made. Provision of
interconnected roads seems to have generated better results than local
relatively unconnected roads.
* While the rate of productivity growth in the U.S. economy has benefited
substantially from investment in highway infrastructure, the main factors
were external to highway capital provision, mainly those related with
national income and growth in population.
With the above conclusions we finish our study on transportation and economic
investment. In the following section we will introduce the concept of competitive
strategy and will discuss its relationship with regional strategic transportation
planning.
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3.3 COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: A FRAMEWORK FOR REGIONAL
TRANSPORTATION
In chapter 2, Figure 2.4 depicted a hierarchy of regional strategies. In this
hierarchy the strategy for social and economic development occupies the higher
position followed by the competitive strategy. In what follows we will review Prof.
Michael Porter's framework of competitive strategy, which this thesis argues can
shape strategic planning for regional transportation.
The ever-increasing pace and technological breakthroughs of the past decades
have defined a clear trend that is likely to become the basic structure for the
world in the next century: worldwide economic integration and globalization. The
advances in transportation and telecommunications have made it possible to
increase and improve mobility and accessibility of people, freight, and
information in ways not conceived a few generations ago. This new accessibility
has promoted a new state of increasing economic interdependence in the world.
Companies are not only trying to find new markets or suppliers outside their
borders; they are also changing the location of their facilities, expanding and
diversifying their operations in the face of growing competition among regions
and countries to attract these resources. On the other hand, opportunities that
were the privilege of a reduced pool of participants because of their proximity to
a specific geographic area can be now seized by a larger number of parties.
In a first approach, there is a competitive challenge for regions at two different
levels:
1. Competition among a particular region and other areas (regardless if
they are inside or outside the national borders) to attract international
investments and take advantage of the opportunities generated by the
international context.
2. Competition among a region and other areas of a country for the
distribution of national resources.
Both levels will be treated jointly; unless specifically stated, there will be no
differentiation between them in the following pages. When referring to "other
regions", we can think of either other areas in the same country, or a territory
located in a completely different part of the world.
3.3.1 STRATEGY AND THE "COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS"
In his book, "The Competitive Advantage of Nations" (1990), Porter ss addresses
the issue of competitiveness from the national perspective. While the book
makes a deep analysis of different industries in several countries, this section
will only review the central ideas and their relation with the topics of competitive
strategy that will be studied later in this chapter.
The basic thrust in Porter's framework is that each country has some individual
industries that compete successfully on a world-wide basis because their native
environment provides advantages that are valuable in the international markets.
The main policy role would be to identify and develop those advantages and the
factors that produce such ascendance. The main source of national competitive
advantage is innovation, which is itself generated by (Porter56 , 1990):
* New technologies
* New or shifting buyer needs or priorities
* The emergence of a new segment of an industry
* The change in input costs or availability
* The change in governmental regulations
ss Porter, Michael E. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. The Free Press, 1990
56 Ibid. 55
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Acquiring an advantage is not enough to compete successfully in today's world.
Bench-marking and competitor analysis techniques have allowed the replication
of many of the operations and tactics of the leading corporations. It is necessary
to sustain the competitive advantage gained. Porter5 7 states that the ability of a
particular industry in any nation to maintain its preeminence against competition
depends on three elements:
1. The source of the advantage, which can be
a) "Low order" sources, i.e., cheaper costs of labor and raw
materials, or the existence of economies of scale. Low cost
resources can be relatively easy to find in other regions and the
existence of economies of scale is also readily available to
competitors.
b) "High order" sources, for instance, the possession of proprietary
processes, technology and the presence of differentiation from
competition based on the uniqueness of the product/service
provided. These sources are more difficult to imitate and are
less available to rivals.
2. The number of distinct sources of advantage.
Industries should obviously try to multiply the number of sources of
advantage they have. The more advantages they have, the more difficult
will be for competitors to threaten their viability.
3. Constant improvement and upgrading
The most important element of a sustainable advantage is the constant
effort to progress and enhance the product or service delivered to the
consumer.
57 Ibid. 55
Figure 3.2 presents the well-known "Porter's Diamond" with the factors that
determine the competitive advantage of a nation's industries. These
determinants are also listed below (Porter58 , 1990):
Firms Strategy,
Structure
and Rivalry
Factor
Conditions
Demand
C ondniions
Related and.
Supporting :
Industries
Figure 3.2
The Determinants of National
(Porter 59 , 1990)
Advantage
* Factor conditions: the availability of the production factors in a nation;
skilled labor, infrastructure, capital.
* Demand conditions: the structure of demand for the product or service;
segmentation of demand, and sophistication of buyers.
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* Related and supporting industries: the presence of lack of efficient
suppliers and related industries.
* The firms' strategy, structure and rivalry in the industry
As examples of how these elements shape the competitive advantage of a
nation, Porter states that intense domestic rivalry provides a strong incentive for
innovation and improvement in the industry. Similarly, the presence of highly
sophisticated buyers in the domestic market provides the national industry with
an advantage for competing overseas.
3.3.2 COMPETITIVE STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC PLANNING IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT
"Developing a competitive strategy is developing a broad formula for how a
business is going to compete, what its goals should be, and what policies
will be needed to carry out those goals' 0
From this quotation it can be seen that the concept of competitive strategy is
linked to -actually encompassed by- the process of strategic planning.
Nevertheless, a competitive strategy emphasizes the relation of the organization
to its environment, and furthermore, it narrows the scope of the environment by
focusing on the particular industry or industries -the niche- in which an
organization competes. 61
Porter's framework starts with the goals of the organization and the means to
achieve them. These goals define the way in which the organization will
compete. As we saw in the previous chapter, the first step in the rationalistic
approach to planning is a statement of the mission to be achieved by the
organization. This work argues that both the ideas of competitive strategy and
60 Porter, Michael E. Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors.
The Free Press, 1980
61 Ibid. 60
strategic planning can be easily transferred from the corporate to the regional
context.
A statement of the region's objectives, expectations and aspirations is needed to
start. The SWOT analysis constitutes an essential element for competitive
strategy and strategic planning for regions. The rising of economic and trade
blocks across the world can be thought as an opportunity of development for a
large number of regions worldwide. A recognized weakness, especially in
developing nations, is the poor condition of the transport and communication
infrastructure. And the increased state of competition can be a threat for certain
regional economies.
After the definition of goals the following step to develop a regional competitive
strategy is to identify the environment and distinguish the niches in which the
region competes or would like to compete. Here, the aspirations of the region
can give an idea about the new areas of competition that should be considered.
It is also useful to identify different scales of competition (national and
international) along with institutional, economical, environmental and
technological issues that affect the region's competitive performance. It is
possible to find niches of competition for a region in the following general
clusters:
Products and services that the region currently generates.
The simplest niche to identify is the one formed by different regions
that compete to sell their products and services in the same market.
The products and services that define a niche should include those
that are similar and substitutes.
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* The "attractiveness" of a region
A region also competes to attract resources to support its economic
and social objectives. These resources include federal funding,
private (national and international) investments and population.
Improvement in the regional infrastructure, e.g. a renovated
transportation system that provides easier access and greater
mobility, will increase the attractiveness of such a region in the eyes of
national and foreign companies interested in establishing a new
factory or branch. In the face of growing international trade, a major
concern for certain regions does not relate only to their ability to
attract companies or population. A central issue in these areas is the
ability to provide efficient freight transportation and therefore be
chosen as a regular path to move goods and commodities from
production areas to market centers.
* Current and future opportunities
As mentioned previously, more regions can take advantage of the
opportunities that arise in a global market. Different geographic areas
can take advantage of their specific characteristics and improve their
capacity to compete in the international arena. As will be shown later
in this thesis, an example of a future opportunity for several South
American regions has been identified in Asia and the Pacific Rim: the
possibility of a large increase in food demands from countries like
China and India (Sussman et al,62 1996). Nevertheless, major
infrastructure investments currently under consideration are necessary
to improve the accessibility of these markets for the agricultural and
food-processing regions of South America.
62 Sussman, Joseph M., Xing Yang and Carl Martland. Toward the Development of a Strategic
Transportation Plan for Mendoza, CIT/MIT Joint Program Report, 1996
3.3.3 COMPETITION ANALYSIS AT THE REGIONAL SCALE
According to Porter63 (1980), the state of competition within an industry is given
by the interaction of the five basic competitive forces:
1. Threat of new entrants into the industry
2. Threat of substitute products and services
3. Bargaining power of suppliers
4. Bargaining power of buyers
5. Rivalry among existing firms
To understand the state of competition in each of the niches of competition of a
region it is necessary to make a deep analysis of these five forces in each
industry of interest. Let us consider as an example the wine exports of a region
into a neighboring country. The analysis can start with the following questions:
* How likely is e.g. that producers in other neighboring countries start to
sell wine for the consumer nation? Is there any local production likely to
increase their share of the market?
* Is it feasible that demand for wine in the market will decrease due to
greater commercialization or improved marketing of other liquors or
beers?
* Is the wine business in the consumer country a buyer's or a seller's
market?
* Do rival companies often get into cut-throat price reduction to attack
competition?
Depending on the conditions of each particular case, an effective competitive
strategy must be able to perform the following (Porter64 , 1980):
63 Ibid. 60
a) To identify and locate the region in a certain position in the niche
where its capabilities can provide the best defense against the current
competition.
b) To change the balance of competitive forces and by this mean
improving the region's position in the niche.
c) To anticipate changes in the competition, therefore allowing us to think
how to take advantage of the future state of competition before the
shift actually happens.
Porter65 (1980) also discusses the three generic tactics used to deal with
competition:
1. Overall cost leadership
2. Differentiation: achieving a general perception of uniqueness in the
industry
3. Focus on a specific segment of the market
He acknowledges that each generic tactic implies certain requirements and
risks. A common risk is simply not reaching a leadership position in these
generic tactics and get stuck in the middle of the scale, which results in a poor
competitive position.
While the best tactic for a region will clearly depend on the characteristics of the
competition within the niche considered, overall cost leadership is an important
advantage when speaking of regional competition. The understanding of how
this leadership can be achieved is also relatively straightforward: it is generated
by the combination of several identifiable factors like labor costs, tax levels,
financial rates, and the availability of infrastructure, services and technology.
64 Ibid. 60
65 Ibid. 60
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Developing a perception of differentiation in a region is a more complex and
uncertain matter. What exactly gives a region dominance in the performance of
certain activities? (electronics and computers in Silicon Valley; wines in
Bordeaux, France; tourism in the south of Spain). Great effort and a long period
of time are usually required to yield the desired results. As a first conjecture, we
can think that constant and planned efforts along with advanced technology,
limited-access know-how and/or unique characteristics of a region, may promote
its differentiation. The above ideas suggest that logical incrementalism is a
planning framework well suited for undertaking these efforts.
The third tactic is to focus on a specific portion of a market with particular needs.
It can be used in any of the niches identified by a region, either by satisfying the
special requirements of designated customers, or by generating the particular
conditions that will attract a specific industry or resources.
Porter stresses the need for a complete and sophisticated study of the
competitors and provides a complete framework for doing it. The basic
components of this analysis should be (Porter66, 1980)
* Competitors' future goals
* Competitors' assumption about themselves, the niche and the other
regions competing
* Competitors' current strategy
* Competitors' capabilities
In what follows, a more elemental approach is sketched for the clusters of niches
previously identified:
* Products and services currently generated by the region.
What are the characteristics of the markets? Who are the additional
suppliers? What are the differences/similarities among products and
services? What are the prices paid for the products? What routes and
distribution chains are used?
* The attractiveness of the region
The first step here is to analyze all the sources of support available for
the region. As different sources like international capital flows and federal
funding have different behavior and criteria for resource allocation, these
characteristics should also be studied. Then it is possible to make a
comparison of the regions that are competing to attract financial
resources, jobs or population. A set of strength and weaknesses in view
of other regions will arise and will point the direction for the following
steps to take.
* Current and future opportunities
Looking back to our previous example, if a region is interested in
supplying food for the large populations of the Pacific Rim, the structure
of the world food market should be analyzed. According to Business
Week67 (1996) there are signs that a new trend in this market has started.
After years of stable or decreasing prices, a growing demand and the
limitations to significantly increase supply is likely to rise prices
continuously in the following years. Important economic and geopolitical
implications are involved. One of the expected effects of this new trend is
to
66 Ibid. 60
67 
. The Economics of Food. Business Week, May 20, 1996, p78-84.
".. transfer wealth from food consumers to food producers across
the globe. "68
The main competitors in this niche will likely be traditional supply
countries: US, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Europe, Australia and South
Africa. A study of their characteristics, strengths and weaknesses is
needed. Transportation costs would be a major variable in the
competition for this market. Therefore some regions would need to make
significant improvements in their freight transportation networks to
perform adequately in this niche.
3.3.4 THE SYSTEMIC NATURE OF A COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: STRATEGIC FIT
In the previous chapter, we discussed the relevance that Porter's attributes to
the tradeoffs in strategy. The systemic structure that Mintzberg and Quinn
identified is also recognized by Porter: the existence of tradeoffs provides the
key to structure a sustainable competitive advantage. The way to achieve this is
combining the strategic activities to generate fit among them.
Porter 69 (1996) identifies three types of fit:
First order fit: simple consistency
The simplest fit is that the activities undertaken by an organization -a
region in our case- be consistent with its objectives. Each function
that is performed consistently with the regional objectives adds its
share to the total competitive advantage. Inconsistent activities, on
the other hand, will reduce the competitive advantage of the region.
68 Ibid. 67, p79
69 Ibid. 20
* Second-order fit: reinforcing activities
In this case activities are not only consistent with the final objectives;
more importantly they support each other. When performing a
function by itself reinforces the results that will be obtained by other
task the overall effect is intensified. In a corporate environment, an
example of this relationship is the double effect generated by
advanced research of companies competing in the market of
electronic equipment such as Sony. Technological research is used
not only to produce more advanced systems than the rivals', it is also
used as a powerful marketing tool. High-tech research is an
independent activity that reinforces a completely different one. In a
regional context, second order fit would imply, e.g., that the
educational system of the region helps to attract external industries
that find in this area a source of skilled professionals that are essential
to their operations.
* Third-order fit: optimization of efforts
A deeper integration can optimize the results. A common way to
achieve this optimization is by avoiding redundancy and wasted effort
in the activities. It well may be that the most efficient solution to
provide emergency medical service to a set of isolated mountainous
communities is not to build a road to get to the nearest hospital in the
area, but to establish a small telecommunication system linked to
helicopter emergency teams. In the same way, an educational
broadcast system can be use to provide high school instruction to
these villages with a single teacher instead of several dozen.
Overall, a primary concern in all types of fit must be to focus on the entire
system of activities:
"...the whole matters most than any individual part. Competitive advantage
grows out of the entire system of activities... Strategic fit among many
activities is fundamental not only to competitive advantage but also to the
sustainability of that advantage. It is harder for a rival to match an array of
interlocked activities than it is to imitate a particular sales-force approach,
match a process technology, or replicate a set of product features." 70
3.4 THE NEED FOR PUBLIC/PRIVATE COOPERATION
As can be perceived from the previous discussion, the development of a
competitive strategy at a regional scale is not a simple task. Several facts
suggest that a close collaboration between the public and private sector is
needed to achieve best results:
* A regional study of competition niches and competitors will likely
require large amounts of information and resources from public and
private organizations.
* Some of the parameters that affect the competitiveness of a region will
be primarily under private sector control, while some others will
depend on governmental actions and policies.
* The definition of the regional objectives that is the first step in the
process will be enriched if it involves the views of the public and
private sectors. This will help to make these objectives a
comprehensive list of regional expectations and aspirations.
* Finally, and most important: the need to align the regional strategic
activities in a self-reinforcing way asks for close coordination between
government and private organizations. The regional industry will know
first-hand of the objectives that are to be pursued and therefore can
adapt operations to better suit the regional strategies. And because it
participated in its development, the objectives will not be disconnected
from private sector resources and needs.
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The need for public/private cooperation is a major issue for the development of
regions and their economic performance. A region can take advantage of the
strengths of both sectors. In what follows and in a first approach, some ideas on
the roles for the public and private sectors by each cluster of competition niches
are presented:
* Products and services currently generated by the region.
The improvement in competitiveness in this area is mainly a private sector
task. The role of the government is to provide a stable environment that
encourages market competition, cares for the public interest and
promotes growth in productivity. A combination of the public and private
capabilities is likely to maximize and speed the benefits of a competitive
strategy.
* The attractiveness of the region
Improving the attractiveness of a region requires a deep involvement of
the public sector. Public institutions have the appropriate tools to lead
and undertake a considerable portion of this effort, but again a joint
participation with the private sector would tend to enhance the outcome of
the process.
* Current and future opportunities
In this case, the predominance between the public and private sector
roles is likely to vary from case to case. The private sector would seem
more efficient in perceiving new opportunities or threats to the region's
performance in the global economy. After this has occurred, the private
concerns need to be transmitted to the public agencies, who must react to
this new change in a timely manner. Depending on the nature of the
threat or opportunity, the predominance of the government role in the
regional response will vary.
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3.5 LOOKING AT THE BIG PICTURE: COMPETITION, COOPERATION
AND "COOPETITION"
We have presented in this chapter Porter's framework of competitive advantage
and competitive strategy as a tool to be used in the context of regional strategic
transportation planning. This tool is generally well regarded by managers due to
its usefulness and efficacy in improving the situation of an organization.
But there are also people who argue that if we take a step backward and look at
a larger picture, the competitive model presents an undesirable side (Salvucci71 ,
April 1998). It is based on a "zero sum game", which implies that there will
always be winners and losers: companies that become leaders are profitable
and companies that fail and go bankrupt. What could look like a standard
business reality takes a whole new perspective when competitive strategy is
applied to the regional scale. The losers here are not companies with 100
employees; the losers are nations and states with millions of unemployed and
unnourished. The stakes are high and no one wants to become a loser, so the
result is a further incentive to improve the competitive status to stay afloat.
Brandenburger and Nalebuff72 (1996) have proposed a different approach for the
business context, an approach that combines cooperation and competition:
"Business is cooperation when it comes to creating a pie and competition
when it comes to dividing it up. In other words, business is War and Peace.
But it's not Tolstoy -endless cycles of war followed by peace followed by
war. It's simultaneously war and peace."
"Coopetition" is the word that defines this approach. Knowing when to compete
and when to cooperate is the secret.
71 Ibid. 41
3.6 IMPLICATIONS FROM THE STRATEGIC PLANNING AND THE
REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION CONTEXTS
So far, this work has presented some of the most relevant aspects of the
strategic planning and regional transportation contexts. This section
summarizes the implications and lessons that can be drawn from the previous
discussion.
3.6.1 FROM THE STRATEGIC PLANNING SIDE
Based on our discussion of generic strategic planning in Chapter 1, we can raise
the following points:
Strategic Planning for Regional Transportation will tend to develop in an
incremental way at least in some aspects.
The complexity of the regional context and the close involvement of
transportation with the socioeconomic system predispose the strategic planning
process for regional transportation to a certain degree of incrementalism. Using
Quinn's ideas on the strategy-making process, we can see that while the culture
prevailing in the regional organizations will clearly vary from case to case, the
remaining three determinants of the strategic process strongly suggest a
substantial presence of incrementalism:
0 The environment faced by a region is very complex and in constant
evolution. National economy, politics, and the presence of
globalization trends in trade and financial markets are influential
elements surrounding the planning process.
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0 In the regional context the structure of the "organizational form" is a
wide array of stakeholders from the public/private arenas. Most of
them are independent from each other and have different -even
conflicting- interests.
0 Due to the scope of regional activities, the time horizon is clearly long-
range, and the complexity of the environment produces a medium-to-
low degree of control over events.
* The development of a regional transportation strategy for the future will
require a choice between different alternatives identified for a region.
Mintzberg and Porter reminded us that strategic planning is "fundamentally
choosing" among several options. From the latter author, we must also
remember that choosing between strategic decisions involves facing tradeoffs.
The tradeoffs that regions are likely to face are complex in nature and will not be
easy to reach consensus in them.
* If a region wants "flexible strategic planning", it must improve its capacity to
deal with the future.
Quinn's work showed that the use of broad goals can provide room for flexibility
while allowing the planning process to move ahead. We also acknowledged that
at some point particular objectives and plans will need to be addressed.
Mintzberg's emergent strategies highlighted that after unexpected changes in
the environment, the organizations' reaction will depend on the flexibility of their
strategic planning process.
* The provision of such flexibility in the strategic planning process should be
based on the development of the regions' human resources.
While there are undoubtedly institutional changes that can improve this
versatility to deal with a changing environment, the key elements are the
individuals within the regional organizations participating in the transportation
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planning activities. Regional institutions must develop human resources that
perform efficiently in a quickly evolving environment and able to adapt in order to
face the new challenges to come. Managers of private and public regional
organizations should become familiar with the new ideas that are being
constantly generated and are likely to affect their activities. Technology
scanning and environmental scanning practices can be of great help to this end.
* Regions should acknowledge the two primary components of strategic
planning -strategic thinking and strategic formalization-- and structure their
own process accordingly.
Mintzberg's division between strategic thinking and strategic formalization
suggests that different skills are required for each of these activities. By
recognizing the need to combine analysis with intuition and synthesis during the
process, the value of the rationalist model of planning is also recognized. This
model can generate an incentive for thinking about the future and provides the
framework to implement the decisions taken. To avoid the excessive
formalization of the process, regions should structure their strategic planning
process based on the different characteristics and skills required for creating
and formalizing strategy.
* Regions should have both general and specific goals.
Regional decision-makers can use a set of broad goals to start and advance the
planning process with the initial consensus of diverse participants. They can
also decide on the necessity and timing of announcing a few specific goals to
generate a dynamic and intense response.
3.6.2 FROM THE REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION SIDE
The discussion on the relationship between transportation and economic
development and the ideas of competitive strategy highlight the following issues:
* To fully obtain the economic benefits of new transportation infrastructure,
these investments should be properly integrated with the overall regional
strategies.
Provision of transportation infrastructure will not automatically trigger economic
growth. From the existing evidence, although transportation infrastructure is a
prerequisite for it, it seems unable to produce such growth exclusively by itself.
The decision to deploy new infrastructure requires the consideration of the
economic, social and institutional environment of the region. And all new
projects should be responsive to the overall strategies and goals defined by the
region.
As mentioned earlier, the structure of costs of the users of transportation is an
important element of the economic analysis required to assess the effect of new
investments in infrastructure. Therefore, as part of this coordination effort the
major industries and producers of the regions, and their competitive counterparts
should be studied from this viewpoint. As a corollary, regions should use its
regulatory (or deregulatory) capabilities to encourage the elements of
productivity not related to transportation as well.
* Regions can use the different roles played by transportation in economic
activities to assess their transportation system and evaluate future projects.
Regions should aim for a balanced transportation system able to sustain existing
economic activity, retain expected economic growth, attract economic external
activities and link them with the main centers of the global economy. But
"balanced" does not imply that the four roles should be equally important; rather
it means that each role must be performed accordingly to the region's needs.
Based on higher-level objectives, each region should decide on the appropriate
weight of these four roles in its transportation system.
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* Regions should aim to structure their transportation network in an
interconnected way.
Regions should try to provide the "interconnectivity" characteristic that was
proven to generate the higher economic returns in the U.S. The provision of
infrastructure to link new and existing sections of the system to the main network
is an important part of the regional transportation effort. Regions should also be
conscious of the larger economic benefits of the first provisions of infrastructure
in an area. Except in the presence of congestion, investments should be
oriented toward the generation of new solutions for transportation needs, rather
than providing alternatives to existing routes.
* Providing a market orientation and a competitive element in the regional
transportation system is important.
Transportation investments must meet the expectations of current and future
demand in the region. The infrastructure must respond to the user's needs and
should benefit the largest possible number of users. This is not likely to occur in
a transportation system lacking the incentives of competition. Regions should
use their institutional capabilities to encourage competition in the transportation
system and other related fields.
* Developing a competitive strategy can enrich, refine -and even lead- the
process of strategic planning for the transportation system in a region.
As mentioned before, transportation is a tool that provides specific services to
different users. This tool can be designed in a way to better serve the regional
objectives previously defined. If a region undertakes a competitive strategy as
the core of its development effort, the objectives of such strategy will lead the
development and deployment of the transportation system and will shape its
transportation strategic planning process.
With its narrowing approach to the environment of a region by refocusing on its
different niches of competition, a competitive strategy can provide a foundation
to take the strategic planning task to a more concrete stage. It can help to
recognize needs and features related to particular industries and identify what
the transportation system should provide to improve the competitiveness of the
region in several fields.
Furthermore, Sussman et al 73 (1996) noted that the strategic planning for the
transportation system in a region should not be considered a static process, but
a dynamic one. It requires a continuous effort of revision and improvement.
Thus, the fact that the competitive analysis will be used as an input for a new
cycle in the planning process is not beginning from scratch, but a refining
operation.
3.7 SUMMARY
Chapter 3 has reviewed three elements of the regional transportation context:
the growing relevance of regions, the relationship between transportation
investments and economic development, and the increased state of competition
present in the global economy. It has also raised some implications and lessons
obtained from our discussion of the regional transportation and strategic
planning contexts. Chapter 4 will close the framework part of the thesis by
presenting the organizational context in which the development of scenarios for
transportation planning will be studied.
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4. A DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT:
PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTERNSHIPS
4.1 CHOOSING THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT.
As mentioned at the beginning of the thesis, one of its objectives is to show how
scenario building fits in the overall framework of modern transportation strategic
planning. Having reviewed some of the issues involved in strategic planning
and regional transportation, the previous chapters have noted the basic
characteristics of the environment in which scenarios will be used. This chapter
will define additional features of this environment by choosing a particular
organizational context for the use of scenarios.
The organizational context chosen is what has been called "public/private
partnership". These particular organizations are formed with participants from
the public and private arenas in order to achieve certain goals. While their
structure, operation, time-span and scope of involvement varies largely, the
beneficial character of this organizational arrangement is generally accepted.
Explaining the rise of the public/private partnerships Colman7 4 (1989) asserts
that:
"It is not only logical but inevitable that in a democratic system
governmentally and a capitalist, free enterprise system economically, the
general goals and interest of public and private sectors be compatible and
mutually supportive most of the time."
Despite the theoretical legitimacy of this view, experience has shown that
traditionally the scope for public and private sector involvement in the provision
of services needed by society has been separated. Both ideological and
historical reasons have shaped this division. Too often the private and public
sectors look at one another as a major obstacle for achieving their objectives:
two forces with conflicting positions and goals. However, in the face of current
globalization trends and limited government resources around the world,
practical considerations have started to reshape perspectives on this matter.
The following sections provide some background and introduce the main
reasons for the rise of these partnerships. The particularities of private
participation in infrastructure and transportation and the need for efficient public
participation are also reviewed. Finally, we make the argument for the use of
public/private partnerships in regional transportation strategic planning and
present the case of ITS deployment as a relevant example of these mixed
associations.
4.2 THE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT SIZE
According to the World Bank75 (1997), most countries maintained a small public
sector until well into this century; three significant historical events marked the
turning point by encouraging government participation in new areas:
* The Soviet Revolution in 1917, with its state-directed central planning
model.
* The Great Depression of the 1930s, which encouraged a more active
government participation in economic activities.
* The disintegration of the European empires, caused by World War II.
74 Colman, William G. State and Local Government and Public-Private Partnerships: A Policy
Issues Handbook. Greenwood Press, 1989, p174.
7s The World Bank. World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World. Oxford
University Press, 1997
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As a result, from 1960 to 1995 the size7 6 of the governments in the industrial
countries doubled.77 During this period, an increasing awareness of the
problems caused by such large state influence in a nation's activities also
developed. In the last fifteen years or so, many countries have started or
expanded efforts to reduce the size of their governments. The underlying
concern is to increase the efficiency of the economic processes taking place in
society. Depending on the policies that increased government participation and
influence in the past, the downsizing of the public sector has taken two basic
forms (RPCP7 8, 1988):
a) Deregulation
In cases where instead of taking direct control of industries the
government preferred to regulate them tightly, the decrease of
governmental influence has taken place by eliminating and/or relaxing
many of these controls. It must be highlighted though, that while
undoubtedly many private-sector claims of excessive regulation may be
valid, in some other occasions they could respond to the natural search
for profit of corporations. Let us simply remember that not all regulation is
bad; on the contrary, many public regulations are beneficial for economic
and social well-being.
b) Privatization
In the second approach, reduction of public control is exemplified by
selling public assets or contracting out public services to the private
sector. The sale of previously state-owned assets is based on a
redefinition of the role of public sector. By refocusing on the core
functions of the government, the control of non-essential activities can be
76 Measured by central governments' spending as a percentage of GDP.
77 Ibid. 75
S--------------. Privatization: Toward More Effective Government, Report of the President's
Commission on Privatization (RPCP), U.S. Government, 1988
transferred to private companies. In cases where the nature of the
activity requires some public sector involvement, contracting out services
to the private sector allows government to keep some control of the
industry. The basic objective in contracting out activities is to gain in
efficiency by using private sector resources, while keeping government's
ability to balance corporate profits and public interest. Figure 4.1 adapted
from Guislain79 (1997) shows the range of actions that can be included in
the term "privatization":
Responsibility for investments
and risk allocation:
'-~ ~
Public
riIv ciL~
DU I.
Build-Operate-Transfer
(Infrastructure owned by
the public sector and
operated by private sector)
f".
Build-Own-Operate
(Infrastructure owned and
operated by private sector)
Figure 4.1
Privatization Techniques
(adapted from Guislainso, 1997)
79 Guislain, Pierre. The Privatization Challenge: A Strategic, Legal and Institutional Analysis of
International Experience. The World Bank, 1997, p12
80 Ibid. 79
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The main benefits that can be yielded by reducing public control in the economic
activities are (World Bank81 , 1997):
* To unlock public resources previously devoted to assure state control
or ownership and divert them to high-priority activities like basic
education, health services, or poverty reduction programs.
* To establish the foundation for enhanced and cheaper services, by
allowing competition and encouraging productivity improvements.
* To open the door for stronger private sector development, by reducing
obstacles and costs for companies.
4.3 PRIVATE SECTOR PERFORMANCE
Why is the private sector generally regarded as more efficient than the public
sector? As a first explanation, it can be argued that the profit incentive is a
powerful stimulus for firms and individuals. Private-sector organizations are not
subject to some of the constraints faced by governmental agencies, e.g.,
provision of universal service, close public scrutiny, and accountability to
constituencies with diverging or opposite goals. Additionally, private companies
have the following advantages over government-run services (Serageldin 2 ,
1994):
* Management flexibility and ability to remunerate according to
performance and need.
* Freedom from bureaucratic obstacles in daily operation.
81 Ibid. 75
82 Serageldin, I., Richard Barrett and Joan Martin-Brown, editors. The Business of Sustainable
Cities: Public-Private Partnerships for Creative Technical and Institutional Solutions. ESD
Proceedings Series No. 7. The World Bank, 1994.
Better ability to retain professional and skilled staff, especially In many
developing countries.
An element that helps to explain private sector performance is the management
of human resources (HRM). A thorough study sponsored by the US Government
during the Reagan Administration identified three central differences in HRM
between successful private organizations and government agencies (RPCM183,
1987):
1. Responsiveness to Change
The cited study states that successful organizations in the private sector
are willing to change their structure and operational procedures as
required by a change in the environment. The evidence also suggests
that the opposite happens in the public sphere: it is difficult to reshape the
structure and operation of governmental organizations in a changing
environment. The driving force of public officers is too often to maintain
the status quo instead of improving effectiveness and efficiency.
Additionally, decisions in the public sector are more sensible to the
concerns of different constituencies, which also tends to slow the reaction
time.
2. Human Resource Planning
In some of the private organizations studied, a fundamental thrust in their
business strategy is the quality of their personnel. Significant resources
and effort are devoted to attract and retain human talent. On the other
hand, and with few exceptions in the world, governments do much less to
attract and retain qualified and motivated individuals.
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3. Management development and organizational culture
Some of the most recognized companies in the world have programs to
develop their present and future managers. These mechanisms not only
support managers in the task of leading, but also create strong corporate
cultures that facilitate the achievement of objectives.
4.4 PUBLIC VS PRIVATE: FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE
Despite the advantages of private organizations and the global trend of
government-downsizing, it is important to recognize -and this thesis does so-
that provision of services by the private sector and adoption of free market
practices are not a flawless solution. There have been repeated examples
throughout the world in which the predominance of private interests over public
concerns has resulted in abuse and harm to society. A strong, capable public
sector is needed now perhaps more than ever:
"Many have felt that the logical end point of all these [government
downsizing] reforms was a minimalist state. Such state would do no harm,
but neither could it do much good... Without an effective state, sustainable
development, both economic and social, is impossible." 84
There is still a significant role to be played by the public sector. The challenge
is then to adapt public capabilities to the new times. The World Bank 85 (1997)
has pointed out the tasks that should be at the core of every government:
* Establishing a foundation of law
* Maintaining a nondistortionary policy environment, including
macroeconomic stability
83 Report of the President's Council on Management Improvement (RPCMI). Improving the
Management of Human Resources in the Federal Government through a Private-Public
Partnership. U.S. Government, 1987
84 Ibid. 75, p iii
85 Ibid. 75, p4
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* Investing in basic social services and infrastructure
* Protecting the vulnerable
* Protecting the environment
One of the fields in which private participation has gained acceptance across the
world is the provision of infrastructure. But it has also been recognized that
despite having a large impact on quality of life, some collective good as basic
infrastructure are particularly undersupplied by market forces (World Bank 86,
1997). As a result of this, the need to strengthen the public sector in this
becomes more important. Four additional reasons for making public
participation in infrastructure more effective are (World Bank 87 , 1994):
"First, given current government dominance, the public sector will continue
to have primary responsibility for infrastructure services in most countries
and most sectors in the foreseeable future...Second, even with dynamic
private sector involvement, some sectors --such as road networks and
major public works- will remain predominantly in the public domain. Third,
only an effective public sector will facilitate private sector
involvement...Fourth, many developing governments will decide (for
strategic, regulatory, or political reasons) to retain much of the responsibility
for building and operating infrastructure in the public sector, as many high-
income countries have done."
Following the five core functions of government listed before will require the
public sector to make an effective use of its regulatory capabilities. But effective
regulation -and government- amidst a dynamic and complex environment like
today's can not be done from the isolation of a governmental ivory tower. As a
result, we are seeing increasing participation from those being regulated and
governed. One of the ways in which this participation has flourished is in the
form of public/private partnerships. As it will be seen later in this chapter, a
large number of these joint efforts have been oriented to the implementation of
decisions already taken by the public sector. Participation of the private sector
86 Ibid. 75
87 The World Bank. World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development. Oxford
University Press, 1994, p37
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as an entitled party in the planning process has not been that extensive. As the
thesis begins to address this strategic planning role for the private sector, we will
also start to narrow our focus to treat the particularities of the transportation
field. But before this discussion, the following section will introduce the main
roles that public/private partnerships have played in the field of infrastructure.
4.5 PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN INFRASTRUCTURE
An increasing number of public/private partnerships have been created to deal
with infrastructure needs across the globe. The underlying assumption in these
organizations is that joint participation from the public and private sectors can
generate a better outcome than a separate engagement by public or private
organizations. According to the World Bank 88 (1994), regardless of their public
or private orientation, successful providers of infrastructure have:
* Clear and coherent objectives that are focused on the delivery of
services.
* Autonomous management who with the rest of the personnel are
accountable for the results.
* Financial independence
At this point it is important to differentiate at this point the basic different forms of
private participation in infrastructure:
a) Contractors
b) Providers of services
c) Users of services
d) Participants in planning efforts
88 Ibid. 87
Zimmerman89, 1984 identifies these roles in the context of metropolitan areas:
* Private development of public infrastructure projects and public
participation in the provision of incentives.
* Private provision of public services and goods, as in the operation and
maintenance of tolled highways.
* Joint formation of policy, as in the public/private efforts oriented to
renovate a number of central business districts in the US.
In a research project undertaken at MIT, Sitabkhan90 (1997) found that a large
number of partnerships have been project-specific. In the same way, most of the
literature on public/private partnerships refers to this project-oriented role. In
this context, Payson and Steckler91 (1996) characterize the participants of a
public/private partnership as follows:
'"The government or governments involved may be federal, state, or local,
while the specific agencies involved are often departments of transportation
or independent authorities. The private parties may include firms
specializing in public-private infrastructure, construction companies,
equipment manufacturers, operations specialists, real estate developers,
and various advisors."
The same authors point out several reasons for the growing use of public/private
partnerships in infrastructure (Payson and Steckler92, 1996):
89 Zimmerman, Karita A. Negotiated Investment Strategies: A New Approach to Public-Private
Partnership. Master in City Planning Thesis, Department of Urban Studies and Planning,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1984
90 Sitabkhan, Murtaza. New Roles for the Private Sector in Strategic Transportation Planning,
Working Paper, MIT, Cambridge, MA, 1997
91 Payson, William H. and Steven A. Steckler. Developing Public-Private Partnerships in
Infrastructure. In Privatizing Transportation Systems, Simon Hakim, Paul Seidenstat and Gary
W. Bowman, eds. London, 1996, p33
92 Ibid. 91
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* An increasing shortfall of public moneys and a simultaneous increase
of infrastructure needs.
* Larger public acceptance of user fees instead of taxes to finance
infrastructure.
* Successful experiences in previous partnerships
* A public sector that has become more experienced in the
implementation of the partnerships.
For the reader interested in knowing the approaches to public/private
infrastructure followed outside the U.S., we suggest the works of Tatsumi 93
(1998) and Saito94 (1998) undertaken at MIT and take a look at the way in which
Japan has address these associations.
4.5.1 INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING AND DELIVERY
A large number of joint public/private efforts in infrastructure have focused on
financing and delivery mechanisms. Under this approach to infrastructure
development and beside its traditional role of builder, the private sector is
viewed as a source of financial resources. Table 4.1 taken from the World
Bank95 (1994) presents the results of a survey on infrastructure projects that
have been financed worldwide with private-sector participation since the early
1980s:
Private-sector participation in financing and development of infrastructure can
occur in different ways. A whole new terminology has been coined to
93 Tatsumi, Yasuo Strategic Regional Transportation Planning in the Osaka/Kobe/Kyoto
Metropolitan Area in Japan. Master of Science in Civil Engineering Thesis, Department of Civil
and Environmental Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 1998
94 Saito, Makoto. Public Private Partnerships in Providing Rail Infrastructure: The Japanese
Case. Master in City Planning Thesis, Department of Urban Studies and Planning,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 1998
95 Ibid. 87, p95; originally published by Public Works Financing (October of 1993)
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characterize these mechanisms (Miller and Evje96, 1997): BOT (build-operate-
transfer), BOO (build-own-operate), TKY (turnkey), DBOT (design-build-operate-
transfer), and so on. We will not describe each of these financial approaches.
As an example of the kind of financing arrangements involved, the main
elements of a BOT project are presented as follows (Augenblick and Custer 97,
1990):
Table 4.1
Infrastructure Project Financing with Private Participation
..... 1 . .. Income Income Income
::::... ..Number of . :Funded 148 64 77 7
Projectsi n the 358 1:07 179 72
Funded Pipeline 
Total Value Funded 63.1 34.3 25.7 3.1
(US $ billions) In the 235.4 112.0 77.1 46.3
P peline :___::::i :: :_ :: _:: _;:_ ._ '_::
Distribution of Power 13% :8% 16 29%
STransport 60% 48% 69% 57%
Sector
Water and 16% 25% 10% 0%
Environment.
Telecom 2% 2% 3% 0%
.. . . 1... : .::...::.:::.:.i.:  : : ::: :   :
Others 10% 17% 3% 14%
* Private sponsors, usually a joint venture of construction contractors,
equipment/systems suppliers often with local partners. Participating
companies will build the project, operate it for a specific period of time
and then transfer it to the public sector.
* Private equity investment (typically 10-30% of the total project cost).
96 Miller, John B., and Roger H. Evje. Life Cycle Discounted Project Cash Flows: The Common
Denominator in Procurement Strategy. MIT Working Paper, 1997
9 Augenblick Mark, and B. Scott Custer, Jr. The Build, Operate and Transfer ("BOT") Approach
to Infrastructure Projects in Development Countries. Working Paper (WPS498), The World
Bank, 1990
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* Private debt financing (typically 70-90% of the total project cost) raised
through commercial or development banks.
* In some cases (e.g., projects in developing countries), there is also
need for substantial governmental support in the form of performance
guarantees for the public agencies involved, or guarantees against
foreign exchange risk.
The way in which private participation in financing and delivery of infrastructure
is beneficial to the public agencies involved can be seen in Figure 4.2 taken
from the work of Prof. John B. Miller and Roger Evje at MIT 98 (1997). Figure 4.2
gives an idea of the difference in cumulative discounted cash flows for the public
sector between a traditional approach ("design-build") and a BOT arrangement.
It can be seen that the use of BOT frees a significant amount of resources that
would be used in the construction phase of the infrastructure.
Surplus
Percentage of
Construction 0
Costs
4
UeTiciT
Time -
Figure 4.2
Design-Build vs. BOT: Cumulative Discounted Project Cash Flows
(Taken from Miller and Evje 99, 1997)
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4.5.2 ELEMENTS FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE PARTNERSHIP
From studying past experiences of public/private associations, Brooks'00 (1984)
has identified a set of elements that ease the success of the process:
1. A sense of crisis or a fundamental opportunity
The partnership tends to be smoother and more productive, when both
sectors face a crisis or have the certainty that they must act to avoid one.
2. An effort to search for win/win situations
An integrative negotiation style that aims for results that satisfy all
participants is an important prerequisite for success. Although is clear
that at sometimes negotiations will face conflicting interests, a sincere
effort to find solutions that are acceptable to both parties should be made.
3. A comprehensive strategy directed by "first-rate talent"
An essential factor is to put very talented people in charge of the process.
Ideally, the leaders should be both people directly involved in the
strategic processes of their organizations and qualified administration. A
basic requisite is of course, that they believe in the ends of the effort.
4. An identifiable measure of success other than profit
While it is clear that in order to be attractive and useful to the private
sector, the partnership must address market concerns and profitability,
this should not be the only measure of success. Brooks'01 (1984)
stresses this important concern as follows:
100 Brooks, Harvey. Seeking Equity and Efficiency: Public and Private Roles, In Public-Private
Partnership: New Opportunities for Meeting Social Needs, Ballinger Publishing Company,
1984
101 Ibid. 100
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'The public and private sector have to be involved jointly in
meeting needs. It is the function of the public sector to identify the
needs and of the entrepreneur in the private sector to invent a
market or a customer delivery. Experience suggests that private
partners in this cooperation cannot be solely profit maximizers' they
must have a strongly developed social conscience in combination
with an eye for profitable business."
5. Maintaining control over the agenda and the number of players
The more participants in the process, the more complex the discussion
will become. The important issue is to bring into the discussion the
quantity and quality of participants that will enrich the process without
making it too complex to be managed.
4.5.3 PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN TRANSPORTATION
The large impact of transportation-related decisions in the socioeconomic and
political life of societies has caused transportation to be treated differently from
other economic activities and encouraged government intervention (Coyle'0 2 et
al, 1982). But private-sector participation is also significant as infrastructure
builder, user of transportation, and provider of transport and related services.
The conventional approach to develop transportation infrastructure has made a
clear distinction between the scope of activities for the public and private
sectors. Lockwood 10 3 (1997) characterizes these different roles:
102 Coyle, John J., Edward J. Bardi and Joseph L. Cavinato. Transportation. West Publishing
Co., 1982.
103 Lockwood, Stephen. Public-Private Partnerships are the Answer: What is the Question? In
Transportation Finance for the 2 1st Century. Conference Proceedings, Transportation
Research Board and National Research Council. 1997, p112
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"[In conventional public/private partnerships] the public agency defines the
product, manages the process, makes the key decisions and takes (on
behalf of the public at large) all the risks related to cost, delay, quality, and
customer satisfaction. The private-sector role --in the form of design and
construction entities- has been limited to arms-length vendor status,
supplying competitive low-bid services confined to sequential
design/bid/build processes under public-agency specifications/oversight."
Such a narrow role for the private sector does not take advantage of the entire
set of private resources and capabilities. In the first instance, there are financial
resources and technical/managerial expertise that can enhance the provision of
transportation infrastructure and services. The recognition of this fact has
encouraged the formation of public/private partnerships aimed to improve the
delivery, operation and maintenance of transportation projects in different
countries.
According to Salvucci10 4 (April, 1998), the immense majority of the public/private
partnerships in transportation are associations between public agencies and
contractors. The users of the transportation infrastructure and services have not
been successfully integrated into these partnerships.
Additionally, previous international experience suggests that not all areas of
transportation are suitable to attract the interest of private organizations. The
World Bank 05 (1994) has rated the feasibility of private sector delivery for
different infrastructure types. Figure 4.3, adapted from this work, compares the
marketability of different transportation infrastructure and the long distance
telecommunication services.
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Figure 4.3
Feasibility of Private Sector Participation in Transportation
(adapted from World Bank0 s , 1994)
It can be seen in Figure 4.3 that while there are transportation activities that
have significant opportunities for the private sector, some sector have inherent
characteristics that limit private provision of these services and development of
its infrastructure. The underlying issue is that because of its profit-maximizing
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nature, private interest focuses on the most lucrative activities. The implications
for transportation infrastructure is that private sector aims for the most profitable
facilities and sections of the network. But it must be recognized that those
facilities and particular parts of the infrastructure are part of an entire network,
and the value of transport infrastructure raises with this interconnectivity.
Building and operating transportation infrastructure with a profit-maximizing
approach may cause important parts of the network not to be properly developed
or maintained, and thus deteriorating the value of the entire system.
4.6 PARTNERSHIPS FOR TRANSPORTATION PLANNING
As the previous sections have shown, private involvement in transportation has
occurred mainly in the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of the
systems. This view is generally project-specific and oriented to the delivery of a
previously defined service/facility. It still misses some of the potential that
private participation can unchain. Specifically, Sitabkhan 106 (1997) proposes a
more proactive role for private organizations as a "strategic partner" for the
public sector during the transportation planning process. It should be noticed
that the public/private planning partnership here discussed is not for particular
projects, but rather planning involving the entire transportation system.
It is clear that in order to be effective, planning decisions taken by public officials
have to consider the needs of the private companies. Zimmerman 07 (1984)
states that the typical way in which private concerns has been raised is through
"behind-the-scene lobbying" and technical studies supporting private sector
views. In these approaches private sector input takes place as an external
agent to the planning process, which has the following disadvantages:
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1. The private sector lacks any decision-making role and its relegated to
a second-class rank in the process.
2. It is harder for the private rationale to have direct exposure and
permeate the minds of the planners and public decision-makers.
3. The process does not generate a proper environment for dialogue and
common learning. It also complicates the private organizations'
access to first-hand information on the government's objectives and
strategies.
A joint planning effort in the form of a public/private partnership instead:
1. Puts the private sector right in the center of the decision-making and
recognizes the legitimacy of its participation. This results in sounder
and more comprehensive decisions that should aim to balance the
needs of the industry and corporations, with those of the citizens.
2. Exposes the private-sector views to planners and public decision-
makers since the beginning of the process.
3. Provides an environment that encourages the interchange of ideas
and can generate learning in the individuals and organizations taking
part in the effort. Such learning can occur at different levels:
a) Best Practices
Private companies confront some of the same organizational and
technical problems faced by public agencies. Acknowledging that
in many cases corporations have solved these problems
satisfactorily, the public sector can learn from these best practices
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b) Alignment of private and public strategies
A significant benefit can result from the interaction between
organizations' strategies with the overall regional strategy. Just as
the public sector can learn from corporate practices, private
companies can benefit by adjusting their strategies to be consistent
with the objectives and strategies of the public sector
c) Institutional Learning
Finally, the public/private partnership -as an institution- can learn
too. Whether the learning occurs in how to better address certain
technical issues or how to manage and control the planning
process itself, it can only enhance the final outcome. This learning
element will gain relevance in our later study of the scenario
methodology, as we will see that one of the roles assigned to
scenarios is to support institutional learning.
4.6.1 STRATEGIC PLANNING IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR
There are several differences in the way strategic planning is undertaken by
private and public organizations. Among the most relevant are
* Private companies usually have more tangible ways to measure
performance and success/failure than the public sector: profitability,
market share, and so on.
* Private companies serve the interests of a relatively small number of
main parties. More importantly, these interests are most of the time
aligned, while the public agencies must try to balance opposing and
conflicting interests of different constituencies.
* Public agencies are often affected by political pressures that can
cause them to operate in a sub-optimal manner.
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Public organizations are usually slower to regroup and reassign
resources in the face of unexpected events or new projects.
4.6.2 PRACTICAL OBSTACLES TO A PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP FOR
TRANSPORTATION PLANNING
While public/private participation as partners in the transportation planning
process can generate such benefits, there are also several elements that hinder
the formation and performance of this organizations. This section will mention
some of them.
A first obstacle is found in the difference of incentives and perspectives that
managers of public and private organizations have. The profit incentive can
mobilize large amounts of private resources in relatively short time, but will also
require governmental assurance that the public interest is not being left aside.
On the other hand, public officers must be provided with incentives and tools
that helps them to challenge the bureaucratic status quo, and enables them to
improve their organizations' reaction time for the planning process.
So far we have been using the terms public and private sector as if they were
single units. But this is far to be truth. Within each sector there is a set of
individual elements that have different agendas and perspectives. The public
sector side of a partnership can encompass the three different levels of
government: federal, state and local; additionally each of these layers can be
represented by various agencies. As mentioned earlier, private participation in
transportation takes place as user, provider of services and constructor of
infrastructure. Some participants will probably have diverging or conflicting
objectives (e.g., Environmental Protection Agency and Department of
Transportation). In any case, such an inclusive composition will tend to add
complications into the planning process.
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Participation in the planning process under this arrangement demands intensive
amounts of time and effort. The foreseen tangible benefits of the partnership
may not be enough to counterbalance the size of the task. Formation of the
partnerships can be affected by private-sector lack of interest. Companies that
realize that they have little or no influence on the outcome will not be attracted to
participate. Participation of private organizations in the decision-making must be
assured in some way. At the same time, the need to care for society's well being
calls for a structure that maintains the process under public-sector guide.
4.6.3 A TECHNOLOGICALLY-DRIVEN PARTNERSHIP: ITS
Interestingly, an entire generation of public/private partnerships in transportation
has been the result of technological change. The rising of the Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS) is a promising solution for a number of
transportation problems. The need to address its implications in a
comprehensive way has triggered a large cooperative effort between different
levels of government and private organizations in the US, Europe and Japan.
ITS has created the need for public and private cooperation in two basic arenas:
1. The linkage between vehicle and infrastructure
2. The development of the electronic equipment and technological
systems that are at the core of ITS.
3. The deployment of ITS, which is likely to have significant effects in the
coordination and provision of transportation services and
infrastructure.
Federal, state and local governments are interacting with private stakeholders
from very different fields: software, electronic & telecommunications, rail and
truck carriers, academic institutions, shippers associations, the automotive
industry, transit advocates, environmental groups and so on. The general
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objective of these partnerships is to study and plan the different issues involved
in ITS development and deployment.
A result from these efforts has been already obtained. In 1996, extensive study
and work by public/private groups, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
proposed a system architecture for ITS in the United States'08 . Basically, the
architecture is a tool to coordinate and integrate the deployment of different ITS
technologies and services. 109  Following this first step, several system
architectures have been developed to deploy ITS technology in several cities in
the country (Rodriguez 10 , 1996).
4.7 SUMMARY
This chapter has presented the background and some of the most important
elements of public/private partnerships. These organizations define a complex
organizational context in which regional strategic transportation planning can
take place.
This chapter closes the framework part of the thesis. Chapter 5 will build on this
framework to show how scenario building fits the in the context of strategic
planning, regional transportation, and public/private partnerships.
108 http://www.its.dot.gov/architecture/
109 http://www.its.dot.gov/architecture/overview.htmI/
110 Rodriguez, Daniel. Developing a System Architecture for Intelligent Transportation Systems
with Application to San Juan, Puerto Rico, Master of Science in Transportation Thesis,
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering. Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
1996.
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5. SCENARIOS AS THE INTEGRATIVE TOOL
The previous three chapters have provided a framework in which scenarios will
be used for strategic planning of regional transportation. It is possible now to
study how the scenario-building technique fits into this framework. This chapter
starts by presenting the concept of scenarios, their main characteristics and the
roles they have been assigned in the planning literature. Then, we will study
how the use of scenarios relates to the major issues identified in the context of
strategic planning, regional transportation and the public/private partnerships.
Finally, three relevant scenario-planning efforts undertaken outside the
corporate environment will be briefly described.
5.1 SCENARIOS
Just as has occurred with the words "planning" and "strategy", the term
"scenario" has been used in many ways in the planning literature. A common
meaning attributed to scenario is that of "alternative", and for instance, the
financial feasibility of many projects is said to be evaluated in the face of
"optimistic, realistic and pessimistic scenarios". But the notion of a scenario as a
mere point in the future is very limited. Van der Heijden111 (1996) asserts that
'The scenario is a story, a narrative that links historical and present events
with hypothetical events taking place in the future."
A scenario can be thought of as a story describing how the future may unfold
from the present. Scenarios plot different forms in which the future may develop
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in a structured way.112 The term "structured" implies that it is not enough to
propose the future stage of the system: a cause-effect explanation on how this
actually might happen must be also provided. As an illustration, Figure 5.1
presents a set of events creating a scenario of growth of exports in an
agricultural region.
In Figure 5.1 the starting point is the current state. From there, a set of trends
and events that can be already perceived initiate the unfolding of the scenario.
It must be noted that some of these trends and events are external while some
others are internal to the region. The region has little if any control over the
external part of the scenario, but has a definitive influence in the internal events
of the scenario. Increased demand for agricultural products in Asia/Pacific (due
to the population growth in these countries), the generalized reduction in
cultivable areas and a lack of a technology that boosts crops productivity cause
the prices of food to rise in the international market. Additionally, the continuous
urbanization trend across the world generates a larger demand for processed
food. In the part of the scenario directly involved with the internal context of the
region, constant increases in trade and macroeconomic and political stability
enables an influential event: the establishment of a major transportation link
between the region and Asia/Pacific. Availability of this link, and improving the
regional transportation network (i.e., movement of products from production
centers to the primary link to Asia/Pacific) generate a reduction in transport costs
between these areas. This reduction and the higher prices of food encourage
more agricultural production in the region. The large demand for processed food
(an external element) and the additional production of food in the region (an
internal element) cause the establishment of food processing industries. At the
end, the region sees an increase in its exports of agricultural products and
processed food.
112 Schwartz, Peter. The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World,
Doubleday ed., 1996
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A Tentative Scenario for an Agricultural Region
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5.1.1 THE ROLES OF SCENARIOS
From the study of the scenario planning literature, three major roles assigned to
scenarios can be identified:
1. Scenarios as a forecasting tool.
Using probabilities for the events and trends under study, these works
range from simple risk assessments for decision-making to complex
developments in decision theory. A central activity in this role is to assign
probabilities of occurrence to the alternative scenarios constructed.
2. Scenarios as a tool to generate robust decisions.
In this "strategic-thinking " role, there are no probabilities assigned to the
scenarios. Scenarios are used to test the performance of specific
investment decisions, corporate strategies, or even public sector policies
for various scenarios. Therefore:
"The end result ....is not an accurate picture of tomorrow, but better
decisions about the future." 113
By thinking about how these decisions would perform under different but
equally likely scenarios114, it is possible to identify their vulnerability and
strengthen them accordingly. The role of scenarios is to broaden the
strategy and decision-makers' perspective about the future, so that they
can make sounder decisions. The final outcome of scenario-based
planning are robust decisions, i.e., decisions that will perform adequately
across a range of envisioned scenarios.
113 Ibid. 112, p9
114 The issue of assigning probabilities to scenarios based on their likelihood of occurrence will
be discussed in section 6.4
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The strengthening of existing strategies and decisions is not the only
function of scenarios under this approach. The identification, study and
deliberation of feasible futures by decision-makers provide the best
environment to formulate new strategies. In fact, Peter Wackl 15 (1985b),
one of the seminal figures in scenario developing, asserts that:
"If the scenario process does not bring out strategic options
previously unconsidered by managers, then it has been sterile"
3. Scenarios as a tool for organizational learning.
A good amount of recent literature strongly emphasizes this third role for
scenarios. It is based in the reassessment of the learning role of planning
proposed by the processualist school (refer to section 2.4.3). In this
approach, scenarios become a tool by which organizations learn to deal
with the complexity of its environment and improve its reactions in the
face of sudden changes.
While there are some exceptions, the above approaches seem to follow an
historic evolution in the literature, with the forecasting focus appearing earlier
and the decision and learning roles becoming more visible in recent years. In its
forecasting role, scenarios are primarily a quantitative tool that can be
programmed for a computer and most likely will yield a numerical result. Then it
is up to the decision-makers to use that figure to make a resolution. This
approach shares many of the limitations of other forecasting techniques.
The present thesis will focus on the use of scenarios as a strategic-thinking tool
for sounder decision-making in regional transportation. Also, the learning role of
scenarios will be also addressed at some extent. We will not address the
forecasting approach to scenarios.
115 Wack, Pierre., Scenarios: shooting the rapids. Harvard Business Review, Volume 85, number
6, November-December 1985, p.139-150
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5.1.2 BUILDING SCENARIOS: AN OVERVIEW
In Chapter 8 we will follow a step-by-step methodology to build scenarios for the
transportation system of a specific region (Mendoza, Argentina). This section
gives a brief overview of the major elements involved in scenario building.
Van der Heijden' 16 (1996) distinguishes three basic components in any scenario
exercise:
1. The characterization of internal issues or strategies about which an
organization is seeing for insight.
2. A set of scenarios describing alternate and possible futures of the
organization's environment that will affect these issues.
3. A component where scenarios interact with the internal issues. This is
the area in which scenarios can prove most productive: as a testbed
for organizations' strategies and concerns.
Mercer" 7 (1995) envisions the same components in three progressive groups of
activities:
1. Environmental Analysis
This is the stage in which the information that will be used to build
scenarios is gathered and studied. Mercer warns of the need to
undertake a high quality data collection and analysis:
"Scenarios can only be as good as the information they are based
upon." 118
116 Ibid. 22
117 Mercer, David. Scenarios Made Easy. Long Range Planning, Volume 28, issue 4, August
1995, p 81-86.
118 Ibid. 117
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Mercer also recommends these activities to be performed by a team
rather than an individual. A team-based approach widens the coverage of
the scanning and enriches the analysis due to the interaction among the
team members.
2. Scenario planning
Here is where the specific techniques of scenario planning are used. This
stage involves at least the following steps:
a) Identify, in the results of the environmental analysis, which
factors drive the development of the future -the drivers in the
scenarios.
b) Integrate the drivers into a meaningful and viable framework.
Here, it is necessary to discover the patterns that relate the
drivers. A structure is then created by grouping the drivers into
clusters according to their relationships. The links among
drivers should be also identified.
c) Generate initial "mini-scenarios". The resulting framework
allows to produce different alternative ways in which the future
may unfold as a result from the interactions between the
drivers. Mercer states that the number of this "mini-scenarios"
should be between seven and nine.
d) Reduce to 2-3 larger scenarios that encompass the most critical
issues and concerns. The reason for doing this is a practical
one, as the use of more scenarios is harder to manage by
decision-makers.
e) Write the scenarios in a format suitable for the audience for
which they are intended. As mentioned in the beginning of this
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chapter, scenarios are usually written as stories that describe
the unfolding of the future.
f) Finally, identify the important implications for the organization
resulting from the scenarios.
3. Corporate strategy
This stage involves all the subsequent events that use the results of the
scenario building to improve an organization's strategies and activities.
5.2 SCENARIOS AND THE STRATEGIC PLANNING CONTEXT
5.2.1 SCENARIOS AND THE THREE SCHOOLS OF PLANNING
Across the literature dealing with the strategic thinking and learning aspects of
scenarios, there are continuous references to the issues of strategic planning
already discussed in the Chapter 2 of this work. Several authors have
recognized that scenarios can play a broad and relevant role in modern strategic
planning by becoming a source of strategic thinking within organizations. Table
5.1 summarizes the functions that scenarios can play in each of the planning
schools introduced in Chapter 2. In Table 5.1 the general function of
"generating strategic thinking in the organization" is listed in all schools. It
should be noticed that, depending on the approach of each school -rationalist,
evolutionist or processualist- certain benefits of scenarios become more
relevant in explaining how they promote strategic thinking.
For the rationalist school the fact that makes scenarios a strategic-thinking tool
is that choosing is at the core of scenario-based planning. Different strategies
can be tested across all scenarios to prove their soundness and the tradeoffs
arising from the presence of alternatives are highlighted.
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The evolutionist can benefit from scenarios by means of their focus on strategy-
making and their ability to generate consensus. Scenarios are also a major tool
for studying the complexity and dynamism of the environment. Finally, the
processualist school can use scenarios as a tool to make managers' mental
models explicit as well as to reshape them to better match reality.
Table 5.1
Scenarios and the Three Schools of Planning
School Role of Function of Scenarios
Scenarios
Rationalist Strategic- * To generate strategic thinking in the
thinking organizations.
* To test decisions and strategies,
making them robust across all
envisioned scenarios.
* To highlight the choices and tradeoffs
faced by decision-makers.
* To broaden decision-makers
* To focus on the strategy-making
process.
* To generate consensus among
Processualist Learning * To generate strategic thinking in the
organizations.
* To make decision-makers' mental
model explicit.
* To help changing the decision-makers
mental models.
* To generate learning by "rehearsing"
.. _ ._..._ .._..  current decisions in the future.
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5.2.2 WHERE Do SCENARIOS FIT IN THE STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS?
Several frameworks that integrate scenarios with the activities of strategic
planning and management have been proposed. Based on the forecasting role
assigned to scenarios, Godet"19 (1990) perceives them as a tool for studying the
organization's environment and reducing uncertainty before decision-making is
actually undertaken. Wack'20 (1985b) on the other hand, sees the generation of
strategic options as the core benefit of scenarios and points out that this occurs
when scenarios are combined with the strategic vision and option planning
activities of an organization. Figure 5.2 uses again the strategic management
model proposed by Morrison and Wilson 121 (1996) to show the areas of influence
of scenarios in strategic planning.
Figure 5.2
Integration of Scenarios and the Strategic Planning/Management Systems
(adapted from Morrison and Wilson 22 , 1996)
119 Godet, Michel., Integration of Scenarios and Strategic Management: Using Relevant,
Consistent and Likely Scenarios. Futures, Volume 22, number 7, September 1990, p738
120 Ibid. 115
121 Ibid. 10
122 Ibid. 10
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In Chapter 2 we characterized strategic planning as encompassing the first four
blocks: environmental analysis, organizational assessment, strategic direction
and strategic plans. This thesis argues that scenarios interact directly with two of
them: the analysis of the external environment and the generation of strategic
direction.
5.2.3 PERCEPTION AND MENTAL MODELS: A COMMON ELEMENT IN THE DECISION-
MAKING AND LEARNING ROLES OF SCENARIOS
In the second of two classic articles on scenarios published in the Harvard
Business Review, Wack123 (1985b) asserts that the key problem with the use of
scenarios is that the "interface" with decision-makers is often ignored or
neglected. Scenarios in this case merely lay out a set of alternative futures to be
used as an input to decision-making; this is the case e.g., of the model by
Godet124 (1990) briefly mentioned above. Objecting to this view, Wack 125
(1985b) makes the following statement:
"Scenarios deal with two worlds: the world of facts and the world of
perceptions. They explore for facts but they aim at perceptions inside the
heads of decision-makers. They purpose is to gather and transform
information of strategic significance into fresh perceptions."
The notion behind this view is that the way in which decision-makers perceive
the world -their mental model of the world- will greatly influence their
determinations. Based on the requirement for cause-effect links between
envisioned events, scenarios are useful in challenging perceptions and mental
models. Managers can discover that the views they have regarding the future of
certain issues are not consistent with the trends and forces driving the future.
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The implications of this approach are central to decision-making and the need to
cope with uncertainty in planning. In their decision-making role, scenarios are
used to broaden the decision-makers perspective, which will generate sounder
decision. In the learning role, scenarios are an appropriate tool to make the
decision-makers' mental models explicit. In both approaches there is a
continuous effort to expand the manager's perspective and make their mental
model more consistent with reality. It can be seen that in any of these roles,
scenarios have a direct role in the decision-making process.
One of the most impressive examples of how scenarios can reshape perceptions
is the well-known scenario exercise carried out by Royal Dutch/Shell in the
1970's. Pierre Wack 126 (1985) who was the head of the Business Environment
Division of Shell's Planning Department at the time, provides an interesting first-
hand narration of the exercise, which is summarized below:
The planners of this multinational oil company were looking for events that could
significantly affect the business environment of Shell. A fundamental element of
the business was of course the price of oil, and therefore they investigated how
a price increase might occur. They actually identified determined events and
plausible trends that provided a cause-effect relation suggesting that oil
producer countries would eventually charge higher prices. But the perspective
of Shell's management had been shaped by decades of uniform growing
consumption and stable oil prices. Challenging the conventional wisdom of the
time, they presented their managers a set of scenarios in which oil prices
increased sharply. One of the most useful tools for reshaping the managers'
perspective was a set of scenarios whose foundation was the conventional
assumption that things would remain the same. These "challenge scenarios"
126 Wack, Pierre. Scenarios: uncharted waters ahead. Haivard Business Review, Volume 85,
number 5, September-October 1985, p.73-89
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highlighted the events that were necessary for the oil price to remain constant,
and it was clear that all of them were highly implausible. Then, Shell planners
described the dramatic impacts of an oil crisis on the operation of the company
and in the economies of the oil consumer countries. In response to the
recognition of this possibility Shell's managers perceived the possibility of the
crisis, and as a result the company performed much better than the other oil
companies when the oil OPEC crises occurred.
In a meeting held with Mr. Richard Karash, a Boston consultant working in the
areas of strategic planning and learning organizations, he acknowledged that
the success of Shell was not because they predicted the oil shock and acted
consequently. On the contrary, Shell was basically in the same position as the
rest of the industry when the crisis developed. What Shell did was to ask their
managers to explain how their strategies could perform adequately even in the
presence of high oil prices. The critical difference was that Shell decision-
makers were mentally prepared for such event, and therefore they adapted to
the new environment more rapidly.
5.3 SCENARIOS AND THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT CONTEXT
In Chapter 3 we mentioned the dynamic relationship between transportation and
the socioeconomic system. Two elements of this relation were studied in more
detail. The first one emphasized how transportation can affect the economic
development of a region; the second one showed how increased economic
competition among regions can shape their transportation systems. Overall, the
discussion highlighted the relevance of economic issues in transportation and
the need to integrate these considerations in the transportation planning
process.
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It must be asked then how effective is scenario-based planning in including the
economic and other concerns that affect regional transport? Wack 27 (1985b)
answers this question as follows:
"1 have found that scenarios can effectively organize a variety of seemingly
unrelated economic, technological, competitive, political, and societal
information and translate it into a framework for judgment in a way that no
model could do."
Scenarios explicitly integrate these external elements in one of the steps in the
scenario development process: the identification and study of the driving forces
that will lead the unfolding of the future. According to Schwartz' 28 (1996) driving
forces for a scenario are usually found in each of the following arenas:
* Society
* Technology
* Economics
* Politics
* Environment
Of particular interest to our previous discussion of competitiveness, Becker and
van Doornm29 (1987) see, as one of the strong points of scenarios, its ability to
assist organizations to perform the kind of competition analysis suggested by
Porter and presented in section 3.3.3. Scenarios can provide useful insights on
how competitors may react in the face of future events. Scenario planning
involves the identification of:
1. The forces that are driving the markets for current products of services,
2. Trends that can affect the attractiveness of a region, and
3. Future niches and opportunities.
127 Ibid. 115
128 Ibid. 113
129 Becker, Henk A., and Joseph W.M. van Doom. Scenarios in an Organizational Perspective.
Futures, Volume 19, number 6, December 1987, p 669-667
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In order for scenarios to capture the context of regional transportation -or any
context in which scenario planning will be used- an extensive research effort is
needed. While several general topics may be used as input in any scenario,
research will also require information specific to the field of application. The
information needs of scenario planning are significant, and include "hard data"
(statistics and the like) as much as "soft data" (expert insights, management
opinions).
5.4 SCENARIOS AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT
5.4.1 PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS' CHARACTERISTICS AFFECTING THE PLANNING
PROCESS
Chapter 4 provided a picture of the planning role for public/private partnerships
that this thesis argues would improve regional strategic transportation planning.
These mixed associations are a special kind of organizations and their specific
characteristics will affect the planning process. The determinants of the strategic
process proposed by Quinn and reviewed in section 2.5.1 can shed some light
for such organizations:
1. Organizational culture
It must be emphasized that a public/private partnership is not an
"organization" in the sense of being as a corporation or a public agency.
In the words of O.P. Agarwall 30 , it is more an "arrangement of
organizations". Nevertheless, the tangible boundaries, established
hierarchy, accountability, and shared vision of the partnership can help to
create a culture of its own. The culture in the partnership will be the first
1 30o Agarwal, O.P. MIT Graduate Student. Personal Communication. March, 1998
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determinant of the planning activities. The existence of a collaborative or
confrontational attitude between public and private stakeholders will make
a big difference in the outcome of the effort. A relevant issue in these
associations will likely be how to create a bond between all participants
and the public/private organization at large. Each member of the
partnership will be clearly identified with an independent organization.
Every partner should see its participation as a way to serve its own
interest and the interests of the region-at-large at the same time.
A related issue is that of continuity. Efforts to build an effective
public/private planning culture should aim to establish the partnership on
a permanent basis.
2. Nature of the environment and opposition.
The complexity of the regional environment for transportation will be one
of the most significant parameters in the strategic planning process.
There is a broad range of issues that need to be considered in any
transportation solution, and different political constituencies can originate
sharp opposition, which will hinder the planning process. Decision-
making in the partnership will face simultaneously the complex
environment and latent and overt opposition from different groups.
3. Organizational form and management style
Most participants will have operating independence. The presence of
shippers, carriers, infrastructure developers, public agencies,
environmental advocates and so on, will generate diverging and
conflicting interests.
It is under this panorama that major decisions on the management style of
the partnership are to be taken. Chapter 4 argued that unless private
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organizations can effectively influence the process with decision-making
functions, there is a risk of lack of interest by the private sector. On the
other hand, it was also pointed out that the profit-maximizing behavior
needs to be supervised and harnessed by the state in order to assure the
public interest. These two ideas suggest private sector decision-making
entitlement under public sector supervision and direction. The question
that remains to be answered is how to integrate these seemingly opposite
requirements in the structure of the partnership. How can we find the
right balance?
4. Time horizon and degree of control over events.
In general, the time horizon for this kind of exercises will not be short.
While some significant events and trends driving the environment will be
out of the region's control, some others can certainly be influenced and
managed.
According to Quinn's theory, the above issues strongly suggest that the planning
process in a public/private partnership will follow an incremental approach. One
implication from this incremental character is the need to build consensus to
advance the planning process. Tenaglia and Noonan131 (1992) have reported
the ability of scenarios to build management consensus in the corporate context.
But with a broad range of independent organizations and political contention
involved in the regional transportation planning it will be harder to generate
consensus in the partnership. Most stakeholders clearly would like to influence
the outcome of the process in a way that is favorable for them. Can scenarios
help to build consensus under these circumstances? Based on evidence from
past experiences, the author of this work believes it can be done. Section 5.5.2
later on this chapter, presents a case in which scenarios helped to generate
123
common understanding in a broad and highly politicized atmosphere with public
and private participants from opposite constituencies.
5.4.2 SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT STAFF: INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL TO THE
PARTNERSHIP?
Following the growing use of scenarios and the recognition of their ability to
generate strategic thinking in organizations, several works have studied some
organizational issues involved in scenario planning. If an organization desires
to undertake scenario planning it can develop an "internal unit" to guide this
activity, such as the one in Royal Dutch/Shell, or instead contract an "external
unit" of consultants and scenario experts. The important thing to notice is that
regardless of the internal/external characteristic of the staff that will lead the
scenario building, active participation from the members of the organization in
the exercise is essential.
Becker and van Doorn132 (1987) describe the conditions that support the
presence of an internal or external scenario-guiding staff. Table 5.2 summarizes
their work on this matter.
A public/private partnership for regional strategic transportation planning
combines characteristics that can support an internal or external staff: a
partnership will congregate different organizations that can benefit individually
from the work carried out by an internal scenario unit. On the other hand it is
unclear whether the flow of scenario projects will be continuous enough to justify
the internal staff. For a public/private association starting with the use of
scenarios, the use of external guidance in the form of specialized consultants
13' Tenaglia Mason, and Patrick Noonan. Scenario-based Strategic Planning: A Process for
Building Top Management Consensus. Planning Review, Volume 20, number 2, March-April
1992, p13-19
132 Ibid. 129
124
seems to be the most rational approach. After a first or few other exercises, the
organization can decide to establish an internal unit for future scenario activities.
Table 5.2
Internal or External Scenario-Guiding Staff
(based on Becker and van Doornl33, 1987)
Characteristics that support an Characteristics that support an
Internal Staff Internal Staff
Large organizations that can afford * Small organization
tiDiscontinuous flow of projects or ofitself, or a number of smaller
organizations having enough in ver i i. .
common as to be served by the * Aim for broad public participation in
* A continuous flow of similar projects
* A need or preference to keep the
work in secret.
5.4.3 COMMON PROBLEMS IN SCENARIO PLANNING
The use of scenarios in any organization is not free from obstacles and flaws.
Among them Schriefer 34 (1995) notes:
Lack of focus
In order to be useful, scenarios must be relevant to the decision issues
and strategic concerns of the decision-makers in the organization. To
reshape managers' perspective, scenarios must start precisely from
their concerns and perception of the world. Scenarios should be used
without losing sight from the decision context and the audience for
whom they are developed.
133 Ibid. 129
134 Schriefer, Audrey. Getting the Most Out of Scenarios: Advice from the Experts. Planning
Review, Volume 23, number 5, September-October 1995, p33-35
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* Lack of involvement by decision-makers'
Decision-makers need to be involved in and committed to the scenario
process. Without this active participation the use of scenarios
becomes futile.
* Scenarios are challenging and difficult to use
Scenarios challenge decision-makers' and planners' perspectives and
are time- and effort-intensive at the same time. It is important that the
process be carried out carefully to avoid excessive complexity and
burden that will discourage the interest of managers and staff.
Ralston, as cited by Schriefer135 (1995), suggests the following tactics to
overcome the above problems:
1. Develop an organizational culture receptive to scenarios.
This is a central issue. To promote a receptive culture, scenarios
should be tailored to the specific needs of the organization, made
simple and relevant to the strategic concerns of managers. As already
mentioned, participation of decision-makers is essential.
Based on her experience in a comprehensive scenario planning
activity undertaken by British Airways, Moyer 136 (1996) provides
additional insight on how such receptive culture can be promoted:
'The positioning of the Scenario Planning exercise as an
'experiment' and the consultative style engaged people's interest
135 Ibid. 134
136 Moyer, Kathy. Scenario Planning at British Airways -A Case Study. Long Range Planning,
Volume 29, Issue 2, April 1996, p172-181
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without them feeling that a new structure was being imposed on
them. This mean people tended to be predisposed to being
involved in the exercise."
2. Look for opportunities to use scenario planning
Because scenarios are easier to apply to certain issues, organizations
using the methodology for the first times should try to apply scenarios
to these topics. In general investment decisions, contingency
planning and explicit challenges to planning assumptions are more
friendly applications of scenarios.
3. Create a strong communication program to transmit the messages of
the scenarios to the entire organization.
Once the scenarios have been developed, they should be presented
to the members of the organization that did not participate in their
construction. Realizing the insights and strategic implications of each
scenario require them to be communicated properly and in a way that
catches the attention of the audience. For instance, Ralston suggests
playing each scenario in ten-minute video segments.
4. Link the scenario development with the rest of the strategic
management process.
Building scenarios should not be isolated from the rest of the strategic
planning and management activities. As put forward by Schriefer 37 :
"Scenarios are not the answer to everything. They must fit within a
corporate vision and cannot stand alone. They need to be
supported by a good planning and thinking infrastructure in the
company."
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5.5 EXAMPLES OF SCENARIO-BUILDING OUTSIDE THE
CORPORATE ENVIRONMENT
Within the scenario literature, many of the cases where the methodology has
been applied belong to private sector organizations. This section will present
three examples in which scenario planning has been used outside the corporate
domain. These examples describe scenario activities in different countries and
with different focus, in which the issues under study were clearly relevant for
both public and private stakeholders.
5.5.1 THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT PREPARES FOR THE FUTURE: THE GOVERNANCE
SCENARIOS
A scenario effort directly involved with the needs and objectives of the public
sector was undertaken in Canada in 1995. The following narration of this
exercise is based on information provided by the Canadian government's Task
Force on the Future of the Public Service (TFFPS)138:
In August of 1995 the Canadian government created the Task Force on the
Future of the Public Service which was commissioned to explore the future of the
federal public service for a ten-year planning period. The Task Force was
composed of 26 members primary from the public and academic fields and with
minor participation from the private sector. Scenario planning was chosen as a
tool to test policies and decision in different futures, instead of trying to predict a
particular future.
The Task Force needed to be prepared before building the scenarios. This
learning effort lasted four months and was structured in the following way:
138 Public Service Commission of Canada. Task Force on the Future of the Public Service: The
Governance Scenarios. http://www.psc-cfp.gc.ca/library/scenar/scenar f/sarapr30.htm
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* An initial workshop to identify key strategic issues involving the future of
the public sector, predetermined elements, critical certainties and
uncertainties, and needs for further information research.
* The use of selected readings for certain topics.
* Several intensive roundtable discussions with worldwide recognized
experts.
* Input from strategic conversations with federal deputy ministers.
* A final session in which the Task Force participated developed the
scenarios.
* Several follow-up half day workshops with senior public servants were
held to refine the scenarios to improve their usefulness.
Resulting from the process were three "governance scenarios" (labeled
"Evolution", "Market", and "Renaissance") describing three different futures in
which Canadian public sector might need to operate and govern the country. A
"Crisis Wild Card" was added later as another way in which Canada might
evolve. Following the refining of the scenarios, the Task Force has promoted
their use as:
"a powerful set of tools for encouraging and facilitating strategic discussion
and dialogue about the future of the public service, about governance in
Canada, and even about public policy issues." 139
Table 5.3 based on the on-line document prepared by Task Force, depicts the
main characteristics of the scenarios resulting from this effort:
139 Ibid. 138
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5.5.2 SOUTH AFRICA LEARNS FROM THE FUTURE TO DECIDE IN THE PRESENT:
THE MOUNT FLEUR SCENARIOS
Just as the experience of Shell in the seventies showed the power of scenarios
to reshape decision-makers' perspective, the so called "Mont Fleur scenarios"
highlight how this tool can benefit strategic conversations and build consensus
amidst a group of individuals with conflictive positions. The facilitator for the
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.. ....... Table 5.3
The Governance Scenarios
(based on the Task Force for the Future of Public Service of Canada)
Scenario Main Characteristics of the Scenario
Scenario 1 * More attention to the parts that to the entire system: different regions and
"Evolution" groups increasingly pursue their own interest; institutions function as
S independent entities instead that elements of an integrated system
: Step by step improvements in the public service; continuity on the
performance of bureaucratic procedures and institutional leadership
* Government manages problems pragmatically and carefully
SI : : : . :A focus on the short to medium term
Scenario 2 * A borderless world centered around regional economies; growing income
"Market" disparity, favoring entrepreneurs and risk-takers
SMarket mechanisms are used to address social and regional issues;
private sector concerns help to set federal agenda
* Society continuously adapts to the needs of competition in the global
ec:onomy; wealth creation becomes a priority
* The role of government is refocused to support and facilitate
international competitiveness
Scenario 3 * Challenges are addressed through a more inclusive and systematic
"Renaissance" approach
* The responsibility for governance is redistributed among society, private
and public sectors; increased citizen participation in decision-making; the
roeI of the federal government is to provide strategic, long term and
leadership
Partnerships and alliances are the foundation of business relations; the
distributioof wealth is more equitable
* A learning:society harnesses: technology and uses it to compete
effectively in the global information technology
"The Griss Wild . : Generalized falling incomes; ::people expect the government to lead and
Card" act; the public sector's speed of reaction becomes critical
* While sovereignty and international status of Canada are at risk, the
_ f ::: i:i: i: ocus in I n political direction/survival
140 Ibid. 138
Mont Fleur scenarios, Adam Kahane, as cited by van der Heijdenl 41 (1996)
provides the basis for the following description:
The project was undertaken between 1991-1992 --a period of great uncertainty
and charged with conflict in South Africa due to the political transition being
negotiated at the time. The scenario effort brought together a group of 22
prominent members of the South African society representing different
constituencies: left-wing activists, officials of the African National Congress,
senior corporate executives and academics.
The group was divided in subgroups that were asked to generate stories of what
could occur to South Africa. With such organizational setting, a major concern
was the distortion of the scenario-building process encouraged by the
participants' personal or political interests. Kahane avoided this risk by:
1. Making the participants to focus on "what might happen" instead of
what they would like to happen"
2. Requiring the strict adherence to the cause-effect relationship
between events envisioned as part of a scenario.
This second point proved of fundamental importance as several of the scenarios
created were clearly based on the interests of particular groups. Each scenario
was then presented in a plenary session and only two questions were allowed to
challenge a scenario:
* "Why does that happen?"
* "What happens next?"
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Unless the presenter of the scenario could answer these questions in a
satisfactory way, the story was regarded as inconsistent and therefore unworthy
of further consideration. This search for internal consistency in the scenarios
allowed the process to remain free from distortions. The remaining scenarios
were narrowed down and finally four stories believed to be most relevant for the
South African context were chosen. Each of these four scenarios ("Ostrich",
"Lame Duck", "Icarus" and "Flamingoes") represented a plausible future and
highlighted some of the threats facing the country. Table 5.4 presents the main
events that define each scenario. All the parties involved in the discussion
gained a new level of awareness regarding the impact of the decisions that were
about to be taken.
5.5.3 LESSONS FROM MONT FLEUR
In a later document, Kahane 142 highlights what the results of the Mont Fleur
scenarios were and were not:
* The scenarios did not solve the crisis. It helped to establish a common
language and mutual understanding among the involved parties. Some
areas of understanding were important in the actual negotiations that in
this case occurred simultaneously to the scenario exercise.
* The scenarios did not generate agreement on the solution to the problem.
It generated consensus on how the country "worked" on the nature of the
crisis and on some of its feasible outcomes.
142 http://www.gbn.org/scenarios/fleur/fleurlntro.html. Kahane, Adam Learning from Mont Fleur:
Scenarios as a Tool for Discovering Common Ground.
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Table 5.4
The Mont Fleur Scenarios
(based on Davis-Floyd'
Scenario Summary and Main Events of the Scenario
Scenario 1 "The Ostrich depicts a government that does not want to face realities. An
"Ostrich" ostrich supposedly hides its head in the sand when danger threatens. The
ostrich does not want to see and cannot fly away..."
* Increased international tolerance enables the white government to harden its
position, which leads to a break down in the constitutional negotiations
* A "moderate alliance" government is formed and faces the opposition of the
liberation movements; the State represses mass resistance
* Economy remains lagging due to and unstable business climate and
escalating violence, leading to stagnation economic hardship
0* Eventually, negotiations reopen, but under worse conditions than before
Scenao 2 "The Lame Duck envisages a formal, protracted transition for most of the coming
"Lame Duck" decade, like a bird with a broken wing that cannot get off the ground, and thus
has an extremely uncertain future."
* An agreement is negotiated, but fears from the different stakeholders
impose clauses and conditions that slow and hinder the transition.
* The long transition based on an enforced coalition incapacitates government
* Indecisive government policies fail to address the social and economic
_.._ i__ : problems of South Africa; uncertainty grows, investments hold back
Scenario 3 "The third scenario is one of macro-economic populism of a popularly elected
"Icarus" government which tries to achieve too much, too quickly, like the youthful Icarus
flying too close to the sun."
* Government tries to solve the inherited problems through massive spending
Fmine"* After a i couple of years of impressive economic results and improved living
falls into a deep eytco sustainabe ecn~mic a al o tk f es crisisi
possible"
* Sound social and macro-economic policies are adopted; government
becomes more efficient and succeeds in curtailing corruption
* Adequate social investments reduce violence and give hope to the
population; gradual and generalized income increase
* Substantial agreement on general objectives; balance between social
reconstruction and sustained economic growth
143 Davis-Floyd, Robbie. Storying Corporate Futures: The Shell Scenarios. The International
Journal of Futures Studies. Volume 1, 1995-1997 (excerpted form "The Mont Fleur Scenarios"
The Weekly Mail/The Guardian Weekly, South Africa, 1992.1)
htto://www.svstems.ora/HTMUfsi-vOl/rd-f/shell-3.htm
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Kahane 144 also lists a set of conditions for the success of these kinds of scenario
efforts. From them we can draw the lessons that Mont Fleur can bring for the
development and use of scenarios in public/private partnerships:
1. In order to be effective, the development of scenarios must be a
credible process. The people guiding and structuring the activity must
be broadly respected as advocates of the planning process and not of
any particular position or outcome.
2. Developing the scenarios is an informal and reflective process whose
power comes from its status as an insight-building and imaginative
exercise. It should be treated separately from any formal negotiations
and/or joint decision-making to be made. As mentioned earlier in the
chapter, the influence of scenarios includes the generation of
strategies and decision-making. But Kahane warns us about the need
to insulate each of these processes carefully.
3. Because developing the scenarios will build common ground among
the different organizations involved, it is important that the process be
as inclusive as possible. Participants must represent all the important
perspectives at hand.
4. Individual participants must be respected in their organizations and
able to influence their own groups and constituencies. They should
also approach the process with open mind and be able to listen to and
work with others.
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5.5.4 STUDYING THE FUTURE OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE US
The last application of scenarios presented in this chapter was undertaken in the
US and is directly related to the transportation field. The following description is
based on a report from the Research And Technology Coordinating Committee
(RTCC) of the Federal Highway Administration (RTCC 145 , 1997):
The issue to be studied was the future of the US highway transportation system.
The RTCC developed a list of key factors that could serve as descriptors of the
future highway system:
* Future travel demand
* The future role of the government; new trends in finance and taxation
* Information and communication technologies
* Environmental and energy-related issues
* Vehicle and fuel technology
* Delivery of social services
* Other (economic globalization, social attitudes and values)
In order to identify the driving forces of the scenarios, the most important and
most uncertain of these element were chosen. The criteria for doing so required
that the driving forces should:
* Be essential to the development of the future highway system and at the
same time be independent of it.
* Having a considerable uncertainty and the potential for a major shift over
the next 25 years.
145 Research and Technology Coordinating Committee (FHWA) The Future Highway
Transportation System and Society: Suggested Research on Impacts and Interactions.
Transportation Research Board, Washington, DC, 1997
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Based on these parameters, four issues were identified as the driving forces of
these scenarios: highway-related technology, finance, energy and the
environment. Each of these driving forces was considered to have two possible
end states, which are depicted in Figure 5.3. The combination of these
outcomes defines the different futures that can occur.
State 1 Driving Force State 2
Continuously supported,
developed and
implemented
Availability of public
financing; support for
higher fuel tax and user
fees
Sharp increase in energy
costs
' Highway Technology
Finance
Energy
Environment
\j
Lack of support and
stagnation; innovation
stifled
Low-cost energy is readily
available
Environmental
degradation is tolerated;
improvements are not
supported
Figure 5.3
Possible outcomes of the Driving Forces
(based on RTCC146, 1997)
The RTCC examined the 16 possible combinations resulting from four driving
forces each with two alternative outcomes. Table 5.5 shows the scenarios that
were chosen as representing the widest range of feasible futures with the
minimum overlap:
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User fees are not
supported; public finance
covers only maintenance,
most new facilities are
privately funded
Environmental concerns
are a main policy goal;
public support for
environmental
improvements
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Table 5.5
Four Scenarios for the Transportation System in the US
(based on RTCC 147, 1997)
Scenario End-State of Characteristics of the Scenario
Driving Forces
Scenario 1 * Highway technology * Rationing of petroleum and gasoline supplies;
"Scarcity and stagnates sharp reduction in single-occupancy vehicle
Downward * Lack of political will travel; increased demand for lighter, more
Spiral" to apply user fees energy-efficient vehicles ;
* Sharp reduction of * Personal mobility is not a high priority goal;
low-cost energy reduction of non-work travel
supplies * Reduction in transportation funding
* Environmental * Increased use of telecommunications and
improvements are information technologies
not supported * Concerns of economic well-being make
environmental protection a low priority goal
Scenario 2 * Highway technology * Growing income disparity, continuing
"Significant stagnates suburbanization and deterioration of central
Downturn for * Lack of political will cities; transit almost entirely privatized
the Nation" to apply user fees * Widespread use of communications and
* Low-cost energy is information technology
available * Limited funds for transportation and
* Environmental deterioration of the nation's infrastructure,
improvements are especially in areas of cold weather
not supported * The location of cities and regions would
become critical to their economic success
* Increasing security problems for freight
shipments and individuals
Scenario 3 * Highway technology * Widespread support for innovations in highway
"The Present is widely used and transportation systems technology
Reflected into * Lack of political will * Increased use of public/private partnerships for
the Future" to apply user fees transportation projects; increased willingness
* Low-cost energy is of the private sector to invest heavily in ITS
available * Metropolitan areas with economic potential are
* Environmental benefited
improvements are * Growing conflict in certain locations to choose
supported between rehabilitating old infrastructure or add
road capacity
Scenario 3 * Highway technology * Clear signs of a global warming threat triggers
"Improvements is widely used research and efforts to reduce the effects of
in Many Areas" * Political support to petroleum-based transportation
apply user fees * Technological breakthroughs lead to clean,
* Low-cost energy is renewable and low -cost energy
available * The externalities of transportation are routinely
* Environmental accounted for in pricing travel behavior
improvements are * The gas tax stops being the major source of
supported revenue for highway agencies
146 Ibid. 145
147 Ibid. 145
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5.6 SUMMARY
Chapter 5 has presented the way in which scenarios integrate some of the major
concerns identified earlier in the framework part of the thesis:
* Scenarios have an important role to play in each of the three schools of
planning (rationalist, evolutionist and processualist). Scenarios puts
planning activities back into the track of strategic thinking by highlighting
the need to choose among different alternatives, generate consensus
among decision-makers, or generate organizational learning by reshaping
managers' mental models.
* Scenario building allows us to capture the complexity of the context of the
system under study and the key issues of its performance. For instance,
with scenarios we can include into our decision-making process both the
characteristics of the world economy and the specifics of a regional
transportation system.
* Scenario building is a tool that has been used by public and private
organizations and even mixed associations. Scenarios can provide a
common ground for the public and private sector to start a common
approach to policy formation and regional transportation planning.
In the following chapter, we will study in more depth the theory and principles
underlying scenario-building.
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6. THE SCENARIO-BULDING METHODOLOGY
Chapter 5 presented the main ideas behind scenario planning and how
scenarios can help to solve some of the limitations and concerns previously
identified in the contexts of strategic planning, regional transportation and
public/private partnerships. Chapter 6 will go deeper in the theory and practical
principles underlying the development of scenarios. First, we will present an
overview of the theory behind scenarios. Then, three different approaches to
building scenarios will be introduced. One of them will be chosen and will be
studied further before we apply this methodology in the Province of Mendoza,
Argentina. Finally, the issue of assigning probabilities or not to scenarios, a
fundamental area of debate in the scenario community, will be addressed.
6.1 ELEMENTS AND DEGREES OF UNCERTAINTY IN SCENARIOS
Figure 6.1, which repeats for the reader's convenience the scenario structure
depicted in the previous chapter will be used to illustrate some of the concepts
used in scenarios. Amara and Lipinski148 (1983) identify two primary elements
that affect the development of the future, and characterize their differences:
a) Events have discrete values, and are usually reduced to two possible
states. An example of an event in the scenario sketched in Figure 6.1
is the provision of a major infrastructure link between the agricultural
region and the Asia/Pacific area, the two states being the existence or
lack of such link.
b) Trends have a continuous range of feasible values. These can be
easily identified in Figure 6.1 as the growth rates of population and
148 Amara, Roy and Andrew Lipinski. Business Planning for an Uncertain Future: Scenarios and
Strategies, Pergamon Press, 1983
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consequently of the demand for agricultural products, or the economic
indicators of trade, Gross National Product (GNP) and the like.
Increased
population in
Asia/Pacific
countries.
+ F.
Macroeconomic
and political
stant trade stability in the
creases. Region
Establishment of a major transport
link between the Region and the
Asia/Pacific markets
/
III Ul
regional
transportation
network
Higher prices
of agricultural
products in the
international
market 4
Increase in the
agricultural
production in the
Region
and food processed
exports.
Figure 6.1
Trends in a Scenario Structure
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Different Events and
I I
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In section 2.2.2 we saw that different trends and events in the future have
different levels of uncertainty. Based on Schwartz 149 (1996) and Van der
Heijden i s5 , (1996) we can classify the trends and events that form a scenario
according to their degree of uncertainty as follows:
1. Predetermined Elements
A basic premise behind scenario planning -and planning in general- is
that while we can not forecast the entire outcome of a system, there are at
least some events that can be predicted and trends whose result can be
forecast. Schwartz calls these the "predetermined elements" of a
scenario, and points out that they can be found in:
* Slow-changing trends, such as demographic growth
* Constrained situations, which in the example of Figure 6.1 can be
illustrated as the inevitable pressure to increase food prices, due to
an increase in population, the reduction of cultivable lands, and the
inability to generate a breakthrough in food production technology.
* Elements "in the pipeline", e.g., the number of teenagers or senior
citizens that will live in the industrialized nations by the year 2005.
2. Risks
There are also trends and events whose outcome is not known, but can
be assessed thanks to historical precedents that allow a sound estimation
of probabilities for the possible outcomes. A classic example of this kind
of uncertainty occurs in the decision to drill an oil well. Most of the time
there is not enough information to be sure that a specific site contains
sufficient oil as to be a profitable enterprise. But based on previous
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similar experiences the oil industry has developed the knowledge
required to assign probabilities to this problem and act consequently.
3. Structural or Critical Uncertainties.
These are events or trends that are identified as central factors that will
affect the development of the future. Because they are often unique, we
usually do not have a reliable way to estimate their likelihood. Looking at
Figure 6.1 again, the growth of population and the reduction of farming
land are slow changing trends which can be thought as "predetermined".
But for the other factor needed for higher food prices -a lack of
breakthrough in agricultural technology - we can not know with certainty
whether or not will occur. We know that is feasible, but we do not know
that will actually happen, and if it does, what form will it take. In this
scenario, technology is a critical uncertainty that must be considered. It is
simply not possible to confidently assign probabilities to such critical
uncertainties.
4. Unknowables
These are events that we can not even imagine will appear in the future.
We know that these elements occur from time to time in society, but we
can not prepare for them.
6.2 CRITICAL UNCERTAINTIES: SEARCHING FOR A STRUCTURE
Figure 6.2 taken from Van der Heijden s51 (1996) presents an interesting view on
how scenarios can effectively address the critical uncertainties. At the top of the
"iceberg structure" in Figure 6.2 there are the events that we can see happening
in the environment, --the first step in analyzing critical uncertainties. After
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several events have occurred in time, we begin to distinguish a pattern or
discover a trend. The mental process does not stop there. The immediate step
is to try to find the cause of the pattern. We identify several factors that play a
role in causing the occurrences and we assume that there is a structure linking
the factors in a way that determines the direction and magnitude of the events.
Figure 6.2
The Iceberg Structure of Critical Uncertainties
(Taken from Van der Heijden l 52, 1996)
Building scenarios requires us to find the structure behind a number of critical
events. To understand the structure of an event, we must generate a cause-
effect relationship among the different factors involved. This "causal" structure
is in fact a model that can be used to project -not predict- possible future
conditions in the form of a scenario. It is necessary to remember here that
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because of our mental models, different people will generate different structures
of cause-effect, generating in turn different scenarios. A way to address this
problem is through the formation of interdisciplinary "scenario teams". The team
will have a broader perspective than any one individual and can provide also the
necessary filter to refine the ideas of each participant.
"Scenario planners start from the premise that there is much more to be
said than just reporting events. They assume structure underneath events,
driving these in one direction or another. The assumption is that events do
not just happen at random, but they are related to each other through a
structure where causes drive effects and one event leads to another." 153
6.3 THREE APPROACHES TO SCENARIO-BUILDING
Huss and Honton l5 4 (1987) provide a comprehensive description of three
different approaches for building scenarios:
1. Intuitive Logics
This methodology is also known as the "SRI approach" to scenarios after
the Stanford Research Institute, which together with Royal Dutch/Shell
developed this fashion of scenario-building. The underlying assumptions
of the intuitive logics method are
* In order to improve decision-making, organizations must
understand the complex relations between different external
factors that will influence the outcome of decisions.
* These factors are of economic, political, technological, social
and environmental nature. Many of them are "soft data" as
politics, environmental concerns, and social attitudes that can
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only be characterized with qualitative attributes. These
variables are not suitable for use in quantitative forecasting
models.
The main steps of this approach are (Huss and Honton'55 1987)
a) The demarcation of the scope of the task, by defining the
organization's decisions and strategic concerns that will be
analyzed.
b) The identification of the most important "decision factors" that
will determine the success or failure of the strategies/decisions.
c) The identification of the key forces in the environment of the
organization that are behind the decision factors, i.e., the
elements that "drive" the decision factors.
d) A thorough analysis on the key environmental forces, including
past trends, uncertainties and interrelationships among these
forces.
e) The definition of the logics behind each scenario. The major
assumptions of how each scenario may develop.
f) The actual development of the scenarios. This stage integrates
the scenario logics and the key environmental forces identified
earlier. Here is where a sound cause-effect relationship
between events must be established.
g) The determination of the implications for the performance of the
organization's strategies/decisions in the face of each of the
scenarios.
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Long Range Planning. Volume 20, number 4, August 1987, UK.
2. Trend-impact Analysis
The second methodology presented by Huss and Honton is based on an
independent forecast of an already selected set of key dependent
variables. This forecast is adjusted later on depending on the occurrence
of impacting events. The main steps involved in this approach are (Huss
and Hontonl5 6, 1987)
a) Selection of the topic of study and identification of the key
scenario drivers. The drivers are then classified into alternative
states. If the drivers of a set of scenarios are the level of
competition in certain industry and the condition of the
international economy, the driver-states can be chosen as
strong or weak competition and stagnated or growing
international economy. Each of these driver-states are placed
in a matrix as shown in Figure 6.3 and the scenarios result from
the combination of these driver-states.
Stagnated:
ii nternational
!i Economy.
Growing
International
Ec::: onomy:
-- - -- -
Strong
Competition
Scenario 1
Scenario 3
Weak
Competition
Scenario 2
Scenario 4
• : .. ... .. . .: .. ,, :. ...: : :. . /..: .. :: : ]
"- i : : i:: i: : :: i i: : !::: ] - : :: ii -: 
Figure 6.3
Driver-States Matrix and Resulting Scenarios
s15 Ibid. 154
156 Ibid. 154
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b) Creation of a "scenario space", i.e. selecting a subset of the
scenarios resulting from the driver-state matrix. Following the
example of Figure 6.3, the organization may choose scenarios
1, 2 and 3 as the more relevant ones to be refined. It must be
noticed that in other cases, the driver-state matrix can easily
have more than four scenarios.
c) Identification of relevant trends and collection of time-series
data. Once the organization has determined the scenario
space, a comprehensive list of impacting trends is created and
historical data on them is collected.
d) Extrapolation of these trends into the future by means of
standard time-series techniques.
e) Identifying a list of impacting events, based on literature review,
or consulting experts in the related areas.
f) Estimation of time-dependent probabilities of occurrence for
each of the impacting events.
g) Modification of the extrapolation previously done, based on the
trend-impact analysis and the event-probability estimations.
h) Writing of the narratives constituting the scenarios.
3. Cross-Impact Analysis
The idea behind this analysis is that events should not be forecast in
isolation from the occurrence of other impacting events. Huss and Honton
identify two major branches of this approach: the INTERAX and BASICS
methodologies. A brief description of these approaches follows (Huss
and Hontonl7, 1987):
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A. INTERAX (Interactive Cross-Impact Simulation).
Developed at the University of Southern California, ITERAX is based on a
computerized simulation model and its approach follows eight steps:
a) Definition of the issue and time period to be analyzed.
b) Identification of key indicators whose values can be measured
or estimated in time.
c) Projection of the key indicators by developing models that use
econometric and forecasting techniques.
d) Identification of impacting events through interviews and
discussions with experts, and using the ITERAX Delphi
database.
e) Development of probability distributions for the impacting
events.
f) Estimation the impact of the events on the key indicator
variables.
g) Completion of the cross-impact analysis.
h) Run the model. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, each run will
generate a single scenario.
B. BASICS (Battelle Scenario Inputs to Corporate Strategies)
The main differences between BASICS and INTERAX is that the former
one does not use Monte Carlo simulation and does not perform
independent forecasts of the key indicators. BASICS is also based on a
computer model and its steps are
a) Definition of the topic, scope and time period
b) Identification of areas of influence (political, technological,
economic, regulatory)
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c) Definition of "descriptors", i.e. key factors, trends, attributes or
variables that describe the topic. Descriptors are then
classified in "states", and a matrix of descriptor-states (similar to
the driver-state matrix presented in Figure 6.3 is formed).
d) Completion of the cross-impact matrix and running of the
computer program.
e) Selection of scenarios for further study, based on the results of
the last step.
f) Inclusion of low-probability but high-impact events as part of a
sensitivity analysis.
g) Forecast and study the implications of each scenario.
6.3.1 CHOOSING AN APPROACH FOR THE APPLICATION PART OF THE THESIS
The scenarios to which we have been referring in past chapters of this thesis are
related to the intuitive logics methodology. The following are the main reasons
for choosing this approach:
* The exchange of ideas when building the scenarios and the discussion of
their implications generate a proper environment for performing strategic
thinking in the organizations.
* The identification of the forces driving the future and the sound cause-
effect requirement between events are useful tools to reshape decision-
makers' perspectives. In this way, the intuitive logics scenarios provide a
direct link into the strategic direction block of the planning process (see
Figure 5.2).
* It does not intend to play any forecasting role, which would limit the ability
of scenarios to uncover the entire range of possibilities posed by the
future.
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The intense intellectual interaction between participants can become the
common ground to initiate or advance planning efforts involving public
and private stakeholders.
Chapter 8 applies the framework based on this approach to develop scenarios
for the transportation system in the Province of Mendoza in Argentina. The next
section will expand the study of the intuitive logics approach to scenario building.
6.3.2 A SCENARIO-BUILDING FRAMEWORK -INTUITIVE LOGICS
Figure 6.4, taken from Van der Heijden s58 (1996), sketches the framework for
scenario building.
Outlook
through mental tered Different interpretations of
model what is happening
What would really
make a difference
Already in
the pipeline
Inte rpreta tion 1  I Scenariol I
I Pre-determineds Interpretation2 Scenario 2
Interpretation 3 I Scenario
Figure 6.4
A framework for Scenario Building
(Taken from van der Heijdenl 59, 1996)
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6.3.3 GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN SCENARIO BUILDING
Van der Heijden 60 (1996) provides us with a set of general rules that must be
followed when building scenarios:
* A carefully selected team must perform the task of building scenarios.
Because the broadness of the scope covered in a scenario, the team should
be integrated with individuals from different backgrounds that will provide
multidisciplinary perception and knowledge. An essential requirement for the
members of the team is to approach the process with an open mind; they
should be able to suspend their disbelief in the different scenarios that will be
discussed.
* In order to analyze current trends and events, the process generally demand
large amounts of information. The scenario team must have a previously set
schedule for the duration of the different stages of the process 161 : data
collection, analysis and structuring, refining and presentation of scenarios.
* The number of scenarios should be between two and four. The use of more
than four scenarios is regarded as impractical.
* The outcome of a scenario must develop rationally from a sequence of
events related by a cause-effect structure.
* The arguments on which a cause-effect relationship between two events is
explained must be sound and defendable.
* Each of the scenarios must reflect central concerns and essential issues for
the organization sponsoring the effort. At the same time, the scenario-
exercise must result in an original viewpoint or a broadening perspective of
the decisions under consideration. There is a challenge to be faced in
159 Ibid. 158
160 Ibid. 22
161 We will lay out these steps in our application of the scenario methodology in Chapter 8.
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finding a proper balance between elements of novelty and relevance to the
organization.
A central activity should be to provide a picture of the implications that each
scenario would generate for the organization.
6.3.4 THREE WAYS TO BUILD INTUITIVE LOGICS SCENARIOS
The intuitive logics scenarios described earlier can be also developed in
different ways. Van der Heijden 162 (1996) describes three methods for building
these scenarios:
1. Inductive Method
In the inductive method, the set of scenarios emerges naturally from the
data available. Scenarios can be generated inductively at two levels:
events and logic, and the approach is very similar in both cases. At the
event level, the study of the data and the insights gained are used to
create a list of "illustrative events" along with their timing and actors
involved. These events are recorded on cards, showing clearly if they are
predetermined or uncertain elements. All scenarios will include all the
predetermined elements, and uncertain elements will be included only in
one scenario.
The list of events will be the source to create the scenarios and they need
to be ordered by time of occurrence. Some of the cards will be evidently
linked, while for some others the connection will not seem as clear. At
this point different scenarios can be started to accommodate all events.
At the end of the exercise, all cards must fit naturally in one of the
scenarios under creation. Because of the requirement of internal
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consistency, new events may be generated to provide connectivity among
events and ensure a logical structure.
At the logic level, instead of events, the process generates units of logical
relationship. This is done through a mini-story (known as "snippets") that
links events in a consistent way. The snippets are then grouped following
the team intuition on their closeness. Each group of snippets is then
ordered in time. In the same manner as in the event level, new snippets
will be generated to assure the overall logic of the scenarios.
After the scenarios have been finished and refined to a degree that is
satisfactory for the team, they are named and the overall logic underlying
them is inferred.
2. Deductive Method
The deductive method searches for structure in the data and uses this
structure as a framework to identify the scenarios to be developed. At the
event level, the method starts by grouping data according to their
importance. The knowledge and insights gained during the analysis of
the environment are summarized on cards. The insights are then
grouped in an iterative way in clusters that are mutually independent and
internally consistent. The remainder of the process can be done at three
levels: events, trends or structure. At the event approach, a small number
of key events that will determine the unfolding of the future must be
chosen. The occurrence or not of these events will define the different
scenarios. When instead of events, key trends are the ones that will
determine the outlook of the future, the dominance of a trend over other
ones will define the different scenarios.
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At the structural level, the challenge is to identify two or three driving
forces that will distinguish each scenario. To generate the larger benefits
from this approach, the driving forces should be chosen because not only
for their influence in the future, but also because they are the most
uncertain. Opposite end-states of the chosen driving forces can then be
expressed in a matrix like the one showed Figure 6.3, which will define
the set of scenarios.
3. Incremental Method
Van der Heijden recommends the incremental method in cases where
scenario planning is not fully integrated in the strategic thinking process
of an organization. This approach generates interest in the scenario
methodology at the same time that helps organizations to preview the
unfolding of the future. The incremental method uses a "challenge
scenario" as the ones used by Shell earlier on (see 5.2.3). This challenge
scenario is based on the official future and the task of the team is to find
the weak points of this view: areas where the official perception does not
match reality as reflected by the predetermined and the uncertain
elements. After these flaws have been highlighted, it is simple to develop
alternative scenarios that challenge the official future in a sound and
convincing manner. An important consideration is that these alternative
scenarios should be defined not as a result of using different variables,
but different perceptions on the driving forces in the system. If the official
future is not internally consistent, the first alternative scenario will adjust
this flaw and follow its own representation of the future.
The actual choice of the most appropriate method depends on the
characteristics of each scenario exercise. Table 6.1 summarizes some of the
main advantages and disadvantages of each method.
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Table 6.1
Comparison of the Three Methods
(based on van der Heilden, 1996)
Method Advantages Disadvantages
Inductive * Capable of producing * Easy to end up with a set of
powerful scenarios "good/bad" scenarios, which
emerging naturally from the will erode the usefulness of
data. scenarios in providing
* Recommended for diverse strategic direction to the
organizations aiming to organization.
"explore" the future. * The process takes longer time.
SRequires larger tolerance for
_ambiguity in the participants.
Deductive * Step-by-step approach * Sometimes is not possible to
* Less time-intensive than find a small number of key
the inductive method. elements (events, trends or
* Recommended for groups:: driving forces) that will
lacking diversity of determine the future
thinking.
Incremental * Recommended for * More limited than the other
organizations with little or two methods.
no experience in scenarios.
For the application of the scenario methodology in Chapter 8, the deductive
method will be chosen as the approach to build scenarios for the transportation
system in Mendoza Argentina.
6.4 ASSIGNING PROBABILITIES TO SCENARIOS
As suggested by our discussion in section 5.1.1, the decision to assign
probabilities of occurrence to the developed scenarios is closely related to the
roles assigned to them. The fact that the use of scenarios to develop robust
decisions considers all scenarios equally likely may rise a doubt in the credibility
of the methodology. After a set of scenarios has been built, it would seem
natural that some may look more likely to occur than others. As recognition of
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this fact, it would also seem logical to weight their different likelihood -even
judgmentally- by assigning probabilities of occurrence to each scenario.
Despite the apparently simplicity of this idea, many scenario-planners -some of
them seminal figures as Wack- strongly oppose the assignment of probabilities
to the created scenarios. Global Business Network, an organization that brings
together leading thinkers and practitioners of scenario planning has posted in
the Internet (GBN164 , 1996) an interesting discussion among its members on
whether scenarios should be assigned or not a probability of occurrence. Some
of the main ideas raised in this discussion follow (authors in parenthesis):
* Assigning probabilities to scenarios naturally invites managers and decision-
makers to focus on the one that seems to be the most probable at the time
and forget about the other scenarios (Lee Schipper). In general, people
focus strongly on quantitative figures and ignore the more important concepts
and underlying structures (Adam Kahane).
* Any specific scenario has a minuscule probability to occur as it has been
built (Adam Kahane). The future will most likely be a combination of the
different scenarios developed. Therefore, scenario-builders should not try to
pinpoint the exact future, but rather to show the range of futures that may
come to pass.
* Scenarios are not about estimating probabilities or employing sophisticated
decision-analysis techniques. These approaches do not guarantee robust
decision-making, as they do not reveal --much less allow to consider-
hidden factors and events that can affect the performance of the decisions.
Scenarios are about improving perception. (Kees van der Heijden).
Scenarios help to understand the range of possibilities of a system and to
164 Global Business Network. Probabilities: Help or Hindrance in Scenario Planning. June 1996.
http://www.gbn.org/Scenarios/Probabilities/
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prepare individuals and organizations to face successfully different futures
(Steve Rosell).
The comments of Pierre Wack on this matter are straightforward:
'It looks very attractive to use probabilities in scenarios, both from the
perspective of the client -which scenario will really occur?-- and from the
perspective of the scenario writer, who can communicate more of the
information he already has. But I have a strong feeling that it will be
poisonous and will contaminate the logic of scenarios.
These are strong words: let me explain. First, I do not know of any
successful case of scenarios using probabilities, not one, and I think there
are good reasons for this. Probabilities are more of a nuisance than a help
in the non-trivial process of communicating scenarios to management. By
focusing on the outcome instead of developing and understanding of the
forces leading to an outcome, they will have a superficial and mechanical
impact, and will not change management mind-sets in depth." 165
The discussion on the usefulness of assigning probabilities to scenarios is an
ongoing and recurring matter in which a complete consensus has not still been
achieved. Several of the most influential scenario-planners believe probabilities
are more a problem than an aid. Therefore, in the application of scenarios to the
Province of Mendoza in Argentina to be undertaken in the following chapter, we
will not assigned a probability of occurrence and therefore in effect will consider
all scenarios equally likely. As a result, we should aim to make the decisions
robust for all scenarios, and not only for those that would seem more likely to
occur.
6.5 SUMMARY
In this chapter we have introduced some of the theory behind scenario planning
and three different methodologies to build scenarios have been reviewed.
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Within the chosen methodology, three alternative ways to create scenarios were
also studied. Finally, the issue of assigning probabilities to scenarios was
addressed. This chapter closes the methodology part of the thesis. In the next
chapter a specific application of scenario planning for the transportation system
of Mendoza, Argentina is undertaken.
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7. THE PROVINCE OF MENDOZA, ARGENTINA
The present chapter will introduce the province of Mendoza, Argentina and will
describe the characteristics and issues relevant to this particular region and its
transportation system. This background information will provide the basis for
building the scenarios in the next chapter.
7.1 THE PROVINCE OF MENDOZA, ARGENTINA
Located in the southern cone of the American continent, Argentina has an area
close to 2.8 millions of square kilometers and a population of around 35 million
(World Bank 66, 1997). Starting in the 1940's Argentina, once considered among
the most prosperous nations in the world, suffered slow economic growth and its
economy continuously eroded until in 1989 the state became financially
insolventl 6 7 . A sustained effort of structural reform in the last years has
improved the overall economic situation of the country.
As can be seen in Figure 7.1, the province of Mendoza is located in the most
western portion of Argentina and is bordered by Chile, close to the Andes
Mountains. Mendoza has an area close to 150,000 km2 and over 1.4 million
inhabitants, with roughly half of them living in the metropolitan area of the same
168, 169name
166 Ibid. 75
167 The World Bank Group. http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/offrep/lac/argentin.htm
168 Espinosa Edgardo et al. Mendoza en el Corredor Bioceanico Central. Relevamiento y
Estado de Situacion. CIT/MIT Joint Program, 1996
169 Unless specifically stated, Mendoza will refer to the province of Mendoza.
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Figure 7.1
South America, Argentina and Mendoza
(adapted from Yang170 , 1997)
7.1.1 ECONoMIc ACTIVITY
Despite its arid climate, agricultural activities and manufacturing of products from
agricultural and cattle origin have traditionally played an important role in the
Mendozan economy. A moderately diversified agriculture yields different
vegetables and fruits, and a significant portion of this harvest is processed in the
170 Yang, Xing. Designing a Transportation Network for Mendoza, Argentina: A Strategic
Approach. Master of Science in Transportation Thesis, Department of Civil and Environmental
Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 1997, p 9
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province (Espinosa 171 et al, 1996). The province is increasingly active in
exporting its products. Table 7.1 based on Yang 172 (1996) shows the
performance of the major exports of Mendoza in the last years:
Table 7.1
Main Mendozan Exports
(based on Yang 17', 1996)
Products 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Agricultural and 25.7 37.8 60.9 76.3 56.0 65.3 77.9 116.3 123.5
Primary Products
Manufactures of 62.2 110.4 134.8 111.1 104.6 96.4 109.5 193.0 213.0
Agricultural and
Cattle Origin
Manufactures of 40.1 49.3 73.0 70.3 54.2 90.6 158.6 182.0 203.0
Industrial Origin
Fuels and Energy 24.4 54.8 157.2 113.8 136.2 131.9 172.1 215.0 245.0
Total 152.4 252.3 425.9 371.5 351.0 384.2 518.1 706.3 784.5
While traditionally the role of Mendoza in the Argentinean economy has been
hindered due to the long distance to the city of Buenos Aires, this situation may
be coming to an end (Sussman et al174, 1996). The creation in 1991 and later
development of the Mercosur Trade Alliance (Mercosur), currently formed by
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia, has significantly
increased the trade flows among these countries. As a result of this, there are
clear opportunities for rapid growth in the national and regional economies of
these countries. The importance of Mercosur for Mendoza has been highlighted
by Sussman et a1175, (1996):
"Any planning for the province of Mendoza must be conditioned by
Argentina's expanded focus on international trade, and in particular, its role
in the Mercosur trade alliance..."
171 Ibid. 168
172 Ibid. 170, p12
173 Ibid. 172
174 Ibid. 62
175 Ibid. 62
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In recognition of the above, the following section presents additional information
on this multinational trade association.
7.2 THE MERCOSUR TRADE ALLIANCE
After several years of diplomatic contacts and negotiations, in 1991 Argentina,
Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay signed the Treaty of Asuncionl 76. This agreement
aimed to the creation of a free trade zone and customs union including all
signing members: the "Mercado Comn del Sur" (Southern Common Market), or
Mercosur for short. Bolivia and Chile joined as "associated members" in 1996
(Balazs, 1997)77. Unless otherwise specified, when alluding to Mercosur in this
work we will not differentiate between "full members" (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay
and Paraguay) and associated ones (Bolivia and Chile), and will be therefore
referring to all six countries.
The participation of Chile has particular importance for Mendoza, as it could
benefit not only from access to the Chilean market, but also to the Chilean ports
in the Pacific (Rasquin and Sussman'7 8, 1996). These ports can become a
gateway for the export of Mendozan products to Asia and the Pacific Rim.
Table 7.2 based on the statistical data published by the Inter-American
Development Bank presents some basic data for each of the Mercosur
members.
176 Red Academica Uruguaya. http://www.intr.net/mercosur/primerp.htm
177 Balazs, Caroline A. An Analysis of MERCOSUR: South America's Common Market, 1997.
http://www.aimi.org/Mercosur/index.htm
Rasquin, Oscar and Joseph M. Sussman. Strategic Planning for Multimodal Freight
Transportation in the Northern Oasis of Mendoza. Phase I Summary Report. CIT/MIT Joint
Program, 1996201
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Table 7.2
Mercosur Countries: Basic Data as of April, 1997
(source: IDB 179, 1997)
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Uruguay Total
Mercosur
Population 34.6 7.6 163.9 14.5 5.0 3.2 228.8
(millions)_,
Land Area 2,777 1,099 8,456 756 407 177 13,672
(thousands of km 2)
1996 GDP 211,642 6,956 493,038 49,745 7,392 9,959a 778,732
(in millions of
1990 US$)
GDP 1987-1996 2.5 3.7 1.9 7.1 3.7 3.3 ----
(Avg. Annual
Growth Rate)
1996 GDP per 6,105 916 3,007 3,440 1,471 3,127a
capita (1990 US$)
GDP per capita 1.2 1.4 0.2 5.4 0.9 2.7 ----
1987-1996
(Avg. Annual
Growth Rate)
1996 Exports of 23,818 1,107 47,747 15,353 2,680 2,440 93,145
Goods
(millions of US$)
1996 Imports of 22,123 1,405 53,286 16,500 4,059 3,143 100,516
Goods
(millions of US$)
a Data corresponds to 1995
Since its creation, Mercosur has boosted intra-regional trade.180 Figure 7.2
shows the growth in trade among member nations from 1991 to 1996. During
these years, trade between the full members has increased by 217%, which
results in an impressive average annual growth rate of 28%. If this trend
continues, the region's internal trade would double every three years, posing an
enormous challenge for the transportation system currently serving Mercosur.
179 Inter-American Development Bank, Basic Socio-Economic Data, 04/21/97. Washington, DC.
180 Ibid. 178
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Figure 7.2
Trade Among Mercosur Members
(source: Mercosul Estatisticas 81)
But Mercosur has not only supported trade within its borders. In the six-year
period between its formation and 1996, trade with other countries has increased
89%182. As shown in Table 7.3, Mercosur growth rates compares favorably with
that of the developed regions in the world:
Figure 7.3 taken from Balazs 184 (1997) shows that a large amount of Mercosur
exports are directed towards overseas markets, with the European Union and
the U.S. the major trade partners:
8' TRIX MediaNet. Mercosul Estatisticas. (Document in Portuguese)
http://www.trix.net/index.cqi?mercosul estatisticas .par
182
182 Mercopress News Agency. Mercosur News. December, 11, 1997.
http://www.falkland-malvinas.com/archive/sni2 1197.html
183 nd
8 Mercopress News Agency. Mercosur News. October 2d, 1997.
http://www.falkland-malvinas.com/archive/sni4021097T html
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Destination of Mercosur Exports
(taken from Balazsl8 5, 1997)
After having established itself as a key player in the Latin American trade,
Mercosur may have started to expand its influence. Two approaches followed
by Mercosur seem to reinforce this view:
1. Formal discussions to accept new members have been going on for
sometime. 186 Some of these countries like Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and
Venezuela (members with Bolivia of the so-called "Andean Group") can be
considered part of Mercosur's natural area of influence. But Mexico and
Canada -two NAFTA members- have also applied for their incorporation
and President Menem of Argentina has expressed its belief that they will
become members as early as the first half of 1998.187
184 Ibid. 177Ibid. 177
185 Ibid. 177
186 Mercopress News Agency. Mercosur News. October 25, 1997.
http://www.falkland-malvinas.com/archive/sni4251097.html
Mercopress News Agency. Mercosur News. February 15, 1998.
http://www.fal kland-malvinas.com/archives/sni8150298.html
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2. Mercosur has made an effort to reach out beyond its borders and strengthen
overseas trade. The link with the European Union has a predominant
position in this effort. Continuous interactions have speeded formal
negotiations for a common market between the two blocks by 2000.188 The
traditionally more distant relationship with South Asia has started to change
too. 189 The rise of the Pacific-Rim as a major player in the world economy
has encouraged shared interest to establish closer links between Mercosur
and the ASEAN nations (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam). 190
7.3 TRANSPORTATION ISSUES IN MENDOZA AND MERCOSUR
7.3.1 OVERVIEW
The formation of Mercosur and the more recent inclusion of Chile have
positioned Mendoza in a strategic location because of the increasing freight
flows directed to the Chilean ports in the Pacific Ocean. The Andes Mountains
are a natural barrier that hinders the movement of commodities between Chile
and Argentina. Several border passes through the Andes do exist, but because
of their high altitude, the bad weather causes them to close during winter
(Koehne 91, 1996). Therefore, the construction of a major infrastructure link
between Mendoza and Chile has been proposed continuously.
An additional consideration is the deployment of an international transportation
corridor in South America. The so-called "Bioceanic Corridor" is envisioned as a
"88 Mercopress News Agency. Mercosur News. December 11, 1997
http://www.falkland-malvinas.com/archive/sni3111297.html
189 M.G.G. Pilllai. Latin Tigers Show Claws. The World Paper Online. March 1997.
http://www.worldpaper.com/March9/pillai.html
190 Ibid. 189
191 Koehne, Timothy. On Projects, Transportation Projects and the Mendoza (Argentina) - Los
Andes (Chile) Transportation Corridor. Master of Science in Transportation Thesis, Department
of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
MA 1996
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transportation corridor connecting the main centers of population, production
and transshipment points in South America, including ports along the Atlantic
and Pacific (refer to Figure 7.4). The deployment of such infrastructure is highly
dependent of numerous economic, political and social factors. If completed,
such transportation infrastructure would become a first-order international
multimodal and intermodal corridor linking Mercosur, the Pacific Rim and NAFTA
(Sussman et a1192, 1996).
Mendoza is interested in strategic planning for its regional freight transportation
system that helps it to obtain and sustain competitive advantages in a changing
international economy. Yang193 (1996) summarizes the main goals of this
region:
"[to] balance the objectives of promoting economic growth, improving
environmental quality, and facilitating the mobility and accessibility for
people and freight."
It has been suggested that the Bioceanic Corridor can be used as a tool for
economic development in Mendoza (Sussman et al, 194 1996). The following
section provides additional information on this international transportation
infrastructure.
7.3.2 THE BIOCEANIC CORRIDOR
The construction of a Bioceanic transportation corridor in South America -hardly
a new idea- has taken on momentum in the last years as a result of three major
reasons (Espinosa et a1195, 1996):
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1. A rapidly expanding trade between regions in the Atlantic Coast of
South America and the Pacific Rim nations that demands more
efficiency in the transportation system.
2. Potentially major flows generated by this trade would justify the large
investments needed to manage the increasing traffic.
3. The presence of a base for a future Bioceanic infrastructure in the
existent linkages between:
a) the ports of Chile, Argentina, and the southern ports of Peru
and Brazil.
b) the rail networks of Southern Peru, Northern Peru, the
Northeast of Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Brazil.
The deployment of the Bioceanic Corridor would imply (Espinosa et a1196 , 1996):
* Offering transport services through multiple modes complementing each
other and interconnected in a truly intermodal network.
* Achieving economies of scale and density by means of large shipments
scheduled with adequate frequency.
* Providing support services to transportation and trade activities along the
corridor and within its hinterland.
* Providing links to other international transportation corridors.
* Supporting of the institutional structures required to manage, operate and
maintain the Corridor in an efficient manner.
195 Ibid. 168
196 Ibid. 168
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7.3.3 THE ALTERNATIVES FOR THE BIOCEANIC CORRIDOR
As shown in Figure 7.4, there are three main different routes that could serve the
purpose of a Bioceanic Corridor. The decision on which location will be chosen
as the major transportation corridor in South America has not be taken yet. A
brief description of the characteristics of these alternatives follows (Espinosa et
a11 97, 1996):
1. The North Bioceanic Corridor.
The corridor uses two routes to link the northern ports of Chile and the
southern ports of Brazil. The first route (called Arica-Santos) starts in
Arica, Chile and crosses Bolivia to end in the port of Santos in Brazil.
The highway link has paved surface with exception of 900 km between
Santa Cruz y Puerto Suarez where the road is only consolidated.
Additionally, in this section the road uses a number of rail bridges
adapted for highway operation. As a result, traffic must be interrupted
when trains need to cross. The railroad infrastructure consists in a
narrow-gage line (1 m) across the three countries, but the link between
Cochabamba and Santa Cruz is missing.
The second path (Antofagasta-Santos) starts in Antofagasta, Chile
and goes east to Salta in Argentina to connect later in Santa Cruz
(Bolivia) with the first route. The road infrastructure between
Antofagasta and Salta combines paved and gravel surface. This route
has a complete narrow-gage rail line between both oceans. It
currently carries approximately 90,000 metric tons per year and its
capacity has been estimated in 2 million metric tons per year.
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Figure 7.4
The Alternatives for the Bioceanic Corridor
(adapted from Yang1 98, 1996)
198 Ibid. 170
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2. Central Bioceanic Corridor
This corridor links the ports of the central zone of Chile and the
Atlantic coast ports of Buenos Aires in Argentina and Sao Paolo in
Brazil. The road infrastructure of this corridor is the only one
completely paved and is in better condition as it uses the national
routes of Argentina. The railroad connection in this corridor is not
complete and several sections of the network use different gages.
The rail link between Mendoza and Buenos Aires -a wide-gage line
(1.676 m)- is estimated to have a capacity up to 10 million metric
tons per year.
Yang1 99 (1996) makes a case for the viability of the Central Bioceanic
Corridor:
'The Mendozan Route 7 and the Cristo Redentor Pass is currently
the only major route over the Andes. The economic logic for the
Cristo Redentor Pass in the Central Corridor is compelling.
Mendoza is opposite to the two most important ports of Chile -
Valparaiso and San Antonio. Mendoza is the most important dry
port in Argentina. Due west of Mendoza is the most attractive
region for development in Chile, with 65% of the country's
...population and the bulk of the economic activity."
Despite of the above, several major infrastructure improvements
will be needed to make the this corridor functional, among them
(Rasquin and Sussman20 0 , 1996):
Upgrade and expand the highway and railroad infrastructure
between Buenos Aires and Mendoza.
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* Improve the international and interregional linkages, especially
the connection between Argentina and Chile through the
Andes. This later connection is notably hindered by the lack of
a rail link between the two countries.
* Build bypass routes to divert traffic around the city of Mendoza.
* Develop better modal coordination.
3. The South Bioceanic Corridor
This corridor links the Chilean ports of Talcahuano and Puerto Mont
with Bahia Blanca in Argentina. The main existing infrastructure
consists in a wide-gage rail line. The border passes used by this
corridor are lower than in the North and Central alternatives. The
winter conditions are not as severe and the passes are open almost
the entire year. An important disadvantage to this corridor is that it
does not link major productions/consumption centers in South
America.
7.4 THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM IN MENDOZA
The highway and railroad infrastructure is the backbone of the Mendozan
transportation system (Rasquin and Sussman,20 1 1996). Figure 7.5 depicts the
primary transport infrastructure in Mendoza.
Based on Espinosa et a1202 (1996), a brief description of the major elements of
the transportation infrastructure in Mendoza follows:
172
201 Ibid. 178
202 Ibid. 168
Cristo
Redento
Pass
Railroad
' Line
41 Provincial
Route
National
Route
Airport
Figure 7.5
Primary Transportation Infrastructure in Mendoza
(based on Espinosa et a1203 , and the Argentinean Transport Ministry204)
203 Ibid. 168
204 Secretaria de Transporte. Infrastructura Ferroviaria. http://www.mecon.ar/transporte/ffcc-
c.pg
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a) Highway
The National Route 7 (NR7) is the main link between the cities of
Mendoza and Buenos Aires in the East. The section of Route 7
crossing the province is a four-lane road. Approximately 93 km west
of the city of Mendoza, NR7 connects with the Provincial Route 153
(PR153) linking the Central Corridor to the South of the province.
Going south, PR153 meets with NR146 and then becomes PR171 to
arrive to General Alvear. Two National Routes are linked to this
locality: NR188 and NR143.
The National Routes NR40 and NR143 provide the main link to cross
the western part of Mendoza from north to south. Immediately after
the city of Mendoza, NR40 constitutes the access to the portion of
NR7 heading to the Chilean border for all flows. At this point, the road
is also a four-lane link. After getting on NR7 again, the Central
Corridor encounters increasingly difficult terrain. The width of the road
varies from 6.70 to 12 meters in different sections until it arrives at the
border with Chile. The border crossing uses the Cristo Redentor
Tunnel of 3100 meters in length and is located at 3185 meters above
sea level. The tunnel can be operated in one direction (with height of
5.10 meters), or in both directions (and a height of 4.20 meters).
There is no ventilation system in the tunnel and all freight considered
dangerous uses an old rail tunnel that has been readapted for this
purpose.
b) Rail
The Argentinean rail network consists of more than 40,000 kilometers
of lines and it is operated through several private companies. Table
7.4 shows the composition of the rail lines located in Mendoza:
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* Includes deactivated branches
The concessionaire serving Mendoza is the "Buenos Aires al Pacifico"
(BAP) railroad. The "Buenos Aires-Mendoza-San Juan" (BAMSJ) rail
corridor is linked to the Argentinean ports of Buenos Aires and
Rosario in its western end and to the City of Mendoza in the east.
Then the rail line goes north into the Province of San Juan until it
reaches the provincial capital of the same name. The BAMSJ line
connects with the Mesopotamic railroad -also owned by BAP-
serving the north of Argentina and a critical link for the Bioceanic
Corridor, as it is the natural link with Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
The BAMSJ line has, in general, favorable alignment and gradients.
There is double rail in 621 kilometers out of the 1,063 kilometers
between Mendoza and Buenos Aires. The BAP railroad currently
transports approximately 2.1 million metric tons per year, and its
potential capacity is estimated at 10 million metric tons per year. The
referred document mentions that despite the above, the private
operator has said that investments in the order of US$ 150,000 per
kilometer are required to upgrade the BAMSJ line.
205 Secretaria de Transporte. Longitud de via por provincias.
http://www.mecon.ar/transporte/ii-c27.htm
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Table 7.4
Mendozan Rail Network in kilometers*
(source: Argentinean Ministry of Transpo ation0se)
Narrow Gage Medium Gage Wide Gage Percentage of
(1 meter) (1.435 meters) (1.676 meters) the National
Network
303 0 1,353 3.91%
A multimodal freight terminal has been already built in Palmira, east of
the city of Mendoza. This facility is likely to play a significant role in
the freight transportation system in the province, as it is conveniently
located for land flows linking the city of Mendoza with other regions.
c) Air
The "El Plumerillo" Airport is located on the north access to the city of
Mendoza (NR40). It is connected to the NR7, the bus station and with
nearby rail lines. While the airport's infrastructure and equipment
enable it to receive large freight carriers as the B-747 year-round, the
air terminal is not prepared to manage freight operations.
7.5 THE PASS THROUGH THE ANDES
A critical issue involving the Mendozan transportation system and the Bioceanic
Corridor -in any of its three alternative routes- is the border pass between
Chile and Argentina that occurs in the Andes Mountains. The Cristo Redentor
Pass in Mendoza is the major route over the Andes, but is not the only feasible
alternative.2 06 A comprehensive study aimed at analyzing how to improve the
international connection between Chile and Argentina was contracted out by the
Transportation Ministries of both countries. Figure 7.6 shows the five major
border passes between Chile and Argentina identified by the contractor. Based
on this work, a description of each of these passes follows below (CJP1207):
206 Gimenez, Roque. Problematica del Transporte en el Contexto Regional: Tunel de Baja
Altura. Workshop on Transportation and Communications. CIT/MIT Joint Program, Mendoza,
Argentina, 1995. (Document in Spanish)
207 Consorcio Juan Pablo II. Estudio Prefactibilidad Mejoramiento Conexion Internacional Zona
Central (Chile) y la Region Cuyo (Argentina): Informe Diagnostico y Propuesta. Informe
Etapa II. Volumen I.. (Document in Spanish)
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Figure 7.6
Main Border Passes Through the Andes
(adapted from Yang 208, 1996)
1. San Francisco Pass
This road links the city of Copiapo in Chile with the cities of Tinogasta
and Aimogasta in Argentina. The geometry of the road is complicated
due to the mountanous terrain. On the Chilean side, the road starts at
370 meters of altitude in Copiapo and travels 284 km to reach the
pass at 4,726 meters above sea level. Several of its sections have
177
208 Ibid. 170
steep gradients of up to 4%. On the Argentinean side, Aimogasta has
an altitude of 820 meters and is 359 kilometers from the pass. While
in general the slopes are milder on the Argentinean side, the road
reaches here its maximum gradient (5%) in a 6 km section. Due to the
severe climate, the pass is open only from December to March (i.e.,
the summer months in the Southern Hemisphere). Despite an increase
in the use of the pass in the previous years, in 1994 only 580 vehicles
-all of them automobiles- crossed the Andes through San Francisco,
i.e. less than two vehicles per day.
2. Agua Negra Pass
The major cities linked by this road are Coquimbo in the Pacific coast
of Chile and San Jose del Jachal in Argentina. Coquimbo is located at
10 meters of altitude and 232 kilometersfrom the pass (4,760 meters
above sea level). San Jose del Jachal is located at 1,160 meters of
altitude and 154 km from the pass. On both sides, a fair amount of the
journey must be done in sections with grades above 3%, reaching 5%
in the Argentinean side. The geometry of the road is extremely
difficult and drops of rocks and snow are not uncommon. The pass is
closed practically during the entire winter. From 1992 to 1994 the
traffic through Aguas Negras quadriplicated, reaching 2,209
automobiles in 1994, i.e., a daily average of 6 cars.
3. Cristo Redentor Pass
This pass connects the provinces of San Felipe de Aconcagua in
Chile and Mendoza in Argentina. It is considered to start in the
Chilean city of Los Andes (altitude: 833 meters) and after 65
kilometers it crosses the border at 3,185 meters of altitude. From
there, it travels another 196 kilometers to reach the city of Mendoza
(altitude: 769 meters). The road presents steep slopes (7% and 8%)
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and close curves 30 kilometers before and after the border. The pass
is closed during winter an average of 47 days/year for cars and 60
days/year for trucks and buses. The Cristo Redentor Pass absorbs
90% of the land traffic of all border points between Chile and
Argentina with a daily average of 809 cars. Table 7.5 classifies the
traffic using the pass in 1994 by type of vehicle:
Table 7.5
Annual Transits on the Cristo Redentor Pass (1994)
____ _ ____ ___ (source: CJP11 209) _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Type of Vehicle Annual Transits Percentage of Total
Cars 164,953 55.9%
Buses 37,608 12.7%
Trucks 92,772 31.4%
Total 295,333 [ 100.0%
The large share of TransAndean traffic managed by Cristo Redentor
can also become a cause for concern. According to Koehne 2 10 (1996)
the pass capacity has been estimated in 5,000 vehicles per day. But
the same author suggest the need to review this figure based on
claims that during the peak demand (approximately 3,000
vehicles/day) congestion is already occurring. The strong growth
rates in trade of Mercosur showed earlier suggest that this problem
could become critical for the development of the Central Bioceanic
Corridor, and it could even affect the development of Mercosur itself.
4. Pehuenche Pass
This link connects the province of Maule in Chile with the southern
portion of Mendoza in Argentina. The cities directly linked are Talca
(Chile) and Malargue (Argentina). From Talca (altitude: 332 meters)
209 Ibid. 207
210 Ibid. 191
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the road travels 166 km to reach the pass at 2,553 meters above the
sea, and then descends into Argentina and arrives to Malargue
(altitude 352 meters) after 150 kilometers The alignment of the route
is difficult and presents steep slopes (5% to 7%) 40 km before and
after the borderline. The pass is closed from April to the beginning of
November. The pass is used lightly and almost exclusively by
automobiles. In 1994 1,246 vehicles crossed through Pehuenche, i.e.
an average of 3.4 cars per day.
5. Pino Hachado Pass
The last of the passes studied was Pino Hachado, which links the
provinces of Malleco (Chile) and Neuquen (Argentina). The Chilean
section is considered to start in Victoria at approximately 300 meters
above sea level. The road arrives to the border pass (1,884 meters of
altitude) after 194 km and then descends into Argentina and reaches
Zapala at approximately 1,080 meters of altitude, after travelling 122
kilometers The route takes place over a hilly terrain and the alignment
is considered not as difficult as in the other four passes. In 1994
17,457 vehicles used Pino Hachado, being 65.6% automobiles 34.4%
buses. The daily average transit was 47.8 vehicles.
The figures and facts presented above highlight the importance of the Cristo
Redentor Pass for the Central Bioceanic Corridor. The characteristics of Cristo
Redentor and its location relative to major production centers, markets and
transportation links in Chile and Argentina seem to confirm its predominance.
But it is also true that the inability of the pass to serve an increasing trade due to
congestion will strengthen the competitive position of the alternatives. A major
investment in any of the alternative passes can also cause a significant shift in
the flows crossing the Andes. The improvement of these international transport
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links is likely to play a major role in the choice that the route the Bioceanic
Corridor and the bulk of Mercosur's freight flows will follow.
Mendoza has recognized the need to study the ways in which the Cristo
Redentor Pass can be improved.'" In the following section we review one of the
proposals under discussion for a major investment aimed to improve the Cristo
Redentor Pass.
7.5.1 THE JUNCAL-HORCONES Low-ALTITUDE TUNNEL
One of the options proposed to enhance the international link between Mendoza
and Chile -and thus the Central Bioceanic Corridor- is the construction of a
tunnel through the Andes. Koehne 212 (1996) has performed an economical
analysis of different technological alternatives for the operation of the tunnel.
The following discussion is based on the study of technical feasibility (CJPIIb 21 3)
completed by request of the Chilean and Argentinean Transport Ministries.
Eight different sites and alignments were studied and the choice between a
tunnel for highway or railroad was also analyzed. Figure 7.7 depicts the location
and overall alignment of the proposed tunnel. This facility would be part of the
present link between Los Andes (Chile) and Mendoza. The tunnel built between
the localities of Juncal (Chile) and Los Horcones (Argentina) would save the
steepest part of the current alignment. The length of the tunnel would be on the
order of 27 km., being the altitudes of the two ends 2,274 meters in Juncal and
2,720 meters in Horcones. The construction of the tunnel would provide a link
available all year round. Several options for the mode to be used in the tunnel
have been proposed: a highway-only tunnel, a railroad-only tunnel, and a rail
shuttle that would transport cars and trucks in flat cars.
211 Ibid. 206
212 Ibid. 191
213 Consorcio Juan Pablo II. Estudio Prefactibilidad Mejoramiento Conexion Internacional Zona
Central (Chile) y la Region Cuyo (Argentina): Estudio de Factibilidad Tecnica, Tunel a Baia
Altura Juan Pablo II1. Informe Etapa III. (Document in Spanish)
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While the exact additional capacity provided by the tunnel depends on the
different transportation systems proposed, it has been estimated that the
capacity is around 10,000 vehicles/day.214 There are also different estimates of
cost and time for construction. Koehne's analysis suggests a cost range from
US$ 1.0 billion to US$ 4.2 billions and a completion period from 11 to 19
years.2 1 5 The choice of transport system to be used in the tunnel will also have
major repercussions for the feeder system: a rail tunnel would require and
encourage a more fully developed rail network in Mendoza.
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Figure 7.7
Cristo Redentor Pass: Current Alignment and Proposed Tunnel
(based on Espinosa et a1216, 1996)
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One of the key variables involved in the analysis of the tunnel is the growth in
the demand for transportation through the Andes. Koehne 217 (1996) shows that
for different levels of demand, there are different "optimal solutions" for the
timing of the construction and operation of the tunnel. Furthermore
"...there is a serious gap between the maximum traffic volume that can be
handled by the current route and the minimum traffic volume needed to
justify the tunnel." 2 18
The basic problem is of course that it is not possible to forecast this demand in a
confident manner. This issue will be at the core of the scenario analysis to be
undertaken in the next chapter.
7.6 SUMMARY
In this chapter we have introduced the province of Mendoza as a developing
region that is interested in using regional strategic transportation planning as a
tool for its economic development. The Mercosur Trade Alliance and its
relevance for the Argentinean and Mendozan economy have been also
presented. The transportation system in Mendoza has been presented and
some important issues affecting its performance have been reviewed. Among
them, we have presented the Bioceanic Corridor, the Cristo Redentor Pass and
the Low-Altitude Tunnel between Juncal and Horcones. The following chapter
will use this background to build the scenarios for the transportation system in
the province. During this process, several additional elements impacting the
Mendozan transport system will be identified and studied.
216 Ibid. 168
217 Ibid. 191
218 Sussman, Joseph M., Carl Martland, Abel Muioz-Loustaunau and Xing Yang. Strategic
Planning for Multimodal Freight Transportation in the Northern Oasis of Mendoza. Summary
Report. Year 3. Unpublished.
183
184
8. BUILDING SCENARIOS FOR REGIONAL STRATEGIC
TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN MENDOZA
The last chapter described the characteristics and issues relevant to Mendoza
and its transportation system was presented. The present chapter will apply a
specific scenario-building methodology for the transportation system of the
province of Mendoza in Argentina. We will use some of the findings of our
previous work on the scenario methodology (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6), and a
step-by-step approach to build and use scenarios within the context of Mendoza
will be followed.219
In his book "The Art of the Long View", Dr. Peter Schwartz 220 (1996) explains
step by step the process of building scenarios. We use this framework and
follow his guidance here to show the process of scenario developing by making
a specific application to the Mendozan context. When the use of Schwartz's
framework in Mendoza triggers the need for further studying certain issues - a
common occurrence in scenario building- this will be also undertaken.
8.1 STEP1: "IDENTIFY THE FOCAL ISSUE OR DECISION"
According to Schwartz, it is better to start a scenario "from the inside out" with a
decision or central issue faced by the province, and then move toward the
external context. What are the decisions about the transportation system that
the Mendozan decision-makers -public officers and private manager- will have
to evaluate in the short term? Which of the decisions that must be taken will
219 An early version of the scenarios received the valuable contribution of Mr. Richard Karash, a
private consultant in the Boston Area whose work includes leading private corporations in
developing their own scenarios.
220 Ibid. 112
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have a strong influence in the life of the province? Which of them will have a
long-term effect on Mendoza? How do these decisions relate to higher-level
goals of the province?
At this stage of the scenario building, it is useful to discuss some of the ideas on
strategic planning, economic development and competitive advantage that were
presented earlier in the thesis. In section 3.2.1, we recognized that transport
systems are closely related to society's needs and functions, and that
transportation can be thought of as a tool to support a region's economic activity.
Regional strategic transportation planning should be responsive to the specific
socioeconomic needs and objectives of the region under consideration. Quinn's
hierarchical subsystem of strategies (see section 2.5.5) also reminded us the
critical importance of a systematic approach to strategic planning. A
transportation strategy for Mendoza should be based on the overall objectives
and strategies of the region. Therefore, before addressing the transportation
decisions faced by the province, the following sections introduce some thoughts
on regional strategies in Mendoza and its competitive niches.
8.1.1 MENDOZAN STRATEGIES
In October of 1994, the province of Mendoza and MIT signed an agreement for a
collaborative program of science and technology, whose ultimate purpose was to
support the socioeconomic development of the province.22 1 For this thesis, the
concerns and issues studied in this joint effort are considered a good reflection
of some of the objectives pursued by the province. The following assessment of
the Mendozan strategies -depicted in a systematic view in Figure 8.1- is based
on the above reference as well as on information provided in different
221 Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Province of Mendoza, Argentina.
Collaborative Program of Science and Technology. Progress Report, October 1995
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documents generated by this program (all of which are listed in the bibliography
as publications of the "CIT/MIT Joint Program").
Figure 8.1
Some Elements of Mendoza's Regional Strategies
(based on MIT/Mendoza222 , 1995)
Figure 8.1 shows some of the elements of the Mendoza's regional system of
strategies. The dotted lines indicate that there may well be other elements in
each of these strategic levels. The generation of sustainable economic
development that improves the living conditions of the population is shown as
the highest level objective. The ideas of competitive strategy are considered a
tool that will help to achieve the development of the province. In a third level,
four strategic subsystems supporting the competitive approach of Mendoza are
depicted. A short description of each of them follows: 223
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1. Information Technology Strategy
This aims to help Mendozan companies to increase their efficiency and
potential through the use of information-technology applications and a
technology transfer effort.
2. Transportation Strategy
Because of the favored location of Mendoza with respect to Mercosur
flows, the development of a multimodal freight transportation system is at
the core of the transportation strategy.
3. Industry Competitiveness
This aims to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of the Mendozan
firms, this strategy focuses on manufacturing industries
4. Energy/Water Resources Strategy
This will assess the alternatives for a sustainable development of the
water and electricity sector in Mendoza.
Another fundamental concept from our previous discussion is the need for fit
among the elements of the overall regional strategy (section 3.3.4). At the
simplest level, the activities undertaken in each of the above fields should not
conflict with the objectives of other field. Another requirement is that these
activities should support each other, reinforcing the overall effect.
At this stage we seem to find a major problem, as there are signs that the above
strategies have not been developed with a systemic approach. Salvucci 224
(April, 1998) has pointed out the existence of conflicts between some of the
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Mendozan strategies -conflicts that could blockage the socioeconomic
development of the province:
* One element of the Energy/Water Resource strategy is the
construction of a dam for generation of electricity in the province. The
dam could significantly alter irrigation patterns and thus the
agricultural yields of Mendoza. The location of the dam also conflicts
with the transportation strategy, as sections of the Bioceanic Corridor
would be flooded.
* The industrialization strategy, focused on manufacturing firms seems
also to pose a risk for the agricultural land of Mendoza. Part of the
land has already become more saline and polluted, among other
reasons due to the overexploitation of subsurface water.225
Additionally, a tradeoff arises because some of the best agricultural
land is also becoming the most appreciated by real estate developers.
While the provincial government has already identified the need for
land-use regulation and has promoted a land-use regularization
program 226, the outcome is still unclear.
8.1.2 COMPETITIVE NICHES FOR MENDOZA
In our earlier review of Porter's work on competitive strategy, we identified three
major niches of regional competition that are now briefly reviewed in the light of
the Mendozan situation:
1. Products and services that Mendoza currently generates.
Mendoza competes with other regions to sell its products and services in
the same markets. Table 7.1 pointed out the main Mendozan exports:
225 Ibid. 221, Attachment C: Energy/Water Resource Project Planning
226 Ibid. 168
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* Agricultural and primary products
* Manufactures of agricultural and cattle origin
* Manufactures of industrial origin
* Fuels and energy
2. The attractiveness of the province
Mendoza also competes to attract resources to support its socioeconomic
objectives. In the context of Mercosur and the Bioceanic Corridor, a major
element in the attractiveness of Mendoza is related its desire to be
chosen as the main pass to cross the Andes to get to Chile and its Pacific
ports.
3. Current and future opportunities
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, a perceived trend in the world food
market (to be discussed later in detail) and the relevance of
agricultural/cattle related exports in its economy suggest a future
opportunity for Mendoza (and other regions). The Bioceanic Corridor
would improve the accessibility of these regions to Mendoza, Argentina
and the rest of Mercosur.
8.1.3 THE FOCAL ISSUE FOR TRANSPORTATION STRATEGY FOR MENDOZA
Figure 8.1 suggests that a transportation strategy for Mendoza should be aimed
at supporting the province's competitiveness. An essential concern expressed by
Mendoza has to do with Mercosur and the international trade flows that pass
through the province. Mendoza is both interested in attracting more of these
commodities movement and concerned that the growth of trade in the region will
surpass its infrastructure capacity. Therefore, investments aimed to build and
maintain infrastructure are likely to be a major element in the transportation
strategy. An additional concern is that the infrastructure investment should
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benefit Mendoza, generating a crossroads effect and supporting an improvement
of regional productivity (refer to section 3.2.2).
In section 3.2.1, we presented Pendleton's four basic economic roles of
transportation (sustainer, retainer, and attractor of economic activity; link to the
global economy). Figure 8.2 uses these roles to suggest how investment in
transportation is linked to the competition niches of Mendoza:
J
Figure 8.2
Transportation Investment and the Competition Niches of Mendoza
(based on Pendleton2 27, 1996)
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The last chapter introduced the importance of the Central Bioceanic Corridor for
Mendoza. It was stated there that a major variable in the choice of route for the
Bioceanic Corridor will likely be the condition of the international link between
Chile and Argentina. The investment needed to improve the pass between
Mendoza and Chile arises as a central issue of decision for Mendoza.
Previous work at MIT has identified six other major concerns for the
transportation system in the province (Martland et a1228, 1997):
* The need for a multimodal connection between the provincial routes
and the international/national freight transport system.
As presented in section 3.2, larger benefits seemed to be generated
when transportation investments provide "interconnectivity", i.e.,
provide a link with the main network. At the same time that Mendoza
acknowledges the relevance of the Bioceanic Corridor for its
development, the province must also be thinking about the way to
integrate the provincial network with this international transportation
system and to Mercosur. Even if the low altitude tunnel is deployed,
additional investments will be needed to in the provincial and national
routes crossing Mendoza. The Buenos-Aires Mendoza highway and
the BAMSJ rail line are major elements of the link to the main network.
* The need for accessible and efficient freight terminals for the
transportation modes involved.
The provision of such facilities allows and expedites changes of mode,
which in turn enables more efficient distribution and flow of goods as
the shippers can chose to use different modes for different parts of the
movement. The province is already building a multimodal freight
228 Martland Carl et al. Strategic Planning for Multimodal Freight Transportation in the Northern
Oasis of Mendoza. Phase II Summary Report. CIT/MIT Joint Program, 1997
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station in the town of Palmira, 45 km east of the city of Mendoza22 9.
This facility will link the railroad to the National Route #7.230 The
improvements needed in the terminal of the "El Plumerillo" airport in
order to be able to operate a freight service are also part of this
concern.
* The state of the provincial highway network.
Attempts to use transportation investment to support Mendoza's
economic development are likely to encourage increasing utilization of
the regional highway network. Proper maintenance of this
infrastructure is essential to assure it will support the development
effect generated by other transportation investments in the province.
* The need to upgrade the railroad serving Mendoza
As mentioned in section 7.4, the "Buenos Aires al Pacifico" (BAP)
railroad is the concessionaire serving Mendoza. BAP owns the
"Buenos Aires-Mendoza-San Juan" (BAMSJ) line and the
Mesopotamic railroad. While both lines can play a major role in the
Bioceanic Corridor significant investments are required to upgrade the
BAMSJ line before it can reach its potential capacity of 10 million
metric tons per year. The fact that the Mesopotamic and the BAMSJ
line have different rail gages suggests also that further investments to
facilitate the connection between the two lines might be necessary.
* Land use planning that supports and takes advantage of efficient
freight movements.
Currently, flows using the Bioceanic Corridor interfere with the local
traffic in the provincial capital. Failure to provide a proper bypass
193
229 Ibid. 62
230 Ibid. 168
route can generate problems both to the city and the Corridor. A well-
planned land use program can support the creation of facilities and
services (food, fueling and other truck-related activities) that benefits
from these flows. Land use policy can also be used to control road
accesses and avoid suburban sprawl to encourage a better use of the
transportation infrastructure.
The state of the urban transportation infrastructure and facilities in the
city of Mendoza.
Proper attention must be paid to the condition of local streets, parking
regulations, delivery/unloading activities, and the interaction between
freight and passenger movements.
We argue that these six concerns and the one about the international link can be
characterized as a set of transportation-related strategies. It is likely that in the
face of limited resources, Mendozan decision-makers will need to choose among
them. Figure 8.3 depicts the focal decision for the scenarios: Which of these
seven strategies should be given priority in face of limited resources?
Link to the Provide
international/national freightfreighttransport system terminals
Upgrade the
International
link Upgrade the
BAMSJ rail
Which should be given priority in line
face of limited resources?
Define and Improve theimplement land Improve the Regional Highway
use policies conditions of the Network
urban system
Figure 8.3
The Focal Issue for the Mendozan Scenarios
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An alternative approach that could be pursued during this process is how to get
more resources that allow us to do more? The study of each of the strategies
can identify new sources of moneys and/or political support that enable to
accomplish more.
8.1.4 CHOOSING A TIME FRAME FOR THE SCENARIOS.
Van der Heijden 231 (1996) suggest that the determination of how far the
scenarios will look into the future -the horizon year- should be based on the
nature of the concerns or areas of interest:
"The horizon year needs to be selected on the basis of the future impacts of
today's decisions and strategies. Major capital investments require
consideration of a period up to 20 years."
The Mendozan objectives and the impact of the decisions faced by the province
are both of a long-term nature. Based on this fact, a rough 20-year horizon is
considered adequate for the purposes of this thesis. Therefore, the scenario
exercise will cover from 1998 through the year 2020.
8.2 STEP 2: IDENTIFY KEY DECISION FACTORS OF SUCCESS
The second step in Schwartz's methodology is to identify the key factors that will
determine the success or failure of the decision to be made. At this point, we
are focusing on the provincial environment: How do we define the success or
failure of the decision from the viewpoint of the province? What would the
Mendozan public officers like to know when choosing among the existing
alternatives? Three key decision factors for the scenarios can be found in:
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a) The demand for transportation through the Andes
b) The regional economic development and competitive
resulting from the transportation investment.
c) The competition posed by other regions/modes
transportation services.
advantage
providing
8.2.1 THE DEMAND FOR TRANSPORTATION
Whatever investment option is chosen, it must be clearly appropriate for the
level of demand to be served. Neither a chronically congested small road nor a
huge infrastructure facility working at very low traffic levels are likely to be
considered a success. The future demand for transportation services across the
Andes is likely result from the growth rate of traffic moving through the Central
Bioceanic Corridor. The growth rates of transits through the Cristo Redentor
Pass during the last years are presented in Figure 8.4.
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Figure 8.4
Growth Rates of Transits through Cristo Redentor
(based on Koehne232, 1996)
196
50%-
40% -
30% -
20% -
10% -
0% -
-10% -
-20%-
-30%
232 Ibid. 191
_ _I__
--
-2%". m
'"'"'"~8Ip~r~m\u 1 m m maa
.. . ..
-7%
..........................
It CO 0 N I (0 CO. 0 N It (D M 0C ) ) : C) 0 0 0 0 Y- ,, ,- ,- .. N
Year
Figure 8.5
Cristo Redentor Pass: Four Traffic Growth Rates
(based on Koehne234 , 1996)
The minimum traffic that is believed necessary to make the low altitude tunnel
financially sustainable is in the order of 3,650,000 transits/year (10,000
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Table 8.1
Traffic at the Cristo Redentor Pass: Annual Growths Rates
(based on Koehne 233, 1996)
Projection 1994- 2010 2010 - 2015 2015- 2020
A: Low growth no tunnel 3% 3% 3%
B: Low growth with tunnel 3% 5% 5%
C: High growth no tunnel 9% 9% 9%
D: High growth with tunnel 9% 12% 10%
* A
1,B
A C
X D
vehicles/day).235 Therefore, all four projections in Table 8.1 seem to fall short of
supporting an investment in the tunnel.
The projections obtained by the contractor were the result of a comprehensive
effort in data collection and the use of transportation theory and mathematical
models. Both passenger and freight movements were included. The freight part
of the study considered the trade trends between Mercosur and overseas
countries that crosses the Andes Mountains. Nevertheless, because of its
forecasting nature, this effort shares some of the limitations of forecasts
identified by some authors earlier in the thesis:
1. Despite considering the construction of a new major infrastructure -the
tunnel- the underlying structure of the projections is that of "business
as usual". The future looks as an extension of the present. No search
for events or trends that could dramatically change the status quo was
performed.
2. It does not address in an explicit way the level of uncertainty involved
in the projections.
3. There is little discussion of the implications that different levels of
demand poses for the Mendozan decision-makers.
4. A broader approach to the issue of financing the tunnel is missing.
While the tunnel may not be viable if financed based on user fees,
some other sources of financial support may be explored. The tunnel
can generate public benefits broadly distributed over Mendoza,
Argentina and Mercosur. This, and our earlier recognition that
investment in infrastructure is at the core of governmental activities,
235 Consorcio Juan Pablo II. Estudio Prefactibilidad Mejoramiento Conexion Internacional Zona
Central (Chile) y la Region Cuyo (Argentina): Evaluacion Economica Financiera Etapa V.
(Document in Spanish)
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suggests that the federal government in Argentina (and the rest of
Mercosur countries) could provide some financial resources.
8.2.2 THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE RESULTING
FROM THE INVESTMENT
A factor of a different nature is the economic development and competitive
advantage enabled/supported by the new transportation investment in the
province. Long-term economic benefits can be generated thanks to reduction in
the transportation costs and an improvement in the accessibility/mobility in the
province. It is of little interest for the province that the infrastructure capacity
matches the transportation demand if the Mendozan firms and population do not
share the benefits created by these flows.
In section 3.2.2 we pointed out Vickerman's three basic effects of transportation
investment -corridor effect, crossroads effect, and regional productivity
improvement. Figure 8.6, based on Yang236 (1996), focuses this concern in the
Mendozan context. The first arrow in Figure 8.6 depicts a case where
transportation infrastructure works as a bridge that crosses the province, simply
passing through the region having little or no interaction with local economic
activities. This effect could occur for instance, if the provincial highway network
is not properly integrated with the Central Bioceanic Corridor. The crossroads
effect improves transportation from/to the region, by means of reduced
transportation cost of supplies and outputs. Finally the last effect helps to
improve the productivity of the region.
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Figure 8.6
Feasible Outcomes of Transportation Investment in Mendoza
(based on Yang, 1996; Vickerman, 1991)
The way Figure 8.2 depicted the relation between transportation investment and
the competition niches of Mendoza suggests that different niches are better
served by certain transportation investments. It can follow that investments in
different kinds of infrastructure (highway vs. railroad, the international link vs.
provincial routes, etc.) will tend to support different niches. And each of the
strategies defined in step 1 involves the improvement of the international link,
which is likely to play a role as link to the global economy and attractor of
economic activity, more than as sustainer or retainer.
The following are among the lessons that can be raised for Mendoza from our
discussion in section 3.2:
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1. Unless congestion or lack of competition are a problem, transportation
investments should aim to provide new solutions rather than alternatives
to existing links. According to Koehne's opinion presented earlier, the
capacity of the Cristo Redentor Pass should be studied and estimated
again. The critical impact of congestion in the Pass as an obstacle to
trade and arguably the development of Mendoza would require this task
to be undertaken as carefully and timely as possible.
2. The economic effects of new transportation infrastructure in a depressed
economy will be mainly a redistribution of economic activity in the region,
with small or none aggregate economic growth. Additional inputs will be
required to trigger the benefits that are enabled by transportation.
In the following section, we study the world food market, which could
provide the incentives required for non-transportation investments and
activities that are necessary to complement the effects of the
transportation effort.
8.2.3 TRANSPORTATION COMPETITION FOR MENDOZA AND THE BIOCEANIC
CORRIDOR
The third key decision factor identified for the scenarios is the competition posed
by other regions/modes providing transportation services that could attract some
of the flows that otherwise would travel through Mendoza. Because of the
relevance of the Central Bioceanic Corridor for Mendoza's transportation
system, competition faced by this international corridor should be studied. Two
major areas of transportation competition for the Bioceanic Corridor are
201
a) Transportation within Mercosur. Being relevant for Mendoza the flows
from/to the province, and the Transandean traffic going between Chile
and the rest of Mercosur.
b) Overseas trade of Mercosur that could use the Bioceanic Corridor and
Mendoza to access a major port as departure/arrival point for this
traffic.
We can identify these to areas of competition with two potential sources of
transport competition for Mendoza and the Central Bioceanic Corridor:
1. Southern & northern alternatives of the Bioceanic Corridor; additional
border passes between Chile and Argentina.
This source corresponds to Mercosur's internal flows. As presented
earlier, the Central route of the Bioceanic Corridor is by far the most
used and has inherent advantages over the north and south
alternatives. The most important advantage is perhaps that it is the
shortest link between the economic centers of Brazil, Uruguay,
Argentina and Chile and connects them with major ports in the Atlantic
-Buenos Aires, Sao Paolo- and the Pacific -Valparaiso, San Antonio
(Koehne, 1996237; Yang 238, 1996). While the Central Corridor needs
infrastructure improvements in order to function as an international
transportation link, the other two alternatives seem to require even
larger investments. This seems to suggest that the preeminence of
the current route would continue in the future.
Figure 8.7 taken from the study of demand for the low-altitude tunnel
depicts the share of demand for the different border passes. The
estimation considers that the tunnel would become operational in
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2010. According to Figure 8.7, before 2010 the percentage of
crossings using Cristo Redentor is approximately constant. The new
tunnel would then take a large amount of this traffic, but the
percentage of trips using other passes does not change significantly.
Figure 8.7
Share of Border Crossings between Chile and Argentina
(based on CJPII b239)
In a first approach, it could then be argued that only congestion in the
Central Bioceanic Corridor, or a major investment in the passes
serving the north and south routes could alter the existing balance.
None of these alternative routes for the Corridor seem to present a
traffic level that can justify the large investments required to become a
relevant competitor of Cristo Redentor. Despite this fact, Chile has
announced that will invest US$ 160 millions during 1998 to improve
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thirteen border crossings -including Cristo Redentor. 240 According to
the Chilean Minister of Public Works the main purpose of these
investments is "to advance integration with Mercosur" 241 One of the
explanation for such lack of focus in the border investments is the
natural political pressure to spread infrastructure investments to
benefit a larger body of constituencies.
Regarding congestion, while the Cristo Redentor Pass is the major
concern, three other elements of the infrastructure can slow down
traffic (Espinosa et al,242 1996):
* The interaction of the Bioceanic Corridor with the local traffic in
the city of Mendoza, where unless a bypass is provided,
increasing obstruction to the international flows are expected.
* The Chilean ports of Valparaiso and San Antonio, which are
already congested and would require new investments to
handle additional traffic.
* The Chilean side of the Bioceanic Corridor close to the border,
where the road takes place in very difficult terrain, with small
curvature radios and steep grades exceeding 8%.
2. The Panama Canal
From a broader perspective, the Mendozan transportation system will
be affected by competition to the international transport services
provided by the Bioceanic Corridor. A central player in international
freight transport is the Panama Canal, and therefore this section tries
to characterize its role in the scenarios.
240 Mercopress News Agency. Mercosur News. March 9, 1998.
http://www.falkland-malvinas.com/news/sni9.html
241 Ibid. 240
242 Ibid. 168
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80 kilometers (50 miles) long and finished in 1914, the Panama Canal
connects the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, allowing huge savings in
distance and time for ships travelling across the globe.243 Table 8.2
gives an idea of the distance savings for three maritime routes.
Figure 8.8 shows the location of the Canal in the American Continent
and its main structures. Figure 8.9 presents the waterway in profile.
Ships crossing the Canal are raised or lowered 26 meters from the
entrance to the end by means of three sets of locks (Miraflores, Pedro
Miguel and Gatun)245. The locks are necessary because while the
Atlantic and Pacific have practically the same average sea level, the
Pacific has large tide variations (up to 18 feet). This would cause a
current running northbound when the Pacific's tide was high and a
current running southbound when low.246
243 Panama Canal Commission http://www.pancanal.com/public/general/features/features.htm
244 Panama Canal Commission. http://www.pancanal.com/public/general/overview.htm
245 ibid. 243
246 Panama Canal Commission. http://www.pancanal.com/public/general/know.htm
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Table 8.2
Examples of Distance Savings Allowed by the Panama Canal
(source: Panama Canal Commission244
From To Savings
In km, in miles
New York San Francisco 12,668 7,872
U.S. East Coast Japan 4,800 3,000
Ecuador (West Coast Europe 8,000 5,000
of South America_
Figure 8.8
The Panama Canal
(taken from Panama Canal Commission247)
Figure 8.9
Profile of the Panama Canal
(taken from Panama Canal Commission248)
247 Panama Canal Commission. http://www.pancanal.com/public/pictures.htm
248 Panama Canal Commission. httD://www.Dancanal.com/Dublic/Drofile.htm
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Figure 8.10 presents the cargo moved through the Canal in recent
years. It can be seen that the largest part of the traffic growth seen by
the Canal is due to increasing flows from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
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Figure 8.10
Commercial Traffic through the Panama Canal
(source: Panama Canal Commission 249)
Table 8.3 presents the principal commodities shipped through the
Panama Canal. Of particular interest for our future discussion of the
agricultural food market is the fact that in the last years, grain
shipments have become the largest commodity group moved through
the Canal reaching 23% of the total volume in 1995. Other agricultural
products and processed food added another 6% of the total cargo
moved in that year.
249 Panama Canal Commission http://www.pancanal.com/public/operat/statisti/statisti.htm
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Table 8.3
Some of the Principal Commodities Using the Panama Canal a
(source: Panama Canal Commissios __
Commodity 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Grains 32.9 32.7 33.4 34.1 44.1
Petroleum and .:24.0: 25.2 25.5 26.9 27.5
Nitrates, phosphates :14.7 13.8 13.1 15.4 15.9
and potash
Coal and coke 8.4 8.9 8.0 9.3 11.3
Oresand metals 11.4 9.6 10.6 10.1 108
Canned and .6.1 5.8 5.4 5 .9 6.9
refrigerated food ___
Other agricultural 5.1 4.9 4.5 4.5 4.9
commodities ._ _ I ,
All other:i i 60.1 58.4 57.2. 64.3 68.9
Total 162.7 159.3 157.7 170.5 190.3
a Data in millions of tons
Most traffic using the Canal moves between the East Coast of the U.S.
and the Far East.251 Table 8.4 shows some of the main routes using
the Panama Canal from 1991 to 1995, including some routes that are
relevant for the Bioceanic Corridor. Routes involving trade from/to
South America are potential areas of competition between the Canal
and the Bioceanic Corridor. New international trade or the attraction of
some of the freight currently using the Canal -particularly flows
between the east coast of South America and Asia- can provide the
overseas traffic that Mendoza and the Bioceanic Corridor are looking
to benefit from. It should be noticed, though, that the Canal is already
a functioning critical artery of the world trade, while the Bioceanic
Corridor it is not.
250 Panama Canal Commission. http://www.pancanal.com/proposal/htraffic.htm
251 Panama Canal Commission. http://www.pancanal.com/public/general/overview.htm
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Table 8.4
Some of the Main Routes Using the Panama Canal a, b
(source: Panama Canal Commissio 252
Route 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
EC U.S. - Asia 62.8 61.3 53.4 50.2 63.8
Round the World 7.9 8.0 20.2 27.1 20.9
EC U.S. - WC South 11.2 :10.4 11.0 14.9 16.9
America
Europe - WC 15.0 15.0 10.9 11.7 13.4
U.S./Canada
Europe - WC South 8.3 8.0 8.2 9.6 10.8
America
Europe - Asia 4.7 4.6 5.2 6.8 7.5
South America 3.2 3.9 3.8 4.1. 6.0
Intercoastal
EC South America - 4.1 4.1 3.5 4.3 5.5
WC U.S./Canada
EC. South America - 1.9 2.0 2.6 3.3 3.1
WC Central America*
All other routes 43.6 42.0 38.9 38.5 42.4
Total 162.7 159.3 157.7 170.5 190.3
a Data in millions of tons
b EC = East Coast; WC = West Coast
* Does not include the Panamanian
ports of Balboa and Cristobal
A significant element in this discussion arises is the Panama Canal's
capacity and its ability to serve future demand. In 1995, the daily
transit average exceeded 37, and traffic is expected to reach the
Canal's operating capacity of about 39 transits/day by 1999 (the
maximum sustainable capacity is 42 transits/day).253 The increase in
transits is compromising the Canal's long-standing commitment to
assure the transit through the Canal in an average of 24-hour Canal
Waters Time (CWT).2 54 The average CWT in 1995 was 28.2 hours
252 Ibid. 250
253 Panama Canal Commission. Panama Canal Spillway. January, 26, 1996. (reprint obtained
in course 1.286's "Freight Transportation Management", Panama Capacity Study Case)254 Canal Water Time (CWT) is the time a ship takes to cross from side to side once is ready for
transit. While the actual transit of the Canal can be done in 8-10 hours, ships usually need to
wait several hours for their turn to cross.
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and increased to 32.6 hours in the fist ten months of 1996.255 In
response, the Panama Canal Commission's is speeding the expansion
of the waterway's capacity. A 5-year capital investment program will
provide US$476 millions between 1996-2000 in addition to a previous
US$2.5 billion capacity expansion scheduled for completion in 2002
(Panama Canal Commission 256 ; Martland,257 1997).
The above investments are expected to increase the operating
capacity to about 44 transits/day and the maximum sustainable
capacity to 50.258 The Canal's demand projections suggest a 2%
growth that would more than double tonnage and would roughly
double transits by 2040 (Martland,259 1997). A "back of the envelope"
calculation results in the Canal's operating capacity being exceeded
by 2004 and the maximum sustainable capacity by 2011. Proposals
for longer term improvements to the Canal -including a third set of
locks- are currently under discussion, but imply investments between
US$2 billion and US$10 billion, and up to 20 years of planning and
construction before becoming fully operational (Martland,2 60 1997).
The trend of larger ships and containers are an additional element of
this picture. Panamax vessels -the largest ships that can be handled
by the waterway- make about 27% of the total transits through the
Canal. 261  The pressure to reduce costs is encouraging the
construction of larger post-Panamax vessels, which can not be served
by the Canal. The increasing use of these ships would tend to reduce
255 Panama Canal Commission. http://www.pancanal.com/proposal/capital.htm
256 Ibid. 255
257 Martland, Carl. Panama Canal Capacity. Study Case for 1.286 Course: "Freight
Transportation Management", MIT, September, 1997
2s5 Ibid. 253
259 Ibid. 257
260 Ibid. 257
261 Ibid. 244
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the costs of a multimodal movement involving maritime and land (more
likely rail) transportation.
Martland 262 (1997) presents some of the discussions of a group of
specialist and consultants gathered by the Panama Canal Commission
on June of 1997. The arguments there expressed seem to suggest
that while the Panama Canal faces some uncertainties in its operation,
it will continue to be a major player in the world trade, and a
formidable competitor for the Bioceanic Corridor.
The transfer of the Canal has also raised an additional concern -this
one of political nature- on the waterway operation. Since its
completion in 1914 and until 1979, the United States controlled and
operated the Canal. In 1979 the Panama Canal Commission was
created to operate the waterway during a 20-year transition, before
Panama assumes complete control of the Canal on December 31,
1999263. Some have expressed fears that the Panamanian
government could divert some of the Canal's resources to other ends,
causing deterioration of the financial base and efficient operation of
this international link.2 64 The security of the Canal after the U.S.
troops leave is also a concern,2 65 since a significant part of the
Panamanian security forces was destroyed in 1989 during the U.S.
invasion.
Regarding these issues, the rationale followed in this work is that the
likelihood of a permanent decay caused by a security problem or poor
262 Ibid. 257
263 Panama Canal Commission. http://www.pancanal.com/public/history/historyl 
.htm
264 Fabey. Michael. Can Panama Handle it? Traffic World. August 18, 1997
265 Rohter, Larry. Handoff in Panama: Hong Kong was Just a Rehearsal. The New York Times.
July, 13, 1997
211
management is considered very low. The magnitude of the economic
implications is likely to provide strong incentives for a careful
operation by the Panamanian Government and if this is not the case,
to force the major geopolitical powers to intervene before such decay
occurs. Despite the last statement and because of the nature of the
scenario approach, the feasibility of a future with a disrupted Panama
Canal should not be discarded right from the start, as its occurrence
would likely have a major effect on international trade.
A recent article on the Wall Street Journal266 provides an additional
element supporting the consideration of a future with disrupted Canal
operation. According to this report, water shortages due to
uncontrolled development of the canal's watershed and climate
change pose a major threat for the future operation of the Canal. The
article states that already in 1998, the lowest rainfall levels in 84 years
are drying up part of the lakes that are used to fill the locks of the
Canal, and as a result, the Panama Canal Commission has limited the
loads of some ships using the waterway. If water shortages like this
become common in the future years, restriction on the weight of the
ships is likely to divert some traffic to alternative routes and modes.
8.2.4 THE WORLD AGRICULTURAL MARKET: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR MENDOZA AND
MERCOSUR?
As could be seen in Chapter 7 food production plays a significant role in
Mendozan exports: over 40% of its 1996 exports were related to agricultural and
cattle products (either manufactured or not). Argentina traditionally has been a
net exporter of agricultural products and the four full members of Mercosur
(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) hold a relevant share of the world's
266 The Wall Street Journal, April 22, 1998
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cattle (26%), corn production (6.5%), soybean production (29%) and farming
land (6%).267 The recognition of these facts encouraged the search for
information on the world agricultural market that could affect the demand for
transportation in Mercosur, especially across the Andes. This search revealed
the existence of a heated debate on the world agricultural trends that, according
to some authors, could be signaling the start of an era of huge demand, limited
supply and hence, high prices. The occurrence of such event world change the
transportation demand across the Andes and at the same time provide an
incentive for non-transportation investments that could generate a
developmental effect in Mendoza and the rest of Mercosur.
As presented in Figure 8.11, world trade of agricultural commodities -which
represents roughly a 10% of world production268 - has been growing strongly in
the last decades:
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Figure 8.11
World Trade of Agricultural Commodities
(based on FA0 269, 1996a)
267 Ibid. 183
268 OECD. The Future of Food: Long Term Prospects for the Agro-Food Sector. 1998
269 Food and Agriculture Organization. Food and International Trade. Technical background
document for the 1996 World Food Summit
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There are two drivers for the global food demand: population and income
level. 270 Table 8.5 depicts population growth in the last decades and its
projections into the future.
Table 8.5
Population Data and Projections (in Millions)
(source: UN 1996 population assessment; taken from 0ECD271, 1998)
Year World Developed Developing
______Countries Countries
Total Annual Total Annual Total Annual
Growth Growth Growth
1970.... 3,702 2.06% 1,008 0.82% 21694 2.55%
1990: :5,282 1.73% 1,148 0.60%/ 4,134 2.06%
It can be seen in Table 8.5 that a large share of this growth has and will continue
to take place in developing countries, where population lives with lower levels of
income. Per capita gross domestic product has increased steadily in the last 25
years, boosting the demand for meat and agricultural products272. A further
modest increase of per capita income in developing countries could nearly
double their food needs in the following 30 years273.
Brown 274 (1996) has pointed out that while population growth rate has slowed,
the population base is still expanding. Because of this, the annual number of
persons added to the world is larger now than ever before (e.g., in 1995, 90
http:/www.fao.org/wfs/f inal/e/volume3/tl 2-e.htm
270 Macalla, Alex F., Food Needs for the 2 1st Century. Agricultural Outlook Forum, 1997
gopher://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu:70/00/reports/waobr/aof/aof96/g-denis.asc
271 Ibid. 270
272 Ibid. 67
273 Ibid. 270
274 Brown, Lester. Tough Choices: Facing the Challenge of Food Scarcity. W.W. Norton and
Company, New York, 1996
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million people were added, as compared to the 70 million added in 1970).
Brown also highlights that close to 60% of the population growth is taking place
in Asia, where a rise in income is expected.
Table 8.6
Data and Projections for all Cereals ~I
(taken from FA0275, 1996b)
World Developed Developing
Countries Countries
Production
1969-71 1,117 (303) 635 (591) 482 (185)
1989-91 1,727 (327) 864 (690) 863 (214)
1993-95 1,729 (307) 802 (627) 927 (213)
Projected 2010 2,334 (327) 1,016 (723) 1,318 (230)
Total use
1969-71 1,115 (302) 615 (573) 500 (191)
1990-92 1, 758 (327) 786 (624) 972 (237)
Projected 2010 2,334 (327) 854 (608) 1,480 (258)
Net trade
1969-71 22.5 -20.3
1992-94 89.1 -86.3
Projected 201,0 ___162.0 -162.0
a Data in millions of tons
b Figures in parenthesis are kg per capita
Among all agricultural products, cereals are especially important in the world
market: they provide 50% of the calories supplied and account for over 60% of
harvested land.276 Table 8.6 shows data and projections for all cereals
according to the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). It
can be seen from Table 8.6 that according to FAO, while some regional
imbalances are expected -developing countries are expected to become net
275 Food and Agriculture Organization. Food, Agriculture and Food Security: Developments
Since the World Food Conference and Prospects. Technical background paper, 1996
httn://www.fao.ora/wfs/final/s/volumel/t -s.htm
Ibid. 268
215
importers- the food deficits (162 million tons) are manageable and can be
matched with imports from developed countries. International trade of cereals is
expected to increase continuously. China -the world largest cereal consumer-
is estimated to require annual imports between 20 and 50 million tons per year
during the early decades of the next century (Fan and Agcaoli-Sombilla,1996 as
cited in World Bank 277, 1997b).
Contending with the above view, Brown278 (1995) has estimated that by 2030
China alone would need to import between 200 and 369 million tons of food.
The rest of the developing world would also require continuously increasing
amounts of imports to feed its population. Such disproportional demand, along
with supply constraints would increase prices of agricultural products, generating
an era of scarcity and high prices. The warning call made by Brown and others
seem supported by current events in the world agricultural market. Prices of
grain are now higher than they have been for a generation, demand has been
rising constantly, and the decline in global grain stocks has got to the level to
generate concern in the international community.279 As a result of these events,
the issue of "food security" has regained relevance throughout the world in the
last years, to the point that in 1996 FAO organized year of the World Food
Security Summit, to discuss the different aspects of the problem.
The debate on the prospects for the future world food market is an on-going
discussion. According to the World Bank 280 (1996), the existence of two deeply
divergent views (the "optimists" and the "pessimists") can be explained by their
different perception of four critical supply parameters:
277 The World Bank. At China's Table: Food Security Options. China 2020 Series. Washington,
DC, 1997
278 Brown, L. Who will Feed China? Wake-Up Call for a Small Planet. W.W. Norton and
Company, New York, 1995
279 Denis, G. 1996: A Crossroad for the World Grains Industry. 1996 Agricultural Outlook
Forum. gopher://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/70/00/reports/waobr/aof/aof96/g-denis.asc
280 The World Bank. Food Security for the World. Report prepared for the 1996 World Food
Summit.
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1. The rate of increase in biological cereal yields to be expected over the
next 15 to 30 years;
2. The amount of land to be added or lost from agricultural production;
3. The amount of land subject to intensification primarily through irrigation;
4. The impact of environmental degradation on food production capacity.
Despite the differences regarding how challenging will be to satisfy increasing
food demand, both sides of the debate seem to agree with the following
statements:
* Trade of food will continue to increase in the future, as it is the only way
in which countries can cover their deficits.
* Increasing population and the prospects of economic development in
many developing countries will increase the demand for food
continuously. Urbanization of these countries will reshape the structure of
demand, increasing the need to process, transport and storage food.2 81
* China plays a critical role in the international food market. Each year, the
prospects of Chinese agriculture affect the performance of the world
agricultural market. Because Chinese agriculture is done mainly with
traditional methods and is heavily dependent on the weather conditions,
yields can vary largely from year to year (Shang,282 1997). A consensus
seems to exist on the fact that China will depend on imports in the future
to cover the needs of its population (Nybery,2 83 1996).
* The role of biotechnology in feeding future generations is still uncertain
and is considered particularly important by some. We know that the
technology has the potential to revolutionize food production, but it is not
281 Ibid. 270
282 Shang X., Present Situation and Trends of Chinese Agricultural Development. 1996
Agricultural Outlook Forum.
qopher://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/70/00/reports/waobr/aof/aof96/x-shang.asc
Nyberg, A., China's Grain Marketing Infrastructure, 1996 Agricultural Outlook Forum
gopher:/lusda.mannlib.cornell.edu/70/00/reports/waobr/aof/aof96/a-nyberg.asc
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clear if this will actually happen. Public concerns and opposition from
environmental groups to genetically altered products can hinder the
development of biotechnology.
* An additional element of uncertainty is the presence of protectionist
measures that backed by concerns of national food security close the
borders to imports of food even in some of the most open economies such
as in the European Union (Denis, 284 1996). Countries may be reluctant to
rely on international markets for assuring their food supply, encouraging a
policy based on subsidies to local producers and protectionism.
The future of the world food market is relevant to Argentina, which is among the
traditional exporters of cereals and agricultural products. While the
development of an industrial/service-based economy that involves activities with
large value-added is generally regarded as desirable national goal, the World
Bank has pointed out that:
"For many developing countries, improved agricultural productivity can be
the engine of widely-shared growth. Indeed, growth in food and agricultural
output has been the main basis of economic growth, higher per capita
incomes, and better diets for most countries. Most of the developing
countries that grew rapidly during the 1980s, and achieved the largest
improvements in diets, experienced rapid agricultural growth in the
preceding years." 285
According to the New York Times286, Argentinean entrepreneurs have already
seen in the development of the food market enough opportunity as to begin
investing in land, irrigation, biotechnology and new feeding systems for
livestock. Figure 8.12 and Figure 8.13 show respectively the amount and value
of the Argentinean exports of cereals for the last years.
284 Ibid. 279
285 Ibid. 280
286 The New York Times. This Year in Argentina, Two Brothers Build an Empire. April 14, 1998
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Figure 8.12
Argentinean Cereal Exports
(source: Ministry of Economy and Public Works287)
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Figure 8.13
Value of Argentina's Exports of Cereals
(source: Argentina's Ministry of Economy and Public Works288)
287 Ministry of Economy and Public Works.
http://www.siap.sagyp.mecon.ar/comercio/capl2/12cua03.htm
288 Ibid. 287
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For Mendoza -as an agricultural region- the issues treated in the above
discussion should be integrated in the considerations of an overall strategic plan
for the province. In the context of strategic planning for the transportation
system in Mendoza, a major consideration deals with how to link the strategic
options listed in section 8.1.3 with the additional freight flows created by the
international trade of food.
Table 8.7 shows the projected deficits in the production of cereal by developing
countries according to geographic region. It can be seen that while Asia has
been mentioned as a major target for exporters due to its increase in population
and affluence, other regions will also require important imports of cereals. While
Africa is actually expected to have the larger needs for food imports, a major
concern is how will these already distressed economies be able to pay to feed
their populations. Latin America -a closer market both geographically and
culturally- can become a major destination for Mercosur's agricultural
production. Increasing imports from Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela have already
offset Argentinean exports making the region an overall importer of food.289
Mendoza's should be thinking how to serve some of these markets.
Table 8.7
Developing countries: Projected Deficits in Cereal Production i
(tai :ii ken from FA 290, 1996b)
S:: : :Sub- Near East/ South East Asia Latin America
Saharan North Africa Asia & &
1969/71 20.3 2.7 6.5 5.5 8.8 : _:_:: -3.2*:
1992/94 86.3 11.2 35.8 3.1 20.1 15.3
Projected 162.0 19.0 72.0 10.0 35.0 26.0
20 10 : . . "".... .. . .:.
a Data in million tons.
* Figure represents a surplus
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One of the implications of the above is that the agricultural flows crossing
Mendoza and Mercosur could be oriented westbound heading to the Chilean
ports in the Pacific, eastbound to Brazil and the Atlantic coast of Argentina, or
north to Peru, Bolivia and the rest of South America (Figure 8.14).
Figure 8.14
Feasible Flows of Agricultural Products from Mendoza and Argentina
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8.3 STEP 3: DRIVING FORCES
Continuing with Schwart'z framework, after the key local factors have been
identified, we must make a list of the forces in the macro-environment that will
affect these key local factors. The objective is to distinguish the forces behind
the key local factors identified in the last step. These driving forces are both
internal and external to the province, and they can be predetermined elements
or critical uncertainties. Schwartz states that this step is the most research-
intensive of the process.
According to Van der Heijden,2 91 (1996) the process starts by articulating a
number of significant variables for the decision under consideration. A way to
start the search for driving forces in Mendoza is to ask what are the main issues
involved in the key factors already identified (demand for transportation across
the Andes, economic development/competitive advantage gained in Mendoza,
and competition in transportation services).
Table 8.8 presents a set of relevant issues highlighted by members of the MIT
transportation group working in the Mendozan research project mentioned in
section 8.1.1.
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Table 8.8
Some Relevant Issues Involved in the Key Decision Factors
* Political and economic stability in
Mercosur countries
* Concerns regarding external
economic shocks (e.g., Mexico
1995, South Asia 1997)
* World political stability
* Degree of cooperation between
Mercosur
* What's the constituency of the
Central Bioceanic Corridor in
Mendoza and Mercosur
* How much does Mendoza really
cares about its transportation
system? Is transportation
perceived as critical Mendoza's
socioeconomic development
* Perceived Increase in the global
demand and trade of agricultural
products
* Agricultural nature of Mendoza
and relevance of agricultural-
origin products in Mendozan
exports.
* Feasibility of a disruption in the
Panama Canal
* World oil prices
: International economic growth
* Economic integration and free-
trade trends.
* Transportation and related
technologies (fuels, new engine
designs, fewer emissions)
* Mercosur trade: intra-regional
and overseas; international
demand for Mercosur products:
Europe, Asia/Pacific, NAFTA
* Attitudes toward risk of
investment in the region
* Availability of international
moneys to fund large
transportation projects
* Attitudes generated by global
environmental concerns
* Global climate change
* Argentina's role as grain exporter
nation
* Expected traffic growth and
capacity constraints in the
Panama Canal
* Mendoza's ability to benefit
economically from traffic using its
transport system
After listing the above significant issues, it is necessary to group them in clusters
of related topics as presented in Figure 8.15.
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Global Politics
* World Political Stability
Environment
* Global climate change
* Attitudes driven by global
environmental concerns
State of the Regional Economy
* Argentina/Mendozan Economy
* Attitudes toward risk to invest in the
region
* Agricultural nature of Mendoza and
relevance of agricultural-origin
products in the provincial exports
* Argentina's role as net food exporter
* Mendoza's ability to benefit from the
traffic usina its transoDort system
The Provincial Transportation System
* Development of the rest of the
provincial transportation system
The World Food Issue
* Expected Increase in demand and
trade of agricultural products
* Expected increase in demand for
processed food
* Price instability
Technology
* Transport and related technologies
* Biotechnology
Figure 8.15
Clusters of Relevant Issues
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State of the World Economy
* International economic growth
* External economic shocks
* World oil prices
* Availability of international moneys to
fund large transportation projects
* Economic integration and free-trade
trends
The Transportation System
Constituency
* Political support for the Bioceanic
Corridor: Argentina, Mercosur
* How much does Mendoza cares
about its transportation system? Is
transportation perceived as a critical
element of Mendoza's socioeconomic
development?
Development and Performance of
Mercosur
* Economic and political stability and
trade in Mercosur countries
* Mercosur trade: intra-regional and
overseas
* Degree of cooperation between
Mercosur countries
Panama Canal Competition
* Growing traffic and capacity
constraints in the Canal
* Possibility of a disruption in the
Canal operation
8.3.1 THE INFLUENCE DIAGRAM
Van der Heijden, 292 (1996) recominends to use of an "influence diagram" as a
way to identify and highlight the relationships between these variables and
uncover the driving forces. It must be reminded that as mentioned in section
6.3.2, the construction of scenarios depends on the structure that is used to
explain the relationships between events and trends. Different interpretations of
this structure will result in different scenarios, and the interpretation is based on
the perceptions and mental models of the scenario builders.
An influence diagram for the Mendozan case is depicted in Figure 8.16. The
diagram reflects the relationship that the author believes connects the key
decision factors and the relevant issues presented above. The diagram will be
used to look for the driving forces of the scenarios and is not intended to include
all elements and all relationships. It is easier to understand the relations
represented in Figure 8.16 by starting with the key factor decisions of the
scenarios -in boxes. An arrow starting, e.g., in element A and pointing to
element B implies that element A affects element B.
The demand for transportation through the Andes is the first key decision factor
and the diagram presents three major elements influencing it:
a) The condition of the infrastructure
The condition of the infrastructure is affected by a transportation
constituency that encourages and lobbies for new investments. This
constituency is itself influenced by the perception of how important is
transportation for Mendoza and Mercosur.
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Key Decision Factor:
Demand for
Transportation through
the Andes
Infrastructure : Transport
Condition Constituency
Perceived relevance
of transport in
Mendoza/Mercosur
Panama Canal's
Panama Canal Capac ity
Competition
Communications
and Transportation
Technolo VMercosur Trade (intra-.
regional and overseas)
crossing Mendoza
Mendoza/Mercosur
Agricultural: :
Economy
tal
Behavior of
Financial Markets
Availability
of low-cost
Energy ,
nomic integration
STrade Trends
Mendozan
Public/Private
Sector
Performance
Mendoza's
ability to benefit
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State of the
Argentinean/Mendozan
Economy
Argentina/Mendoza
Political Stability
Figure 8.16
Influence Diagram for the Mendozan Scenarios
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The development and performance of Mercosur will shape the perception
of the role played by transportation. If Mercosur continues to develop and
performs successfully, the flow of goods will increase and the relevance
of transportation as a tool for economic well being is likely to grow. In the
Mendozan case, we argue that the rise and prospects of Mercosur places
transportation among the top priorities for the province. The potential
benefits of strong Transandean trade are significant for Mendoza.
b) The international transport competition
This element is itself one of the key decision factors. The Panama Canal
represents a large share of the international competition for the Trans-
Andean flows. This can be better understood by looking at Figure 8.17:
Figure 8.17
The Panama Canal and the Central Bioceanic Corridor293
293 based on http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map collection/alobe.iDa
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The capacity and operational issues of the Canal discussed earlier in this
chapter will have a definite influence over the level of service -and of
competition- that can be expected from this international waterway, and
therefore is one of the elements to be considered in the scenarios.
Advances in communications, transportation and related technologies will
also affect the competition in the market of international transport.
Improved transportation has already enabled the expansion of global
trade. Additional technological progress in these areas will continue to
ease overseas movement of freight and people. New services and
capabilities are likely to be developed by carriers and demanded by
shippers.
A third influence over the level of transport competition is provided by
political stability in the world. A stable and peaceful future that fosters
trade could encourage different alternatives for routing and managing
overseas traffic. On the other hand, a planet plagued with armed conflicts
and a multiple insecure geographical areas would reduce the movement
of goods and may also reduce the number of reliable transport options.
The development and performance of Mercosur will also affect
competition. A prosperous Mercosur can encourage the deployment of
the North and South Bioceanic Corridors. Inclusion of other South
American nations could change -although perhaps not significantly- the
traffic flows in the Southern Cone.
c) Mercosur's trade crossing Mendoza
Trade involving Mercosur and crossing Mendoza's is the more direct
influence on the demand for transportation through the Andes. The state
of the world economy influences overseas trade as it affects the demand
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for Mercosur goods in foreign markets. Mercosur is itself the largest
influence of intra-regional trade moving through Mendoza. Among all
trade, the exports of agricultural products are presented as a specific
influence. A further figure will address the world food issue with more
detail.
Additionally to the economic performance of its member nations (not
pictured in the diagram), Mercosur's performance is influenced by two
elements: the state of the global economy and the trends in economic
integration and free trade. The 1997 currency crisis in East Asia slowed
down economic growth in Latin America 294 and provides a good example
of the effects that such economic events in distant regions can have on
Mercosur.
The reader will note that Figure 8.16 depicts the economic integration and
free trade trends not as a manifestation of the economic activity in the
planet, but as an independent force in and of itself that affects the
behavior of the world's economy. This consideration is based on the
perceived strength of these trends of economic globalization. The world's
political situation influences these trends, as a decomposition of the
global status quo -e.g., an exacerbation of regional conflicts- could
reverse the current trends and result in a world with a few closed trade
blocks. It should also be noticed that there is no relation drawn between
communication and transportation technologies and these economic
trends. This of course does not mean that such relationship does not
exist, but represents the notion that further technological advances in
these areas will only speed economic globalization rather than define the
direction of these trends.
294 Global Business News. Market Turmoil Hampers Latin American Growth. November, 1997
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Economic integration and free trade have already been embraced by a
large number of nations and seem to have a solid acceptance. Still, these
trends could follow two courses. 295, 296 The first one -open
regionalism- implies a multilateral approach, encouraging trade among
the different areas of the world. The second and opposite way -closed
regionalism-- means integration and free trade among members of
different economic blocks and at the same time discrimination toward
outsiders.
In the last chapter, we acknowledged the efforts of Mercosur to reach
beyond its borders and strengthen overseas trade. Formal discussions
with the European Union, Mexico, Canada are already underway. A
major example of how economic integration trends could affect Mercosur
can be found in the proposal to create the Free Trade Area of the
Americas. This effort initiated in 1994 aims to create a free trade block
stretching the entire American Continent by 2005.297 While the 1998
Summit of the Americas held in Santiago, Chile confirmed the intention of
the American countries to create the largest trade block in the world, the
project is not free from obstacles and uncertainties exist that could hinder
and even prevent its completion.298
Beside world political stability, three other elements are depicted as influencing
the state of the world economy:
295 Times Net Asia. Japan External Trade Organization Chief-warms to liberalization.
http://web3.asial.com.sq/timesnet/data/ab/docs/ab0992.html
296 Talbott, Strobe. East Meets West: The Asia-Pacific Region in an Age of Interdependence.
http://www.ozemail.com.au/-usaemb/archive/st971030.htm
297 Free Trade Area of the Americas. http://www.ftaa-alca.org/englishversion/view.htm
298 Traffic World. Mother of All Blocks. April 27, 1998.
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a) Global environmental conditions
The perceived effects of environmental degradation can affect the future
prospects of the world economy. According to the Boston Globe299 , a
recent study undertaken at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst
concluded that 1997 has been the warmest of the last 600 years, followed
by 1995 and 1990. The study:
"provides strong evidence that the extraordinary warming of recent
years is a direct result of the burning of fossil fuels and other
human activities that add carbon dioxide to the atmosphere." 300
The accumulation of evidence like this is likely to strengthen global
environment concerns. But global climate change might affect the
economy not only because of perceptions. The geographical patterns of
food production in the world could be significantly altered due to global
warming.
b) The availability of low-cost energy
The importance of low-cost energy in the world economy was exemplified
during the decade of the 1970s when sharp increases in the price of oil
pushed many countries into a decade of stagnation and inflation.30 1 While
in general the world economy is more energy efficient and its better
prepared for such contingencies, higher-cost energy could have a major
impact in the global economic performance.
299 The Boston Globe. '97 Warmest in Study of Last 600 Years. April 23, 1998
http://www.bostonglobe.com/dailyglobe/globehtml/113/97warmest in study of last 600 ye.htm300 Ibid. 299
301 Blanchard Olivier, Macroeconomics. Prentice-Hall Inc. New Jersey, 1997, p2.
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c) The behavior of the international financial markets
Globalization of the economy has not only meant increased trade of
merchandises and commodities, but also increased transactions of
foreign assets and foreign currency, which in 1994 reached a volume of
US$ 1 trillion per day.302 These gigantic flows of money provide short and
medium term financial resources for many countries, but can also
exacerbate economic problems. Sudden capital outflows and speculative
attacks have played a major role in the currency crises and subsequent
economic struggles suffered by Italy and Great Britain in 1992, Mexico in
1994 and East Asia in 1997. 303, 304
Two concerns of the author of this work may be considered a source of
uncertainty for the future of the world economy:
* The increasing role that financial markets' perceptions -as compared
to economic facts- have in the world economic performance
* The seemingly unchallenged ability of speculative attacks to trigger
and profit from these capital crises, which is likely to provide an
incentive powerful enough to guarantee the reoccurrence of this
behavior.
The last key decision factor in Figure 8.16 is the economic advantage and/or
competitive advantage resulting from Mendoza's transportation strategy. On
one side this factor is influenced by the ability of the province to benefit from the
flows using its transportation system, which in turn depends on the performance
of Mendoza's public and private sector. Another major influence comes from the
302 Ibid. 301
303 Ibid. 301
304 International Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook 1998
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/weo0598/index.htm
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state of the Argentinean and Mendozan economies, since as discussed earlier,
transportation investments in a stagnated economy will tend to relocate
economic activity instead of creating new ones. Just as the world political
situation influences the state of the global economy, the political conditions in
Argentina and Mendoza will affect the economic performance of the region.
8.3.2 THE GRANULARITY OF THE ANALYSIS
Before attempting to identify a set of driving forces from Figure 8.16, it is
necessary to comment on the level of detail of the analysis. Van der Heijden 30 5
(1996) states that the "granularity" of the driving-force analysis poses a
significant challenge, and that a safe middle ground must be found between
specific structural relationships among variables -that are hard to generalize-
and high level analysis that provide little evidence of causal relationships. His
recommendation is to:
" ...lean towards a fuzzy fit of a somewhat imprecise generalization, with
enough validity to be useful in understanding underlying structure." 306
It is clear that the previous analysis of the influence diagram for the Mendozan
scenarios has been performed at a very general level. For the purposes of this
thesis -illustrating the use of the scenario technique in a regional transportation
context- it is considered appropriate.
A more detailed analysis of the influence diagram could start by disaggregating
the elements of Figure 8.16 in different areas. As an example, of this approach,
the influence diagram in Figure 8.18 focuses only on the demand for
transportation through the Andes and looks exclusively at the influence of the
global food market in Mercosur trade. Then, the relationships in the influence
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diagram can be established through quantitative models representing a
particular structure between events and trends.
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Figure 8.18
Influence Diagram: World Food Issue and
Transportation Demand across the Andes
8.3.3 THE DRIVING FORCES OF THE MENDOZAN SCENARIOS
Several of the elements represented in Figure 8.16 and Figure 8.18 can be
characterized as driving forces of the scenarios. There are a few which seem to
have a leading influence on the behavior of some of the other variables and the
overall outcome. These are the driving forces of the scenarios:
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* World population growth
* Increased affluence in developing countries
* Mercosur's development and performance
* The behavior of the financial markets
* World political stability
* The international demand for agricultural products
* The development of biotechnology
* Global environmental conditions
* The availability of low-cost energy
* The advance in communications, transportation and related
technologies
* Panama Canal competition
* Global economic integration and Free Trade Trends
8.4 STEP 4: RANK KEY DECISION FACTORS AND DRIVING FORCES
BY IMPORTANCE AND UNCERTAINTY
We have to rank the key factors and driving forces: first, based on their
relevance to the success of the focal decision identified at the beginning of the
process; and second, based on their uncertainty. The final objective is to
identify two or three driving forces that are the most relevant for the outcome of
the project and are also the most uncertain.
Table 8.9 presents our ranking according to both criteria and is the base to find
the major axes that will define the structure of the scenarios.
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.Table 8.9
Ranking of Key Decision Factors and Driving Forces
:::: By importance BDeision Factors y uncertainty
1 iEconomic development andI 1 Economic development and
competitive advantage gained competitive advantage gained by
by Mendoza Mendoza
2 Demand for transportation 2 Demand for transportation
:Ii through the Andes through the Andes
3 Competition for International 3 Competition for International
Transport Services Transport Services
Driving Forces
1 Mercosur's development and 1 : Mercosur's development and
_performance _prerformance
: 2 Global economic integration and: 2 Level of affluence in developing
_n____o sfree trade trends ._._ countries
3 -Level of affluence in developing 13 .Global economic integration and
_ countries_ free trade trends
4 Panama Canal competition 4 World political stability
!5 International demand of ;:5 Development of biotechnology
agricultural products
6 Development of biotechnology 6 Communications, transportation
Sand related technologies 
.
7 Communications, transportation 7 Panama Canal competition
and related technologies , _ ____________
_ __ _: __ :_ _: :: : _ _;_ : i :agricultural products
9 ..1 World political stability 9 Behavior of financial markets
10 Availability of low-cost energy 10 Gl.bal environmental conditions
11 Global environmental conditions 11 Availability of low-cost enegy
,12 World popi! i ulation growth ::::  12 : World populaltiion growth
8.5 STEP 5: SELECT THE LOGIC OF THE SCENARIOS
Schwartz 307 (1996) explains this fifth step as follows:
"The results of this ranking exercise are, in effect, the axes along which the
eventual scenarios will differ. Determining these axes is among the most
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important steps in the entire scenario-generating process. The goal is to
end up with just a few scenarios whose differences make a difference to
decision makers.... ...Once the fundamental axes of crucial uncertainties
have been identified, it is sometimes useful to present them as a spectrum
(along one axis), or a matrix (with two axes), or a volume (with three axes)
in which different scenarios can be identified... ...The logic of a given
scenario will be characterized by its location in the matrix of most significant
scenario drivers."
Based on the above ranking, the following will be selected as the crucial
uncertainties that will define the scenarios for Mendoza:
* Mercosur's development and performance
* The trends of global economic integration and free trade
* Level of affluence in developing countries
Figure 8.19 depicts the "scenario space" for Mendoza. Each block in the figure
represents a different combination of "values" of the critical uncertainties.
Mercosur development
and performance
Global economic
integration/free
trade trends
Figure 8.19
A Scenario Space for Mendoza
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To define these values, each of the critical uncertainties will be characterized by
different "states"; in our case these are qualitative descriptions of their feasible
outcomes. Table 8.10 presents these states.
Table 8.10
S : : : : The States of the Critical Uncertainties
U ncertainties ::. 1 i ii:
Mercosur's Boom: Modest growth Slow-down:
development and Mercosur booms and Mercosur performance Mercosur slows down
performance the member nations continues with a and eventually
become the new healthy but more stagnates
"economic tigers": of modest growth:: :;*~~nsis i.i iSt
the e i century
The trends of global Open Regionalism"- Closed Re(
economic: integration Global integration and Regional ir
and free trade free trade amongst and free tr
:::: ::: different areas of the amongst mi
world closed ec
Sbloc
Affluence in Geneeralized Selec
developing countries: mprovement. Improvement: deterioration:
Widely distributed Income levels improve Generalized fall in
:income growth in slightly but does not afluence in
developing countries reach the majority: of developing countries
... ..the population in
... __ _____ _....... developing countries ___:_J_::_:: "_
The critical uncertainties and states presented above allow for 18 different
combinations. These combinations are presented in Table 8.11 and each of
them is a possible scenario that could be further developed. To be able to
manage the rest of the process, we must choose only a reduced number of
scenarios. For this purpose, we will use some of the recommendations
expressed by some of the experts in the field and cited in our previous
discussion on the scenario methodology:
* The number of scenarios should be between two and four.
* Each scenario should be relevant for the focal issues or decisions
defined in the first step of the process.
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* If using three scenarios, special care should be taken to avoid
structuring them as a set of "good-regular-bad" futures, reducing
therefore their usefulness.
* The use of a surprise-free scenario is a useful addition in the set.
* The chosen scenarios should represent the broad range of futures that
may come to pass.
Table 8.11
Possible Combinations of the Critical Uncertainties
Combination Critical Uncertainties
Mercosur Globalization and Affluence in developing
free trade trends countries
1 Boom Open global Generalized
economy improvement
2 Boom Open global Selective improvement
economy
3 Boom Open global Generalized deterioration
economy
4 Boom Closed regionalism Generalized
improvement
5 Boom Closed regionalism Selective improvement
6 Boom Closed regionalism Generalized deterioration
7 Modest growth Open global Generalized
economy improvement
8 Modest growth Open global Selective improvement
economy
9 Modest growth Open global Generalized deterioration
economy
10 Modest growth Closed regionalism Generalized
improvement
11 Modest growth Closed regionalism Selective improvement
12 Modest growth Closed regionalism Generalized deterioration
13 Slow-down Open global Generalized
economy improvement
14 Slow-down Open global Selective improvement
economy
15 Slow-down Open global Generalized deterioration
economy
16 Slow-down Closed regionalism Generalized
improvement
17 Slow-down Closed regionalism Selective improvement
18 Slow-down Closed regionalism Generalized deterioration
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From the 18 feasible scenarios, we have chosen four (combinations 1, 8, 11 and
18) as the most helpful for the Mendozan case. Table 8.12 lists these scenarios,
which have been labeled to express the main difference they represent.
Table 8.12
______ The Four Scenarios forMendoza
.. ...... I :: :.:". ... . • G ~b: ii --i:' i i l, i i :ii l: iCritical Uncertainties
.... Globalization Affluence in
Scenario Name Mercosur and free trade developing
trends countries
1. "Extended Road" Modest growth Open global Selective
_____ _economy improvement
2 "Global Flight" Boom Open global Generalized
economy improvement
3 "Mercosur Trail" Modest growth Closed Selective
. . regionalism improvement
4. "Pothole" Slow-down Closed Generalized
:regionalism deterioration
8.6 STEP 6: "FLESHING OUT THE SCENARIOS"
In this stage, we must return to the basic factors identified in steps two and
three. We must consider each of the key decision factors and driving forces in
each scenario. It is necessary to integrate each uncertainty in the scenarios.
This is done based on the implications of these uncertainties and the likelihood
of their presence in the environment defined by a specific scenario. Finally, we
must provide the cause-effect relationship in the scenario by explaining in a
"narrative form" how the present could develop into the future represented by
that scenario.
In our case, Table 8.12 provides the general structure of the scenarios for
Mendoza. The remaining driving forces and key decision factors previously
identified were integrated to this structure. Those elements considered as
predetermined appear in all scenarios. Uncertainties behave in different ways
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as determined by the logic of the scenario and cause-effect relationship
underlying its elements.
In what follows, the scenarios for 2020 are presented in a narrative form:
1. "Extended Road"
The world in 2020 is closer than ever to what could be considered a truly global
economy -with the exception of most Africa. While the negotiations for the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) took 5 years longer than expected, the
American Continent has been functioning as a single market since 2010. In view
of the FTAA creation and in fear of losing ground on this huge market, the
European Union strengthened its ties to Mercosur and used this relation as the
gateway to the rest of the Americas. The relevance of Japan and China in the
U.S. trade strengthen the links between the nations of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) and NAFTA, which eventually lead to closer commercial
ties between APEC and the FTAA.
While increased multilateral trade has generated new and improved
opportunities over the years, the benefits have not been uniformly distributed.
An old problem -whose incidence is especially high in Latin America- persists,
as the new wealth created does not reach a significant percentage of the
population. Inequality creates occasional social unrest in developing countries,
which affects their economy and drives away critical infrastructure investments
needed for a sound and continuing socioeconomic development. Mercosur
nations are not an exception: they are not able to repeat the high growth rates of
the first years of the block. Despite this, the modest but continuous growth of
Mercosur allows for increased intraregional and overseas flows.
The international demand for agricultural products -and their price- grows, but
moderately. A predicted era of higher food prices does not occur due to the large
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share of the population whose income remains constant and also to some
applications of biotechnology. Argentina's agricultural surpluses are
increasingly marketed to cover Latin American food deficits. Because of the
moderate prices, geographical location and transportation costs are key
elements of competitiveness in this trade. Therefore, US producers are better
suited to serve the Mexican market, while Brazil and the rest of South America
are major destinations of Argentinean food exports. The larger profits yield by
processed food and specialty produce in more affluent markets (US and
Canada) multiplies the presence of this industries.
The now indisputable effects of global warming are universally accepted.
Environmental concerns encourage research and adoption of clean fuels,
innovative propulsion systems and new engine designs. Clearer public
perception of an environmental threat during the first decade of the 2 1st century
resulted in an increase of energy costs, as it became politically acceptable to tax
low-cost but polluting energy sources. In the medium and long term, as the new
technologies become available, the overall results will likely be a modest
increase in energy costs. The distribution of moneys generated by the tax on
fossil fuels is a major debate in the international community. As the emissions
generated in a country end up affecting all nations, the idea of a global fund has
been around for some time, but a generalized agreement seems far from being
achieved. Developed nations -users of cleaner technologies- continue to
support proposals that charge emissions from all countries equally and distribute
the funds also equally among all nations. Developing countries continue to
argue that developed nations have created the largest part of the problem as
they started to pollute earlier in order to foster their industrial development.
Therefore, developing countries support a tax structure based on levels of
development, and propose that a large part of the funds be invested to
modernize their industries and transportation systems to reduce their emissions
of pollutants to the environment. In the meanwhile, each country has used these
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funds as it best suits their needs. Argentina and Mercosur have used part of the
money to create a fund for the development and improvement of transportation
infrastructure like the Low-Altitude tunnel across the Andes and the Bioceanic
Corridor.
Even after major capital improvements performed at the turn of the century, the
Panama Canal reached maximum sustainable volume in 2010. This has
diverted traffic to other routes: some flows between Europe and Asia and
between Europe and the West Coast of the U.S. use either one of the overland
routes built in Nicaragua and in the south of Mexico. Some traffic between the
two coasts of South America has shifted to land transportation, but a large part
uses the North Bioceanic Corridor, as it matches the origin/destination patterns
better (refer to Figure 7.4). The plans to build the third set of locks in the
Panama Canal were overtaken by the fast development of these new
transportation routes. Now that they have become reliable alternatives it is
unclear if the third set of locks will be ever built.
Occasional instabilities in the world financial markets continue to shake the
global economies every four to six years, but their real effect is not as menacing
and countries have learned to live with them. With some periodical exceptions,
multilateral trade has proved to be a fairly good way to encourage global political
stability.
2. "Global Flight"
In this scenario, the world also lives in a global economy, but the speed of
integration is higher than in Extended Road. The FTAA initiates its operation as
originally scheduled in 2005. European fears of being left out the FTAA market
and Latin American concerns over a US dominated block reinforce each other
and speed the abolition of trade obstacles between the FTAA and the European
Union. A fast growing Chinese economy becomes the engine of Asia and U.S.
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interest in participating further in these markets encourages the establishment of
trade links between APEC and FTAA.
Multilateral trade enables and sustains new economic activity across the globe.
This global growth provides a proper economic environment, from which many
developing countries are able to benefit. The international community is able to
apply tighter controls on the international financial flows and thereby reduce the
volatility of the capital markets. Developing countries can attract some of these
flows and use them to develop a competitive industrial base and take advantage
of their natural resources. A generalized growth in income follows, which
triggers a further increase in trade.
Mercosur benefits from this economic environment. Investments in education,
social services aiming the poor and critical infrastructure and productive projects
support a rise in the quality of life enjoyed by the population. There is strong
intraregional and overseas demand for Mercosur goods and commodities.
One of the products for which there is larger additional demand is food.
Agricultural production faces constraints in several developed countries.
Biotechnology has failed to provide significantly larger yields. Because of
climate change, the prospects of Chinese agricultural -greatly dependent on
rain patterns- create serious concerns. The balance in the international food
markets has changed. Expected permanent shortages of food cause prices to
rise considerably. Asia demands food and has the money to pay for it.
Argentinean and Mercosur food exports do not only aim at Latin America.
The Panama Canal has been operating at capacity since 2005. The alternative
transportation routes crossing the American Continent work close to capacity.
The North Bioceanic Corridor -linking Brazil, Bolivia, the north of Argentina and
the northern ports of Chile- takes a significant portion of the Intercoastal trade
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of South America previously using the Canal. Nevertheless the large food
exports from Argentina to Asia are better served by the Central Bioceanic
Corridor that crosses Mendoza and connects Brazil, Buenos Aires (Argentina)
and the Chilean ports of Valparaiso and San Antonio.
Global environmental concerns play a similar role in the Global Flight scenario
as in Extended Road, and the same happens with the cost of energy and the
world political stability.
3. "Mercosur Trail"
In this scenario, the world is formed by a few economic blocks that work as
independent trade units. While there are flows of goods and capital among
these blocks, the bulk of the exchange takes place within these regions. This
scenario started to unfold when the US Senate denied for second time "fast
track" powers to the new Administration that entered in 2000. This event was a
definite strike to the multilateral discussions for the FTAA. Mercosur decided to
go ahead on its own, and the rest of South America joined the block308. After
attempting to diversify its links with other regions, the relevance of the US in
their economies pulled Canada and Mexico back into NAFTA, which now
embraces the Central America and Caribbean countries -including Cuba. Talks
between Mercosur and the European Union broke off because of the great
political pressure to keep agricultural subsidies in Europe. In view of this
fragmentation, India, China and Japan decided to turn back their eyes to home
and promote an Asian block.
Inequality in income growth and wealth distribution is the rule in developing
countries. Attempts to reduce volatility of the international financial markets
result in rigid regulations that discourage the movement of overseas investments
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into developing countries. Mercosur's growth is constant, but modest. Also
modest is the growth in food demand and prices of agricultural products.
Relatively low prices and tariffs on food trade between blocks keep most flows
contained within each economic block. Argentina is the food basket of the
extended Mercosur. Some specialty products like wines and fruit conserves are
still exported to NAFTA.
The effects of global warming are clear and acknowledged in all countries. Each
block generates its own environmental standards to face the problem. Global
approaches are initiated, but run into a standoff between developed and
developing nations. Energy prices increase moderately, and the division of the
world generates some changes in the world market of energy. Following a trend
initiated at the turn of the century, Argentina has become the energy supplier of
Mercosur based on its oil and natural gas production. 309 A small tax on fossil
fuels is charged and administered by each country, but it fails to reduce
environmental degradation and the revenues generated are also limited.
The Panama Canal is able to satisfactorily serve current levels of demand.
Frictions between some of the blocks create political tension and economic
sanctions. The trade blocks seem destined to follow the path of the European
Union and become a political union in order to be better suited to defend their
economic interests.
4. "Pothole"
In this scenario the world is also formed by few independent and closed trade
blocks. Large financial groups have developed a profitable business in this
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308 The Economist. The Road from Santiago. April 11, 1998
309Mercopress News Agency. Mercosur News.. August 22, 1997
http://www.falkland-malvinas.com/archive/sni6220897.html
future: speculative attack on foreign currencies. A set of major economic crises
in the first years of the 2 1st century strike developing and developed nations,
with the former being hardest hit. The financial run against the Mexican peso
and the Brazilian real created by European investors in 2003 temporarily
affected the stability of NAFTA and damaged Mercosur's performance in a more
permanent way. The world economy slows down.
Mercosur's high growth is just a memory. After the crisis of 2003, economic
output took 7 years to get back to the size it had before. Thereafter, the
economy has lagged for 10 years and there is no clear way out in the near
future. The income levels of Mercosur and the rest of the developed countries
have deteriorated. Population in developed nations maintains a slow growing
income, but inequality in wealth distribution is already a problem. Trade within
Mercosur and the rest of the economic blocks exists but at a much lower levels
than expected in the last years of the 20 th century. The geographical location of
regions and cities, and their access to major local markets becomes again a
critical element of economic survival. 310 Demand for food increases slowly -
following population growth. The constrained economic situation and the
obstacles to trade among blocks encourage a revival of national food policies
based on subsidies and protectionism to local producers. Argentina continues to
produce more food that it consumes, but it is a low-profit export business.
While no clear evidence has been presented, claims that the speculative attacks
on currencies are used to weaken adversary blocks gain acceptance, increasing
political tensions between economic areas. The Panama Canal has excess
capacity due to lower world trade. Global warming is evident, but the search for
economic well-being overcomes environmental concerns. Keeping low-cost
energy sources available is a primary goal, and taxing cheap fuels is not
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politically accepted. Transportation technologies therefore focus on increasing
carrying capacity. The natural environment deteriorates further.
8.7 STEP 7: IMPLICATIONS
Once we have built the scenarios in some detail, it is necessary to consider their
implications. In what follows, and as a first look, some implications that each
scenario pose for the transportation system in Mendoza are presented:
1 "Extended Road"
* The international link with Chile would still be important. But the
Argentinean food flows to cover the Latin American deficit, would
make essential the link of Mendoza with Mercosur and the rest of
South America: the Buenos Aires - Mendoza highway, the BAMSJ rail
line and its connection to the Mesopotamic railroad.
* Proliferation of food processing industries would likely demand good
connections between agricultural lands, processing centers and
gateways to foreign markets. This suggests the importance of:
- improving the provincial highway network
- defining and implementing land use policies that encourage an
orderly growth
- providing the transportation system with efficient freight
terminals
2 "Global Flight"
* The international link with Chile would become critical. But the
success of an upgraded pass would not depend only on its own
performance. The condition and operation of the Chilean part of the
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link -the road and the ports of Valparaiso and San Antonio would also
be essential.
* The new profitability found in agriculture would likely encourage
additional farming in Argentina and Mendoza. The link between
agricultural land and the main transportation network would also
become important.
* The food flows heading to Asia and the rest of the Mercosur and
overseas trade would require an improved connection to the east of
Mendoza and the provision of efficient freight terminals.
* Definition and implementation of land use policies would be needed to
deal with a possible rapid growth in provincial economic activity.
3 "Mercosur Trail"
* The link between Mendoza and Mercosur/South America becomes the
critical issue. In this future, the border pass through the Andes may
be more important to Chile than to Mendoza and Argentina.
* Mendoza's agricultural output would continue to require improved
access to the main transportation network and efficient freight
terminals from where the products may be sent directly to national or
foreign markets in the east or north.
4 "Pothole"
* In this future the connection to Buenos Aires -as the major
Argentinean market- has increased importance.
* The provincial network has also primary relevance, as the economic
success/survival of the rural areas and smaller cities in the province
may depend on their connection to the City of Mendoza.
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For all of the four scenarios, increased global environmental concerns are likely
to put some pressure for the use of cleaner technologies and modes. It is left to
further study if this factor could favor the use of rail over truck.
8.7.1 TESTING THE STRATEGIC CHOICES
An especially valuable contribution of the scenario methodology is that allows us
to "test" the strategic choices against the different futures envisioned. Figure
8.20 depicts this process in a general context:
Strategies:
(decision choices)
Alternative 1
Alternative 2
Alternative 3
Alternative 4
Scenarios
Scenarios:
1 2 3
Figure 8.20
as a Test Bed for Strategies
In Table 8.13, the author makes a specific assessment on the strategic options
for the Mendozan case.
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* Perceived impact of good performance in
Mendoza's socioeconomic development
according to the author
1= Very low
2= Low
3 = Fair
Scale:
4 = High
5 = Very
High
Multiplying the respective figures of Total Performance and the Perceived Impact
results in the last column of Table 8.13. This last column suggests a ranking of
the strategic options based on their soundness across scenarios and their
perceived impact on Mendoza's socioeconomic development:
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Table 8.13
Testing the Mendozan Transportation Strategies:
Perceived Impact and Performance by 2020
Strategies: Perceived Performance of the Sttrategy _
(decision Impact* 1 2 3 4 Total
choices) (1) Extended Global Mercosur Pothole Perf. IxTP
Road Flight Trail (TP)
Upgrade the 5 3 5 21 1 11 55
international link
Link to the 5 5 5 5 5 20 100
international
& national
transport systems
Improve the 5 5 5 5 5 20 100
provincial highway
network
Provide freight 4 4 5 5 3 17 68
terminals
Upgrade the 4 4 5 4 2 15 60
BAMSJ rail line
Define and 3 5 5 4 2 16 48
implement land
use policies
Improve the 2 3 3 2 2 10 20
conditions of the
urban system
An important additional effort to be made during this stage aims to improve the
robustness of each of the strategies available. The objective is to be able to
create an option that performs adequately across all scenarios. In the case of
Mendoza, some of the transportation strategies involve lumpy infrastructure
investments -not a rare event in regional strategic transportation planning.
Inherent in the nature of these investments, there is a loss of flexibility in
decision-making -e.g., it is impossible to stage the construction of a tunnel to
match increasing levels of demand.
Nevertheless, additional ways to provide flexibility should be pursued. In our
case, the order in which the investments are made and the interdependence of
their effects can provide this flexibility. Some of the transportation strategies
that according to Table 8.13 perform consistently in all scenarios can be
characterized as a prerequisite for the appropriate performance of others. This is
the case of an upgraded international link between Chile and Argentina: in order
for Mendoza to take full advantage of it, proper connections between the
provincial highway system and the international/national transport system
(Bioceanic Corridor) would be required anyway. As a matter of fact, undertaking
the first three strategies in our rank provides a flexible approach in deploying the
252
Table 8.14
Ranking of Mendoza's Transportation Strategies
1. Improve the provincial highway network
2. Link this network to the international/national transport system
3. Deploy effective freight terminals
4. Upgrade the Buenos Aires - Mendoza - San Juan railroad line
5. Upgrade the international link
6. Define and implement land use regulations
7. Improve the conditions of the urban system
infrastructure needs of the region. Despite the above, it should be
acknowledged that pursuing some of these strategies first than others may have
certain influence on future decisions. The choice between developing the
highway or the railroad infrastructure in Mendoza is related to the type of tunnel
(highway vs. rail) that could be built in the future
8.8 STEP 8: CHOOSE INDICATORS FOR EACH SCENARIO
The eight and last step in the process is to identify a set of signals that will
provide a sound indication that different scenarios are unfolding in the course of
the future. It is clear that any organization can take great advantage of
identifying the start of the development of a certain scenario.
The indicators that Mendoza should be looking at are related to the driving
forces previously identified. Among others the province could follow closely the
events and trends affecting:
* The development and performance of Mercosur
* The behavior of the economic globalization and free trade trends,
focusing on Mercosur efforts to reach out to other economic blocks.
* The issue of the financial markets and their role in possible future
economic crises
* The development of the world food trade
* The operation of the Panama Canal
8.9 SUMMARY
In this chapter we applied Dr. Peter Schwartz's step-by-step methodology to
build a set of scenarios for the transportation system in Mendoza. Several
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issues relevant for the strategic planning of the Mendozan transport system were
identified. Two of these issues were studied more closely: the behavior of the
world agricultural market and the operation of the Panama Canal. We
developed an influence diagram depicting the structure underlying the
Mendozan scenarios as a way to search for the forces driving the future. Based
on these forces, four scenarios were built. The implications of these scenarios
were identified and used to test the strategic options previously identified for the
Mendozan transport system. The testing exercise provided the basis to rank
these transportation strategies according to their soundness across scenarios
and their perceived impact on Mendoza's socioeconomic development.
It should be noticed here that the scenario exercise here undertaken has some
limitations when compared to the applications of the methodology in a real
organizational context:
* The scenarios should be the product of a team. Despite the valuable support
from the MIT ReS/SITE research team, in the Mendozan case the scenarios
can be considered the work of a single person.
* Scenarios should be built by people with a good understanding of the
environment in which they are being developed. Unfortunately, the scenarios
could not receive the feedback from our Argentinean colleagues previously
working in the CIT/MIT project. Their closer involvement and richer
perception of the Mendozan context would have certainly refined and
improved the outcome of this work.
* Even in the intuitive logics methodology for building scenarios, quantitative
data and models are used as a tool to better understand the relationships
behind the scenarios. Larger amounts of disaggregate data on the economic,
social and political situation of Mendoza, Argentina and Mercosur are
required. It is necessary to detail the relationships between the elements
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playing a role in the unfolding of the future. A quantitative analysis of the
events and trends involved in the scenarios should be undertaken.
The next chapter finishes this work and presents a summary of the thesis along
with its conclusions and suggestions for further research.
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9. CONCLUSIONS
9.1 SUMMARY OF THE THESIS
The present thesis has discussed a broad range of issues that are relevant to
modern transportation planning. The following points summarize some of the
main ideas presented.
9.1.1 THE STRATEGIC PLANNING CONTEXT
* After studying Prof. Henry Mintzberg, we recognized that the outcome of
strategic planning should be an integrated system of strategies, i.e., a clear
statement of the hierarchy, relations and interdependence among the
strategies leading an organization's activities. Prof. Michael Porter reminded
us that pursuing a strategy implies a high-order decision, a choice between
alternatives.
* Uncertainty about the future is a key variable in any strategic planning
activity. Prof. Mintzberg's different forms of strategies highlighted that in the
strategy context the response to a change in the environment takes the form
of the generation of emergent strategies. The ability to generate emergent
strategies is then a reflection of the flexibility built into organizations. And
emergent strategies are the result of strategic thinking performed within the
organizations. As a result, in today's dynamic environment, the planning
process -not the plans- is the appropriate source of an organization's
flexibility, which is understood as the ability to deal with uncertainty and react
promptly to change. Because the foundation of the planning process is the
people that participate on it, this provision of flexibility occurs through the
human resources of the organization. The resulting argument is that the
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efforts oriented to improve the strategic planning process should include the
development of its human resources.
* We reviewed Van der Heijden's characterization of the different structures of
strategic planning that have been proposed, and found that each one is
useful in different ways. Prof. James Quinn's Logical Incrementalism is
considered in this work as an extremely useful tool to understand strategic
planning in real-world complex environments.
9.1.2 THE REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION CONTEXT
* Transportation is not an end to itself, but rather a tool to achieve higher-order
objectives. Transportation systems are closely woven into the economic,
political and social patterns of the area they serve. This relationship is
complex, dynamic and works in both directions: transportation influences the
social and economic systems, but is also affected by them.
* We have found evidence that the regional scale is an appropriate size to
study and address the complex relationship between socioeconomic patterns
and transportation.
* We saw how transportation investments have the potential to become a
major player in the development of economic activities at a regional, national
and international scale. After introducing Prof. Porter's theory on
Competitive Strategy, it was suggested that these ideas can be used as a
tool to lead strategic planning for regional transportation, and its concept of
strategic fit as a valuable framework for regional development efforts.
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9.1.3 THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP CONTEXT
* The creation of public/private partnerships as an innovative approach for
transportation infrastructure and planning was examined. While reviewing
the history of public and private participation in providing infrastructure, it
was pointed out that "public sector" and "private sector" are not synonyms of
"bad" and "good". We acknowledged that a right balance must be found.
The dynamism of the private sector requires a capable and strong public
sector perhaps more than ever. The World Bank highlighted as the critical
issue the need to refocus governmental activities into a set of core functions
-with investment in infrastructure one of them. When talking about
public/private partnerships in transportation, a comment was made on the
difficulty to integrate the parties that make use of the system: shippers,
carriers and individual users. The benefits and complexity of a partnership
for transportation planning were discussed and the Intelligent Transportation
Systems (ITS) technology was presented as an example of joint
public/private participation.
9.1.4 THE SCENARIO METHODOLOGY
* Scenarios can be characterized as a story describing in a structured way in
which the future could develop from the present. The use of scenarios to
generate robust strategies and as a tool for organizational learning was
emphasized. It was shown how scenarios integrate and address several of
the major concerns identified when studying strategic planning, regional
transportation, and public/private partnerships. We reviewed the most
common problems that arise when using the scenario methodology and
described to some detail three examples of major scenario exercises. We
used the work of Kees Van der Heijden and other authors to study the
underlying theory and methodology of scenario planning.
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9.1.5 THE APPLICATION OF THE SCENARIO METHODOLOGY
* The scenario methodology was used for regional strategic transportation
planning for the province of Mendoza, Argentina. The main characteristics of
the province and the most relevant issues affecting the region and its
transportation system were introduced. Then, we followed Peter Schwartz's
framework to build a set of scenarios for the province of Mendoza.
9.2 FINDINGS
9.2.1 SCENARIOS AND REGIONAL STRATEGIC TRANSPORTATION PLANNING
As mentioned in earlier chapters of this work, the scenario methodology is an
approach that is responsive to the needs and characteristics of modern regional
strategic transportation planning. This work argues that scenario-planning
address several of the fundamental shortcomings of most transportation plans
listed in section 1.1:
Additionally, we have found that scenario-planning is a tool for robust decision-
making that works in two tracks:
* Allowing us to "test" decisions against different environments before they
are actually taken
* broadening decision-makers' perspective, which results in improved
determinations and ability to react quickly when the environment changes
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Therefore, instead of relying on the "point estimates" produced by forecasts,
scenarios allow decision-makers to deal directly with the different levels of
uncertainty of the key variables, and consider this uncertainties in the decision-
making. Scenarios are a source of strategic thinking in the transportation
planning process: they can initiate regional strategic transportation
planning by analyzing the environment and generating robust strategies to
be followed by a region.
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Table 9.1
Scenarios and the Identified Shortcomings in Transportation Planning
Identified Shortcomings Scenarios...
Lack of integration of: Allow us to effectively integrate a wide range of issues
* The inherent complexity of the and topics that are relevant to transportation: societal,
transportation context. economical, political, technological and environmental.
* The relevance of economic
development /competitive
advantage considerations.
* The rapid pace of technological
changes affecting
transportation.
* The need for a new Have been used to achieve consensus in the midst of a
public/private relationship. politicized and adversarial environment. This suggests
that scenarios can provide common ground for a
public/private joint approach to planning and policy
formation for regional transportation.
* Lack of human resources Support human resource development as it broadens
considerations participants' perspectives and force decision-makers' to
test their mental models against reality.
* Lack of an intermodal approach Can be tailored to the specific contexts of different regions
* Overemphasis of passengers and transportation systems.
needs as compared to freight
movements.
* Need to link transportation to Start with the identification of focal issues or decisions,
the broad regional strategic thus allowing us to link transportation with higher-order
issues. regional strategies from the beginning of the process.
9.2.2 MENDOZA
The study of the Mendozan context, its transportation system and the application
of Schwartz' scenario-framework highlighted several important issues:
* The existence of clear conflict between some of the strategies pursued
by Mendoza indicates the lack of a systems approach to overall
provincial objectives. As implied by our discussion on strategic
planning, it is essential that this problem be addressed first. The
conflicts between Energy/Water vs. Transportation, Energy/Water vs.
Agriculture, and Industrialization vs. Agriculture imply important
tradeoffs that Mendoza should resolve based on its higher order
objectives. And its is in the main interest of the province that this be
done before committing to long-term loans with international banks in
order to finance a major infrastructure/facility.
* The importance that transportation will play in the socioeconomic
development of Mendoza is closely linked to the rise and future
performance of Mercosur. The scenarios actually suggest that -with
the exception of increasing Argentinean food exports- the way in
which the transportation system should be developed could depend on
Mercosur more than on any other variable.
* The international market of agricultural and cattle products -a driver of
the Argentinean food exports- has been identified as a major issue in
Mendoza's strategic options.
* The results of the scenario exercise indicate that the Province should
not focus first on large investments to upgrade the border pass with
Chile, but rather aim to:
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- Improve the provincial highway network
- Link this network to the international/national transportation system
- Deploy effective freight terminals
It is important to remark that despite the limitations of the scenario
effort undertaken (recognized in the following section), these results
are congruent with the findings of Yang 311 (1996). Her analysis of the
provincial highway network and specifically the Mendoza - Buenos
Aires highway concluded that:
"The approximate magnitude of investment requirements for this
highway is much lower than the investment requirements for the
low altitude tunnel or the Rio de la Plata Crossing, but this major
highway link has as much strategic importance to Mendoza as
those large-scale projects. "
The same author found that the costs of improving the Mendoza -
Buenos Aires highway earlier than the optimal time (as defined by the
number of users), are significantly lower than the cost of doing it after
and suffering congestion in the link.
9.3 REGIONAL ARCHITECTURES: THE LINK TO THE
INSTITUTIONAL AND IMPLEMENTATION ASPECTS OF
TRANSPORTATION
As mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, this work was done within the
framework of the ReS/SITE research project: Regional Strategies for the
Sustainable Intermodal Transportation Enterprise. Scenarios are only one of the
two broad concepts used by ReS/SITE. The second concept is the one of a
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311 Ibid. 170, pp158
Regional Architecture; its origins can be found in the "architectures" of computer
systems.
In a parallel work to this thesis, Todd Pendleton defines Regional Architecture
as:
"A framework that describes how various transportation institutions will
interact in order to provide an integrated series of transportation services in
a metropolitan-based region. 'B12
While in Pendleton's definition a Regional Architecture focuses on a
"metropolitan-based region", the transportation services and institutional
interactions coordinated by this tool can be also identified in a broader scope
like the Bioceanic Corridor. Section 7.3.2 pointed out that the deployment of this
international link would imply:
"Supporting of the institutional structures required to manage, operate and
maintain the Corridor in an efficient manner."
While the scenarios would generate the strategic options and give direction for
the strategic transportation planning effort, a Regional Architecture would
coordinate the different local, national and international institutions (public
agencies and private companies) to allow for the provision of transportation
services in the Bioceanic Corridor.
312 Pendleton, Todd. Regional Architectures: Definition and Integration into the Strategic
Planning Process with Application to the Greater Portland (ME) Region. Master of Science in
Transportation Thesis, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 1998
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9.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
9.4.1 ON THE SCENARIO METHODOLOGY
One major area in which further research is needed deals with the use of
scenario planning in the context of a public/private partnership for regional
transportation. How can scenarios be actually used by a group of public and
private stakeholders to do strategic transportation planning in a specific region?
How should the scenario planning exercise be structured? How to balance the
claim for strong private sector influence and the concern for broad public gains?
9.4.2 ON THE MENDOZAN CASE
The application of Schwartz's steps to Mendoza was made based in the
perceptions of the author and with continuous advice from the ReS/SITE
project team and other researchers at MIT. Despite such valuable
contributions, and in order to become more useful for the province, the
scenarios should be reviewed based on the limitations of the exercise
identified in section 8.9.
9.5 A FINAL WORD
This thesis has studied the usefulness of scenario planning in the context of
regional transportation. The scenario methodology has been presented and an
application to a specific case has been made.
The author hopes that this work helps to advance the generation of a new
regional strategic transportation planning and supports the development of the
transportation system in Mendoza, Argentina.
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APPENDIX A
MINTZBERG'S FUNDAMENTAL FALLACIES OF STRATEGIC
PLANNING
Section 2.3.1 reviewed some of the critiques that have been made regarding
current strategic planning practices. Mintzberg (1994) bases his critique in what
he has called the "fundamental fallacies" inherent to the planning process:
* The Fallacy of Predetermination
An intrinsic characteristic of any strategic planning effort is that requires the
assumption of future conditions of the organizational environment. The
efficacy of planning therefore depends heavily on the accuracy of such
predictions, and as mentioned earlier in this work, the accuracy of our long-
term forecasting tools is eminently unsatisfactory. Therefore, Mintzberg
asserts that the usefulness of strategic planning itself -that deals mostly in
the long term range- is severely hindered.
Overall, the dependence of accurate forecasts is a real limitation, which is
not possible to solve completely. And yet, discarding planning due to the
presence of such a constraint is not an option. In short, it would go against
the very human need for anticipation and foresight. Additionally, as it has
been seen in previous chapters of this thesis, we know that at least some
part of the future can be predicted with enough accuracy as to be useful.
* The Fallacy of Detachment
Strategic thinkers are needed because of their ability to look at the big
picture and consider all major elements. But as presented in Chapter 2,
strategy generated exclusively by people detached from the actual operation
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can be risky. The strategic thinkers will not be able to perceive valuable
information that is generated during the daily operation:
"Effective strategists are not people that abstract themselves from
the daily detail but quite the opposite: they are the ones who
immerse themselves in it, while being able to abstract the strategic
messages from it."13
* The Fallacy of Formalization
This fallacy refers to the assumption that a creative innovation-driven
process like strategic planning can be performed by a system as efficiently as
is done by individuals. In a simplified approach, this assumption would imply
that structuring a procedure that can be followed by managers as a check-list
would generate the desired strategy. The evidence provided by Mintzberg
conflicts totally with this idea: formal operational system can not substitute for
the intuitive/creative process by which strategy is generated by individuals.
As a corollary, strategic planning processes with strong formalization
emphasis will be inappropriately biased toward strategy implementation. The
source of strategic thinking in an organization will rarely be these planning
systems, but rather will tend to flow from less normative structures.
* The "Grand Fallacy of Planning"
Mintzberg states that the fundamental difficulty with strategic planning
resides in the very nature of planning, which is in essence an analytical
process that breaks down a problem in its parts, while the basic tool for
strategic thinking is precisely the opposite: synthesis. Breaking down the
elements into its pieces has allowed planning to manage large amounts of
information, and study each subsystem in detail Nevertheless, there is final
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and critical need to integrate those pieces back into a comprehensive whole,
a real system of decisions.
"The obvious conclusion is that to be effective any organization
has to couple analysis and intuition in its strategy making as well
as other processes... analysis may not be synthesis, and so
planning may not be strategy formation, but effective strategy
formation, especially in large organizations, does depend
importantly on analysis, both as an input to the process and as a
means of dealing with its outputs."'314
314 Ibid. 2, p329
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APPENDIX B
ADDITIONAL IDEAS OF LOGICAL INCREMENTALISM
Section 2.5 presented some of the main concepts of logical incrementalism as
they were related with our discussion on the strategic planning process in
Chapter 2. Appendix B introduces the a few additional ideas of this theory:
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CORPORATE PLANNING STRUCTURES
The theory of logical incrementalism agrees with Mintzberg in that the corporate
structures devoted to carrying out formal planning processes are seldom a
source of strategy formation. Instead, Quinn315 (1980) identifies several
functions performed by these structures in the strategic planning context:
* To formalize and calibrate strategic decisions already taken.
* To provide a systematic mean for evaluating budgets.
* To support the implementation of already decided strategic changes.
* To provide an information network to managers.
* To force operating managers to periodically review their work in the
long term context.
THE GENERATION OF STRATEGIC GOALS
In another parallelism with Mintzberg, the incremental view does not see
strategic goals arising from analytical actions, as suggested in the formal
planning literature; rather it considers them the result of a process that moves
step by step and evolves continuously.
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The argument for incremental goal setting is strongly related to the use of broad
objectives, which require a refining and reshaping process. According to
Quinn 316 (1980), in a corporate environment, the strategic planning effort faces
tensions and disagreements among different units of the company. The larger
the company, the more numerous and complex the disagreements will be. In
such an environment, the first step, that of generating a set of specific goals can
also become an endlessly continuing and last action in the strategic effort.
When facing the risk of not moving at all in the process, logical incrementalism
offers the option of moving step by step. In such cases, establishing an array of
broad objectives to generate initial consensus, and refining them as the process
continues may actually be the best -sometimes the only- solution.
INCREMENTALISM AND CONTROL
While the incremental theory does not extensively address the issues of control,
Quinn 317 (1980) highlights the importance to focus only on the central aspects of
the strategy. The base of control is established in the beginning of the planning
process, by using this small number of essential issues that will become the
thrusts of the strategy and can be the source for future control measures.
The important thing to keep in mind is that keeping control in incremental
planning it is necessary to maintain a cohesive vision of the process. Quinn
states that controlling incrementalism requires a continuous integration of the
different activities being performed, and to link these activities to the surrounding
environment.
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